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
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THE ROLE OF AIRPOWER IN LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

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ETHNONATIONALISTS OR IDEOLOGUES: THE CASE OF TERRORISM IN THE
ISRAELI/PLO CONFLICT

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"ETHNONATIONALISTS OR IDEOLOGUES:
THE CASE OF TERRORISM IN THE ISRAELI/PLO CONFLICT"

by Omar M. Kader*

INTRODUCTION

Israeli's solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict subsumes the
elimination of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) as a
political, social, and economic entity. In fact, it is Israel's effort
to remove the PLO from the political landscape of the Middle East that
has, in part, left the area politically unstable. The Israelis have
invaded Lebanon, expanded West Bank settlements, carried on clandestine
operations throughout the world, and exerted diplomatic influence to
isolate and eliminate PLO influence. Israel's tactics have been
sophisticated; a worldwide intelligence network, cooperation with other
national intelligence operations, one of the world's finest air forces,
an expertly trained military, and aggressive tactical operations have
all been part of a remarkable campaign to remove the PLO from the
area.

Despite the considerable Israeli efforts and resources committed to eliminating the PLO, and their recognized tactical effectiveness, Israel's objective is still as far from being realized now as it has ever been. The PLO continues to be a critical factor in the Middle East. How is it that Israel's effort to remove the word Palestinian from the lexicon and the PLO from the political arena has failed? Why is it that the Palestinians' will to resist elimination continues against a superior Israeli onslaught? What forces account for these factors?

At the heart of the dilemma is Israel's miscalculation of the will of the Palestinians to advance their cause to nationhood. The heart of Israel's policy is the notion that the PLO is essentially an ideologically motivated international terrorist organization (ITO). However, the PLO, its supporters, and many observers of the Middle East conflict view Palestinian activities as a classic war of national liberation against alien ideology (Zionism) imposed on a Middle Eastern society. The debate over whether a group like the PLO is an ethno-nationalistic group (ENG) or an ITO hinges on a fundamental perception of the nature of their activities. Understanding the distinction between an ITO and an ENG is essential in explaining why Israel's tactics against the PLO have failed. This paper examines Israel's misperception of the PLO and its resulting policy in terms of the differences between ENGs and ITOs. I will first establish the criteria for distinguishing between ENGs and ITOs and then explain how the activities and conditions of the PLO are similar to those associated with ENGs. I will also show how Israel percieves the PLO as an ITO, and I will examine how Israel's misperception of the PLO affects Middle East peace prospects.

In conclusion I will explain how the challenge to Israel and other nations in similar circumstances lies not only in combatting terrorism, but in recognizing that nationalistic movements cannot be suppressed out of existence.

IDEOLOGUES AND ETHNO-NATIONALISTS

Research on terrorism has produced more ambiguity than specific information on which policy might be based.[1] Ambiguity results because there are no absolute categories of perpetrators and victims: nations employ terrorism against the other nations and against their own citizens; groups employ it against other groups and against their own nationals. Any definition of a terrorist must be broad enough to include both strictly ideological revoluntionaries _and_ nationalistic freedom-fighters, but narrow enough to exclude publicity-seeking radicals who have only self-interest at heart.

Continued observation of terrorism and research of literature on the subject indicate that terrorist groups fall into two broad categories: 1) ethno-nationalistic and 2) ideologically motivated international terroristic organizations.[2]

An ethno-nationalist group can be defined as an "ethnic, religious linguistic group--with clear, limited objectives, such as unification of Ireland, Palestinian homeland, independence for Namiba (South-West Africa) or Puerto Rico; breakup of multi-ethnic Indonesia, Yugoslavia, Canada; autonomy of Kurds, Azerbaijanis, Basques. Supporters and sympathizers often number many thousands. Some groups gain wide international backing. They may use other means (conventional war, diplomacy) besides terrorism and may eventually come to power."[3]

The international terrorist organization can be defined as "small, violent ideological groups (e.g., Japanese Red Army, Italy's Red Brigades) with little or no clear program, whose aim is mainly to destroy or destablize existing institutions and whose sole weapon is terrorism. They may be far left or far right, self-styled Marxist-Leninists, Maoists, Fascists, anarchists, or even religious zealots. Some observers expect increased use of both groups by governments in 'surrogate' (proxy) warfare against foreign adversaries."[4]

These distinctions in terrorist activity are necessary because they contribute to the generation of more relevant conceptual frameworks that address social conflict in general and contribute to more effective policy making decisions. The differences of these two groups can be further clarified by examining seven attributes of ITOs and FNGs.

Objective: The objectives of ITOs and FNGs differ fundamentally in that FNGs seek territorial acquisition as the primary purpose of their cause. They are irredentist by nature. The ITOs, on the other hand, seek ideological change in government rather than territorial gain. Their objective is to supplant the existing government with their own version of a just political system.

Leadership: FNG leadership is public, often enjoying diplomatic status. ITO leadership is clandestine, often unknown to its own group and to the public.

Organization: FNG organization is complex and stratified, taking on a number of functions only one of which is military in nature. ITO structure is simple and focuses primarily on military activity.

Membership: FNG membership is made up of a broad-based, open segment of a disenfranchised group held together by religious, ethnic, or linguistic similarities. ITO membership is clandestine, limited to those willing to embrace the group's particular ideological creed.

Support: FNG backing comes internally through taxes and contributions from the group's membership, and externally through financial aid and political and diplomatic recognition from standing governments, their citizens, and legitimate international organizations. ITO financial support is primarily a function of the military tactics of bank robbery and kidnapping for ransom. Political support comes from a band of dedicated ideologues; legitimate recognition is practically nil.

Size: FNGs are large and diversified in bureaucratic functions, and can include departments responsible for information, politics, education, health and finance among others. ITOs are narrow and concentrate primarily on revolutionary political change and unconventional military tactics.

Tactics: FNGs use a variety of methods to publicize and further their cause; specifically, they can use secret terrorist attacks, conventional military operations, and legitimate diplomatic exchange. At times all three are pursued simultaneously. ITOs, on the other hand, eschew conventional warfare and diplomatic exchanges mainly because their size does not permit these means. Terroristic operations demonstrate the ITOs' contempt for existing political systems while publicizing their cause. ITOs focus heavily on armed robbery and kidnapping for ransom.

So while FNGs and ITOs differ considerably in goals and structure, they may not always differ in their methods. Either may apply pressure in the form of violence to terrorize a population into submitting, making concessions, or altering specific policies.

All of these characteristics follow the pattern of past FNGs. And like past FNGs, the PLO uses both conventional and unconventional tactics. The Israeli response to the PLO as an ITO and its description of PLO activities as an ideologically motivated ITO are simplistic: they leave much to be explained.

The diplomatic status of the PLO at the U.N. and among major Western nations complicates Israel's perception of the PLO. On the other hand, the fact that PLO activities have at times followed the activity pattern of an ITO lends some credibility to the Israeli perception. Indeed, in this one area the FNGs and ITOs behave in a similar fashion. Both publicly acknowledge their activities and often take credit for terrorist activity. But ITOs and FNGs also differ in the scope of their activities. FNGs conduct activities in several spheres beyond their military mission. The organizational structure of FNGs includes social, military, political, economic and diplomatic operations. For example, before the June 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the PLO operated schools, hospitals, food-production factories, shelters and transportation systems independent of the Lebanese government. The PLO has maintained a readily accessible organization and a broad base of support in Palestinian communities.

In some sections of Lebanon, the PLO controlled areas of territory as do the rural guerrillas described by Walter Laqueur, who uses the terms "rural guerrillas." Laqueur suggests that these terms describe the

the groups activity, but the more important the strategies groups

employ, clarify some very important differences between FNGs and ITOs. In

his description, the terms "rural" and "urban" are critical. (I use FNGs

to correspond with Laqueur's "rural querrillas" and ITOs to correspond

with "urban querrillas" or "terrorist.") Laqueur clearly defines the

difference.

> There are basic differences between the strategies of rural
> querilla warfare and urban terrorism: mobility and taking cover are
> the essence of querrilla warfare, and this is impossible in towns.
> It is not true that the slums (or the rich quarters) of the cities
> provide equally good sanctuaries. Rural querrillas frequently
> operate in fairly large units and gradually transform themselves into
> companies, battalions, regiments and even divisions. They carry out
> political and social reforms in "liberated zones," openly
> propagandize, and build up their organizational network. In towns,
> where this cannot be done, urban terrorists mostly operate in units
> of three, four or five: the whole terrorist 'movement' consists of a
> few exceptions of urban querrilla groups counting more than a
> thousand. Their small number is the source of their operational
> strength and their political weakness. For while it is difficult to
> detect small groups and while they can cause a great deal of damage,
> their political effect is limited. Only a few years ago, newspaper
> readers in the Western world were led to believe that the German
> Baader-Meinhof group, the Japanese United Red Army, the Symbionese
> Liberation Army or the british "Angry Brigade" were substantial
> movements that ought to be taken very seriously. Their
> "communiques" were published in the mass media; there were earnest
> sociological and psychological studies on the background of their
> members and their motivation; their "ideology" was analyzed in
> tedious detail. But these were groups between five and fifty
> members, and their only victories were in the area of publicity.
> Even the more substantial groups, such as the Tupamaros and the
> Brazilian ALN, the Black Panthers and the Weatherman were very small
> indeed and had no significant public support--hence their sudden
> collapse and disappearance. Elsewhere, terrorists had been more
> successful, either because their nationist-separatist appeal
> guaranteed them wider popular support, or because they received
> massive assistance from a foreign power (or powers) or, last, because
> in very few cases the government of the country was in an advanced
> state of decay, no longer capable of mobilizing the vastly superior
> resources of the state against the terrorist.[5]

Laqueur points out that the difference between the two groups is real in both their activities and their impact. FNGs can and often do control "liberated zones" and govern those zones as sovereigns over a terroritv. In addition, an overriding distinguishing characteristic between ITOs and FNGs is their longevity. ITOs do not survive much beyond their burst into public recognition. On the other hand, FNGs exist for years, often beyond the first generation of leaders, in pursuit of their liberation movement.

Given the distinct differences described above between FNGs and ITOs and the nature of PLO activity, it is clear that the PLO is indeed an FNG. However, Israel does not recognize or treat the PLO as an FNG. Rather, Israel's policy is based on the assumption that the PLO is an ITO. The following section examines the Israeli perspective.

ISRAEL'S PERCEPTION OF THE PLO

Israel contends that the PLO is not an organization with which to negotiate differences or seek areas of common interests. This is due partly to Israel's policy under Menachem Begin, who has emphasized the ITO designation of the PLO. Begin has made very clear the distinctions he perceives between the ethno-nationalists and international terrorists. In his analysis of the two groups, Begin draws from history to explain the types of groups the PLO resembles. He depicts the PLO as identical to the turn-of-the-century anarchists, who were ideologically, not nationalistically, motivated. They did not seek to liberate territory, but were bent on changing the form of government from a monarchy to a socialistic utopia. Begin explains:

> During the 19th Century there was a phenomenon of anarchy throughout Europe. Ultimately it was smashed and disappeared. And that anarchy indeed launched a famous or infamous slogan, "there are no innocents," repeated now by the terrorists of our time.[6]

For Begin, the activities of international terrorism and the activities of
the PLO are identical. He also envisions the battle against ITOs as a
cooperative effort of all like-minded nations to destroy terrorism.

> But beware. Don't give, my dear friends from Europe, or your
> governments, comfort and support to this terroristic, inhuman,
> barbaric organization called the PLO.[7]

> You cannot expect to overcome your own terrorism if you permit
> offices of the PLO in your capitals, if you accept them into the
> United Nations, if you give their representatives the right to
> sit around the table of the Security Council.[8]

Begin further clarifies the difference between FNGs and ITOs or, as
he describes the distinction, freedom fighters and terrorists. His act of
bombing the King David Hotel was an act of a freedom fighter, he claims.
The significant difference was "warning":

> We issued a warning, we gave enough time to evacuate the hotel so
> that no one would have been hurt. We gave warning for half an hour
> because this is the difference between a fighter for freedom and a
> terrorist. A terrorist kills civilians. A fighter for freedom
> saves lives and fights on at the risk of his own life until liberty
> wins the day.[9]

While simplistic, this view carries the weight of an official policy of
the state of Israel.

On July 26, 1982, the Israeli embassy in Washington, D.C., issued an
explicit policy statement on the PLO, entitled "The Threat Inherent in the
PLO's Continuance as a Political Entity." The following points were
included in the statement.

1. So long as the PLO, with its leadership, its central
   organizational structure and even a skeleton staff exists, it
   will try--by dint of its very raison d'etre--to bring about the
   dismantlement of Israel.

2. The PLO threat, therefore, is political no less than military.

3. The PLO debacle in Lebanon presents all who have suffered from the
    PLO menace and from international terror with unparalleled
    opportunity to root out this force for destruction. The
    opportunity and responsibility are not Israel's alone. All nations
    who have been victims of the PLO terrorist activities have an
    abiding interest in seeing this scourge removed.

4. An attempt to bring a peaceful denouement of the crisis by
    yielding to PLO demands for some form of continued political (and
    perhaps military) status are misguided and shortsighted. They
    would not rehabilitate this nihilist, chaos-breeding organization
    with disastrous consequences for Lebanon, Israel and the world.

5. Determined action to prevent the PLO from resuming its role will
    promote stability and peace in the Middle East. It could well
    remove major obstacles to the Mideast peace process by eliminating
    the PLO's intimidating anti-Camp David influence. With the PLO
    out of the way, the road to negotiation and peace between Israel
    and its neighbors to the north and east could finally open. [10]

This policy statement leaves little speculation about Israel's intentions

regarding relations with the PLO. Characterizing the PLO as an ITO allows

Israel to make several assumptions:

1) The PLO as an ITO can be successfully controlled, combatted and

    eliminated.

2) The PLO is recognized as an ITO by other nations, and those

    nations should be willing to join Israel in committing resources

    to aid in its elimination. To refuse to join in that effort is

    to capitulate to terrorism.

3) PLO objectives are not the objectives of an FNG organization, and

    Israeli policy should combat the PLO at every opportunity through

    military, political, economic and diplomatic means.

The dilemmas of combatting terrorism, rebellions, and hostile neighboring countries are not new to Israel. The lines in the Arab-Israeli conflict have been drawn for the duration of the conflict. Moreover, Israel's inability to eliminate security problems signals its failure to perceive the threat in its proper dimensions.

The above clarification does not solve the dilemma of the PLO-Israel conflict. Rather, it aids in determining likely outcomes when specific policies are pursued by a nation engaged in combatting terrorism. Accurately assessing the nature of the terroristic activity is as critical to decision makers as devising a policy to combat it.

Governments tend to deal with all serious opposition in generally the same manner--through the use of force. Little attention is paid to the types of groups committing terrorism, the methods used, purposes of the groups, size of the groups, or the grievances exploited to promote their causes. However, in order to be effective, government policy aimed at combatting terrorism should consider the nature of the threat.

Terrorism committed by an FNG is a small part of a larger arsenal of tactics, while terrorism committed by an ITO is the sum of its strategy. That is why a show of force against the smaller, ideologically motivated ITO is often effective in capturing and even eliminating the group. This same show of force against an FNG has a different result. The capture of individuals who are members of an FNG only means that one operations ends and a new one begins. FNGs can afford to lose members to the government because more soldiers are willing to join the struggle for liberation.

These distinctions pose problems for states like Israel. The PLO views its role against Israel as similar to that of the Algerians against the French and the Vietcong against the French and the United States.

Persistence is the PLO creed. The PLO has broad appeal and support, not only from Palestinians and other Arab nations, but from the Third World in general. A policy of elimination through force is not likely to succeed.

A further policy problem Israel faces is its unconditional rejection of the PLO as a representative of the Palestinians. Some observers believe that an Israeli condition for dealing with the PLO could be the PLO's recognition of Israel's right to exist in the Middle East. Israeli policy is explicit in its position that no conditions exist which warrant recognition of the PLO by Israel. This being the case, no incentives exist for the PLO to moderate its policy toward Israel. This poses problems for Israel. How can Israel best meet the challenge of the PLO? What are the prospects that it will succeed in its efforts to eliminate the PLO from the political scene of the Middle East? Can Israel successfully meet the challenge of a persistent PNG over a prolonged time where other nations in a similar position have failed.

POLICY DILEMMAS FOR ISRAEL

Given the experience and research of the 1960s and 1970s, the policy dilemmas facing governments with problems of terrorism are somewhat clearer. As explained, terrorist groups whose profile is best described by that of the TTOs are the most vulnerable to elimination through well coordinated intelligence and force. These groups, while capable of producing bursts of chaos that draw public attention, are not capable of sustaining their effort under extreme pressure, because of their narrow support systems.

Combatting terrorism of PNG origins can best be achieved through other means--political, diplomatic, and military. These groups seek a political end to their grievances; their goal is not merely to create

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conditions that disrupt. They continue their use of terror and violence
until they are confident progress can be made on other fronts. To combat
the terrorism phase, a government must be willing to do one of two things:
negotiate a degree of autonomy, or suppress the movement completely. The
Vietnam experience, pre-Israel Palestine, Algeria, and the scores of new
African nations attest vividly to the dangers of the latter policy.

While it would be folly to advocate a policy of nationhood to every
group with a broad constituency that claimed to be an ENG, it would be
equally unwise to ignore past experience when dealing with existing ENGs.
The political, strategic, military, and economic interests of all
governments are deeply intertwined with maintaining stability in a
terror-free international environment. Diplomacy, negotiation, and
compensation are all more likely to produce results with less violence
than the use of force. To ignore the scope and intensity of ENGs is to
misdirect the resources and political power a nation must expend.

Reprisals, or a conventional military response against ENGs may be
the most unwise policy. These groups have broad support among the
occupied or exiled population. Accordingly, the targets for government
reprisals must be that population. The Algerian rebels were able to force
the French to punish the native population in an attempt to crack down on
FLN activities.[11] The PLO has forced Israel to do the same in Jordan and
Lebanon. The thirty-five years of Israeli government reprisals have not
deterred Palestinians from continuing efforts to acquire statehood. When
the support population of the ENG is punished in reprisals against
terrorism, support is more likely to increase than decrease.

Israel however, has chosen the course of reprisals. Israel's invasion of
Lebanon in July of 1982 was a calculated risk to eliminate the PLO in the
hope that Israel could create conditions more favorable to its
longstanding policy of no dealings with the PLO. But this failed. Israel
now faces a PLO that has survived a major attempt to eliminate it.

There are some lessons to be drawn from the Israeli-PLO conflict.
First, as stated above, neither is likely to abandon its goals or
purposes, and both appear to be secure in their respective positions. The
PLO, having sustained itself--albeit bruised but not broken--through
encounters with Israel, has emerged a victim of the Israeli policy with
some increased degree of world sympathy. Second, the Western world for
the first time actually views the Palestinians as homeless victims, and
this places them at the forefront of the peace process. The PLO occupies
the central role as representative of the Palestinians.

Israel's position is further weakened by the policy of the U.S. in
relation to the PLO. The U.S. official policy on the PLO is based on the
"Memorandum of Agreement," which states,

> The United States will continue to adhere to its present policy
> with respect to the Palestinian Liberation Organization, whereby it
> will not recognize or negotiate with the Palestine Liberation
> Organization so long as the Palestine Liberation Organization does
> not recognize Israel's right to exist and does not accept Security
> Council Resolutions 242 and 338.[12]

This policy is incompatible with Israel's refusal to recognize or deal
with the PLO under any condition. PLO recognition of Israel's right to
exist is not sufficient for Israel. Should the PLO move from implicit
statements of recognition of Israel to explicit recognition, Israel will

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find itself facing a world less sympathetic than before in a struggle with
an organization the world views as an FNG, but one Israel views as an
TTO.

CONCLUSION

While political terrorism is a highly visible activity, its physical
damage is not as great as its psychological impact. Because terrorism is
so highly destructive in nature, creates chaos, challenges orderly
systems, and promotes fear, it has to be taken seriously. The dilemmas
posed are bewildering; while political terrorism on its own cannot destroy
a government, it contributes to that end. Few would argue that terrorism
for political purposes is too dangerous to be left unchecked; fewer would
view political terrorism as the most serious problem facing humankind in
the 1980s.

The distinctions made in this paper between TTOs and FNGs clearly
indicate that successful methods against one group of political terrorists
are not successful against another. FNGs that have succeeded in becoming
independent nations in the last 30 years are numerous.[14] Ideological groups
that have moved from a terrorist beginning to achieving statehood or even
changing the direction of government are extremely rare.

The goal of the FNG is simple--nationhood. The IRA, Basques,
Palestinians, Kurds, Puerto Ricans--all point to the eventual creation of
independent states. The alternatives, while possible, are costly. It is
possible to continue to suppress national liberation movements, but the
costs could very well be prolonged conflict and a resource attrition that
erodes a state into civil war. Any state that fails to maintain unity and
stability is bound to face relentless pressure from irregular forces.

The dilemma to nations dealing with separatist or national liberation movements that represent large numbers is irresolvable. The control of a minority requires either constant repression, or reform, or both; indifference will not work.

Few outside the Arab world questioned the need for the Israeli state as a haven for the world's Jews following the Nazi Holocaust. Few would, in retrospect, question the outcome for the PLN in Algeria in its struggle against the French. Today the same logic applies to the PLO and other irredentist movements. The ability of governments to suppress the demands of NMs is limited to the resources available to the movements. As long as some nations in the international system are willing to support national liberation movements and separatist movements against other nations, threats to regional and global stability are likely to continue. Some may regret the birth of the PLO and other NMGs, and may begrudge their continued existence, but the facts of their existence are irrefutable. The mere wish to eradicate NMGs in the world will not have a significant impact on their drive to nationhood.

Until the PLO and other NMGs achieve a degree of success in realizing their goals, the world can expect them to continue pursuing many methods in order to become independent states.

[1] See J. Bowyer Bell, "Trends on Terror: The Analysis of Political Violence," World Politics, 29 (April 1977):476-88.

[2] Several recent publications allude to these distinctions in passing. See David Ronfeldt and William Sater, "The Mindsets of High-Technology Terrorists: Future Implications from an Historial Analog," in Political Terrorism and Energy: The Threat and Response, ed. Yonah Alexander and Charles K. Ebinger (New York: Praeger, 1982), 19. Also in the same book see Alexander's article "International Network of Terrorism," 40.

[3] American Foreign Policy For the 80's: A Voter's Guide to the Facts and Issues. Published by the editors of the Foreign Policy Association, (New York, 1980), 20.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Walter Laqueur, Terrorism (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1977), 217-218.

[6] Menachem Begin, "Freedom Fighters and Terrorists," in International Terrorism: Challenge and Response, ed. Benjamin Netanyahu (Jerusalem: Transaction Books, 1981), 43-44.

[7] Ibid., p. 44.

[8] Ibid., p. 43.

[9] Ibid., p. 45.

[10] Embassy of Israel, "The Threat Inherent in the PLO's Continuance as a Political Body," in Policy Background, July 1982.

[11] See David Fromkin, "The Strategy of Terrorism," Foreign Affairs, 53 (July 1975):689-90.

[12] Seth P. Tillman, The United States and the Middle East: Interests and Obstacles (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1982), 223.

[13] See Raymond Aron, War and Peace: A Theory of International Relations (New York: Praeger Publishing, 1968), 170.

[14] See Brian Crozier, The Rebels (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960), 180-91.

SECURITY FORESIGHT: A RATIONAL DEFENSE AGAINST TERRORISM

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BIOGRAPHY

Lt Col Felix F. Moran is currently the Chief, Terrorist Defense Division, Office of the Chief of Security Police, Headquarters Military Airlift Command. His previous assignment was as the Commander, 1608 Security Police Squadron, Kirtland AFB, New Mexico. Prior to that, Lt Col Moran was the Chief, 22AF Operations Center, Travis AFB, California. Other assignments have included tours as both a C-141 and C-5 aircraft commander and instructor pilot in various MAC operational flying units, an OV-10 Forward Air Controller, and an early tour with the Security Police in SAC. He is a Command Pilot with over 4800 flying hours, including 680 combat hours.

Lt Col Moran has a Masters Degree in Criminal Justice, has attended the Air Command and Staff College and completed the Air War College and National Security Management non-resident programs. He has published two articles in the Air University Review entitled "Military Justice: Is It Equal?" and "Free Speech, The Military, and the National Interest". He has recently prepared a Senior Officer Protection Handbook that has been widely distributed throughout the Air Force. Lt Col Moran's decorations include the Distinguished Flying Cross, the Air Medal with twelve oak leaf clusters, the Meritorious Service Medal with two oak leaf clusters, and the Air Force Commendation Medal with one oak leaf cluster.

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SECURITY FORESIGHT: A RATIONAL DEFENSE AGAINST TERRORISM

18 April 1983:	American Embassy, Beirut. Vehicle Bomb. 63 lives lost. Building destroyed.
23 October 1983:	Marine Compound, Beirut. Vehicle Bomb. 241 lives lost. Building destroyed.
20 September 1984:	American Embassy Annex, Beirut. Vehicle Bomb. 23 lives lost. Building heavily damaged.

These and other less serious attacks have all occurred since President Reagan stated that international terrorists would face "swift and effective retribution" if they continued to target US interests throughout the world.[1] The fact that retribution has not been forthcoming illustrates the extent of the problem our nation faces in dealing with the spreading cancer of terrorism. Like some other nations, we have enjoyed dramatic successes in combating this malignancy within our national borders. Despite these successes, acts of terrorism continue to grow more frequent and more deadly.

TERRORISM

Contrary to popular belief, the history of political violence and terrorism did not begin with the disasterous bombing of the Marine Corps compound in Beirut. What is new is the form and

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degree of violence now threatening the stability of the world. In the 1970's, as noted by Mr. Brian M. Jenkins of the Rand Corporation, seizing embassies and kidnapping diplomats or business executives were common terrorist tactics. Positive steps to provide better security and national policies that forbade meeting terrorist demands resulted in a decline in embassy takeovers and kidnappings, but there was a corresponding rise in assassinations and bombings.[2] Now, large-scale attacks like the bombings of the American Embassy and the Marine Corps compound in Beirut have apparently become the favored tactic. The random killing of innocent bystanders, as seen in the devastating bomb attacks on the Horse Guards parade in London and the railway station in Bologna, are also common.

Evidence of this trend is borne out by a few basic statistics. Early in the 1970's, 80 percent of terrorist attacks were against property and only 20 percent against people. By the 1980's, one half of all attacks were against people. Fatal incidents have grown 20 percent each year, with multiple fatalities increasing dramatically in 1983.[3] Despite a slight decline in the total number of worldwide terrorist incidents during the 1980's, there has been a 13 percent increase in the number of deaths. Total terrorist activity has increased an alarming 400 percent since the Munich Olympics.[4]

It is unlikely that this trend will reverse itself for several reasons. As Mr. Jenkins points out, "...terrorists have been

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brutalized by the protacted struggle and the public has been numbed. If terrorists are to remain in the headlines in a world in which incidents of terrorism have become increasingly common and recover their lost coercive power over governments which have become more resistant, their acts of violence must become more spectacular. Terrorists have also become more technically proficient; they can build bigger and better bombs. At the same time, the terrorist has changed. Harder men and women have replaced the older generations of terrorists who took the time to debate the morality and utility of actions against selected individuals".[5] Recent history indicates that the debate is over.

How far the escalation will go is a matter for continuous speculation. Terrorism could continue, more or less unchanged, to slowly increase or it could takeoff like a speeding train in the form of mass casualty attacks like that on the Marine Corps compound in Beirut. At the extreme end of the spectrum is the ever present possibility that a terrorist group may acquire and use a chemical, biological, or nuclear weapon to threaten a government into inconceivable concessions. There are terrorists who argue that such action would only alienate their supporters, disgust the public, provoke a repressive response, and expose the organization to betrayal by those with less determination. The harder breed contends that wars are won by ruthless violence. History has shown that, particularly with terrorists, the hardliners more often than not prevail.[6]

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WHAT MAKES A TERRORIST?

Most terrorists are 18 to 28 years old, come from middle class families, have had some college education, are politically-oriented, and embrace communist or anarchist philosophies. Many terrorists are women; they often become the most ruthless killers within the group. Some terrorists are mercenaries who, for the most part, have at least partially embraced the cause of world communism, such as the infamous Carlos. The future will surely bring the day when the purely mercenary terrorist will range the world, dealing death for a price. Also, right wing or reactionary terrorists have surfaced to counter the growing threat they see from leftist led groups.[7]

Regardless of their affliation, terrorists usually work within a group which has a definite organizational structure and hierarchy. The first or command element often consists of the older and more experienced terrorists who establish the organization's objectives. The second element is comprised of the operators or shooters. Sometimes former criminals or ex-military personnel, these individuals actually conduct the planned attacks. They are often prone to irrational actions, giving little consideration to captives or hostages. The third terrorist element is composed of idealists usually assigned to logistical and support tasks. They meet the physical needs of the group, distribute propaganda, and guard prisoners. The idealist is not normally violent and

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sometimes exhibits a sense of reasonableness within the group, balancing the ruthlessness and fanaticism of the other members.[8]

The violence they practice is calculated and rational. Their immediate objectives, mainly psychological, are to generate fear among the populace, disrupt the government, induce a general loss of confidence in the existing social orders or governmental policies, and provoke the authorities to adopt repressive measures.[9] Through terrorist violence, weak organizations or governments are able to strike at their stronger enemies, usually with little likelihood of retaliation.

The more common types of violence committed by terrorists are bombing, hijacking, kidnapping, and assassination. Car bombs and more recently truck bombs driven by suicide assassins are now favorite weapons. A wide variety of armament is readily available to most terrorist groups, including handheld automatic weapons, machine guns, recoilless rifles, rocket launchers, explosives, and incendiary devices. Surface-to-air missiles are also most probably in the terrorist arsenal. With weapons such as these, the possibilities for target selection and type of attack are very nearly limitless. Robbery committed to finance operations or acquire weapons also plays an important role in furthering terrorist objectives.

Most operations are seldom based on chance. They are meticulously planned and executed within a tight schedule, against

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lightly defended or unprotected targets. Both target selection and attack planning are based on lengthly surveillance. Terrorists may recruit or place an operative in a position of access to a targeted individual or facility to assist in either surveillance or execution. Attacks are usually rehearsed several times and may be aborted when the group encounters the unexpected or when they lose control of the situation.[10]

These operational concepts have produced an impressive success record. In over 18 thousand incidents, since 1970, 91 percent of all terrorist attacks have been successful.[11]

IMPACT ON THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

There can be little doubt that terrorism, or even the threat of terrorism, has had a significant impact on The Department of Defense and, in a broader sense, the nation itself. Attacks against US military targets have risen from five in 1968 to 56 in 1983, for a total of almost 500. In 1983, 249 lives were lost 84 personnel were wounded, 19 facilities and 20 vehicles were damaged or destroyed.[12] Tens of millions of dollars have been spent to upgrade security, money that could have been better spent on personnel programs or weapons improvement and acquisition. Particularly in Europe, US installations have become fortresslike, with concrete walls and fences surrounding key facilities. Access to many facilities has been curtailed,

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restricting the movement of potential adversaries and US workers alike. The historical cost to the Air Force for the period 1980 through 1984 was over 105 million dollars.[13]

The fact that US national policy has been changed can hardly be denied. The US Marine contingent to the Multinational Force was withdrawn from Beirut within a few short months of the October 1983 bombing. In retrospect, a relatively small force of terrorists moved a superior power to action it might not otherwise have taken.[14]

MILITARY ACTION AS A SOLUTION

The solution seems so simple. The President and The Secretary of State have both gone on record supporting military action as retribution for an attack and as a preventative measure for future attacks. Secretary Shultz stated recently that "We cannot allow ourselves to become the Hamlet of nations, worrying endlessly over whether and how to respond. Fighting terrorism will not be a clean or pleasant contest, but we have no choice but to play it."[15] This policy calling for a military response is graphically articulated by Mr. Yonah Alexander, director of the State University of New York's Institute for Studies in International Terrorism. He stated that we "must severely punish and isolate terrorists and their sponsoring states,"[16]

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There are, however, deep and basic flaws with this solution. One US official who works directly on the government's antiterrorism programs said it best: "I don't believe it's feasible for us to retaliate because we are not an Old Testament society, we're a New Testament society. Retaliation is part and parcel of Israeli policy,...their religion, and their value system."[17] This value system readily supports the vigorous Israeli policy of military action against terrorist groups and camps, even when located in civilian population centers. US officials and other experts, including Mr. Robert H. Kupperman, Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies, generally believe that American society would reject such a policy if actually initiated.[18]

Even if our national conscience would allow such a policy, the preponderance of evidence suggests that pre-emptive and retaliatory strikes and assassinations do little to prevent or reduce terrorism. The Israeli's have had such a strategy for years. Even precise surgical Entebbe-type operations have not ended acts of terrorism against Israel.[19] If anything, the Israeli policy may have intensified Palestinian resolve to continue the fight. Certainly, at the least, Israel has suffered diplomatic, economic, and even possibly a moral loss.[20]

Finally, despite Secretary of State Schultz's desire to avoid "a cycle of escalating violence beyond our control," many authorities believe this would be the actual result of US

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initiated strikes. The outcome could easily be an escalation of terrorist incidents in this country, accompanied by subsequent countermeasures that threaten our civil liberties.[21] As a minimum, such a policy would certainly jeopardize important global ties with nations vital to our national interest, [22] such as Saudia Arabia.

Since the odds are against our actually striking suspected terrorists before or after an attack, the constant reiteration of such a reactive policy merely draws attention away from the real solution and creates false hope that a quick and easy fix to the terrorist problem is feasible.

SECURITY FORESIGHT: A RATIONAL DEFENSE AGAINST TERRORISM

Rather than accepting a static defense based on after-the-attack retaliatory action, we must develop a long-term, well-planned, concerted proactive defense. This effort must rely on the practice of SECURITY FORESIGHT to reduce the vulnerability of our people, aircraft, and facilities. This concept requires education and awareness training, positive security decisions during all types of planning, the development and use of sound procedures and effective physical security aids, and the presence of a fully equipped and well-trained security police force.

SECURITY FORESIGHT begins with a population that is fully aware of the dynamics of the terrorist threat, the precautions to be

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taken for self-protection, and the application of proven methods for the protection of our aircraft and facilities. A trained and aware population is the single most cost effective aspect of the Air Force's total defensive effort. Unfortunately, we have failed to take advantage of this fact. As noted in the USAF Antiterrorism Task Group Final Report, there are several serious shortfalls in our training program. Antiterrorism training has not been institutionalized across the Air Force. Professional military education courses do not adequately address combating terrorism. Aircrew members are not exposed to the mission-unique vulnerability they face. Senior Commanders, decision makers, and security planners do not always attend the USAF Special Operations School's Dynamics of International Terrorism course or the AFOSI Senior Officer Security Seminar. These deficiencies must be corrected without delay, since only a trained and aware population can produce security planners, decision makers, and commanders capable of formulating effective security plans.[23]

Next, SECURITY FORESIGHT requires a conscious security decision be made during the early stages of mission planning, installation construction and remodeling design, and weapons systems acquisition. Considerations for the defense of Air Force assets from terrorist attack must permeate every formal planning level, at Air Force, Major Air Command, and Wing. Terrorism annexes should be developed in all supporting plans. Each installation resource protection plan should include measures to assess the local

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threat, determine vulnerabilities, and plan necessary measures to limit the impact of terrorism on mission accomplishment.[24] Public affairs and medical planners must be consulted in the earliest stages to insure a coordinated and meaningful response should an attack occur.[25]

Specific location and time dependent mission directives must also consider the terrorist threat. Decisions, based on accurate intelligence estimates, have to be made to insure the security of crews, ground support personnel, and aircraft. Security considerations, such as where to billet personnel, arming of aircrews and ground support personnel, and the deployment of security police forces, must be brought into the decision loop. These decisions are necessary at the beginning of the mission planning cycle, rather than after the aircraft arrive.

Plans for installation construction and remodeling must also address security early in the design process. For example, we can no longer afford to haphazardly site vital facilities close to base perimeters, thereby increasing their vulnerability. Designs that allow easy and uncontrolled access to building interiors must be avoided.[26]

Weapons system acquisition schemes must also provide details of the security required once the system becomes operational. This is essential for long range sizing of security forces to insure that the limited resources available are utilized to the maximum

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extent possible.[27] In the early stages of systems development, electronic sensors and other automated devises can be included to reduce or assist security forces. After operational deployment, such security enhancements become nearly cost prohibitive.

The third aspect of SECURITY FORESIGHT is the implementation of sound procedures and the use of effective physical security aids to provide the commander a flexible response to changing threats. It is essential that these procedures and physical security aids be tailored to meet local conditions and threats rather than be arbitrarily mandated from higher headquarters. Further, they must have day-to-day utility and sustainability. They cannot impair our ability to accomplish our mission. Wider use of electronic explosive detectors and intrusion alarms are necessary to provide greater security against the terrorist threat.[28] A side benefit, of course, is the increased availability of security forces, relieved from detection duty, as response forces. We must be cautious, however, not to adopt a siege mentality, isolated behind gates, chain-link fences and concrete barricades. If we do, we may be safe but we will have forfeited the battle.

Finally, SECURITY FORESIGHT requires fully equipped and well trained security police forces to respond to actual terrorist incidents. Trained hostage negotiators and special tactics teams are necessary for the resolution of hostage situations, aircraft

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hijackings, etc. Trained bodyguards and vehicle drivers are necessary for the protection of high risk personnel.

POLICY IN PERSPECTIVE

As Mr. Brian M. Jenkins has pointed out, "There is a basic assymmetry in defending against terrorist attacks. Terrorists can attack anything, anywhere, and at any time. Governments cannot protect everything, everywhere, all of the time. It is a virtual certainty that terrorists will attack whatever is least defended. And it is a certainty that there always will be something that is vulnerable."[29] SECURITY FORESIGHT, more than retaliation and retribution, can significantly reduce that vulnerability and thereby protect Air Force assets.

Simple precautions and sound procedures would have prevented the Beirut tragedies, but as Robert H. Kupperman contends, "We're not doing steady planning....We're reacting....We're not doing our job."[30] It's time we stopped dreaming about combat solutions for a security problem. They have not worked for the Israelis and they won't work for us. It's time we started doing our job with solid down to earth security planning, practice, and action. SECURITY FORESIGHT gives us that ability.

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LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT: THE TERRORIST DIMENSION

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LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT: THE TERRORIST DIMENSION

by

James Berry Motley

"Fighting terrorism will not be a
clean or pleasant contest but we
have no choice but to play it."[1]

Secretary of State Shultz

October 25, 1984

INTRODUCTION

Terrorism is warfare "without territory, waged without armies as we know them. It is warfare that is not territorially limited...It is warfare without neutrals, and with few or no...innocent bystanders."[2] Though practiced for centuries, terrorism has only recently become a substantial force in contemporary international politics. No longer an abstract concept, terrorism is now a major U.S. national security concern. Recently described by the Department of Defense (DoD) as "warfare on the cheap," terrorism "permits small countries to attack U.S. interests in a manner which, if done openly, would constitute acts of war and justify a direct U.S. military response."[3]

From a U.S. perspective, contemporary terrorism, viewed as a form of warfare, is a relatively new phenomenon -- one which has received little doctrinal categorization or interpretation. Used as an instrument of war, terrorist acts conducted against the United States present formidable

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challenges. If, in fact, terrorism is warfare on the cheap, U.S. policymakers, civilian and military alike, should remember that military operations must be directed towards a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective. The strategic military objective of a nation at war must be to apply whatever degree of force is necessary to allow attainment of the political aim for which the war is being fought. But not until the political purpose has been determined and defined by the President and Congress, however, can strategic and tactical objectives be clearly identified and developed. The strategic objectives, once developed, must constantly be subjected to rigorous analysis and review to insure that they continue to reflect accurately not only the ultimate political end desired, but also any political constraints imposed on the application of military force.[4] Terrorists confronting the United States will never possess military superiority over the U.S. armed forces, but they do not have to possess it. Their strategy is one of limited aims, directed toward weakening and undermining the basic interests and values of the United States by inflicting superficial rather than mortal wounds.

UNDERSTANDING THE NATURE OF TERRORISM

Terrorism is a cheap method of conflict req: ng neither a high degree of sophistication nor extensive training. It is a low-cost strategy which above all else is a political act

designed not necessarily to destroy the enemy but to demoralize him or to force him to overreact.

The October 1983 attack on the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut is an excellent example of how terrorists seek to alter the political stance of an adversary. They were under no illusions regarding the U.S. ability to absorb such a military setback. Their intent -- which was successful -- was to make the continued presence of U.S. forces politically unacceptable to the United States.

Terrorists have become experts at exploiting the media to publicize their cause and to spread the effect of their terror. In years past, terrorism tended to be characteristic of the early stages of any conflict, and as the conflict expanded acts of terrorism diminished substantially. Today, however, terrorist warfare has become an effective form of combat for many participants who see little need to escalate the fighting to more conventional military stages. Accordingly, it has become the prevalent means of armed conflict. In terms of severity, it falls within the range of military operations conducted at the lower end of the conflict spectrum commonly referred to as low-intensity conflict (LIC).[5] Though direct Soviet-American military clashes would be unlikely to fall into the category of LIC, the Soviets and their proxies can be expected to continue to expand their "risk minimizing"[6] strategy by maintaining their involvement in the internal affairs of Third World countries and supporting efforts to overthrow legitimate governments.

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In the past, much of the U.S. military's strategy, doctrine and force structure was based on a traditional model of potential conflict which portrayed the different types of conflict as discrete, incremental phases set along a continuum of probability and risk (figure 1).[7]

FIGURE 1

INCREMENTAL PHASES MODEL OF POTENTIAL CONFLICT

| TERRORISM | UNCONV'NL WARFARE | MINOR CONV'NL WARFARE | MAJOR CONV'NL WARFARE | THEATER NUCLEAR | STRATEGIC NUCLEAR |

Modern conflict, real or potential, is decidedly more complex. Thus, a different, more realistic and potentially more useful way of looking at the spectrum of conflict involves envisioning multiple types of warfare occurring

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simultaneously or in a complementary fashion across the continuum of conflict and intensity (Figure 2). There are three major inferences that might be drawn from this model. First, the United States must maintain the capability to deter strategic nuclear war. Second, the risks are great that conventional war could quickly escalate to nuclear war. Thus, the probability of deliberate conventional conflict occurring between the United States and the Soviet Union is low, primarily because it would prove very costly. Third, and a major premise of this study, the Services must focus renewed attention on the lower end of the conflict model by refining its military strategy, doctrine and force structure to deal more effectively with terrorism, unconventional warfare and other forms of low-intensity conflict.

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FIGURE 2

MULTIPLE, SIMULTANEOUSLY, COMPLEMENTARY
MODEL OF POTENTIAL CONFLICT

As the need to inject into conflict situations small,
strategically-responsive, and flexible U.S. military units,
organized to respond to a broader spectrum of combat
operations becomes paramount, in order to meet the political
and military goals of a LIC environment, the utility of a
large army, navy and air force will become increasingly
questioned. Thus, give the constraints of money, manpower and
the availability of sufficient airlift and sealift, U.S.
military planners will be forced to focus more intently on

"force integration,"[8] i.e., putting trained people and equipment, together with requisite support, into new unit structures throughout active and reserve military organizations.

A discussion of the so-called "force-strategy mismatch" debate, that is, the allegation that the Pentagon is building a force for one type of war when another type is more likely, or that it is attempting to prepare for so many contingencies at once that it never will be adequately prepared for the most likely of those, is beyond the scope of this study. However, the issue is an essential factor that the Services must consider in preparing for their LIC mission, especially with regard to antiterrorist operations. To date, U.S. military forces have been designed and structured primarily to engage in mid-to-high-intensity conflicts, which pose the greatest danger to U.S. national interests. But with the complexity and diversity that terrorist warfare poses, U.S. military forces will have to take on a somewhat different character, to include greater balance and flexibility. Furthermore, realization of an improved power-projection capability by the Soviet Union, combined with its willingness to use surrogates to achieve it global aims, also raises the possibility that the United States will have to commit forces to fight in non-NATO areas. This prospect is further heightened by the existence of widespread instability and conflict in Third World areas that contain the preponderance of the world's energy and strategic mineral resources. It is strategic

reality that forces possessing great flexibility will be required to respond to these kinds of crises in order to demonstrate U.S. resolve, to protect vital interests, or to prevent the escalation of minor crises and LIC into superpower confrontations.

THE CHARACTER OF TERRORIST WARFARE: PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES FOR THE U.S. MILITARY

Terrorist warfare invariably is waged with extreme ruthlessness and cruelty and is clandestinely organized and undeclared. Moreover, it is inherently random, arbitrary and indiscriminate in its effects on the innocent. Unlike conventional soldiers who seek self-preservation in battle and whose survival is essential to success, the terrorist often achieves his purpose most effectively through his willingness to give up his life in the commission of his act. Terrorism differs from traditional warfare, which is most often institutionalized violence perpetrated by state upon state and therefore carries a badge of legitimacy. Terrorism is non-state violence and is regarded as illegitimate violence. This distinction can be found in the U.S. legal system inasmuch as U.S. statutes do not identify terrorism as either a crime or an act of war. Rather, acts of terrorism are punished under existing statutes dealing with murder, arson, bombings, extortion, air piracy, etc.[9]

Terrorist warfare arouses more intense emotion and bitterness than conventional forms of war. This is due, in part, to: (1) the fact that a larger percentage of casualties

are civilians, often women and children; and (2) there are no applicable laws of war. Nonetheless, terrorism has proved itself an effective means of securing certain tactical objectives. For example, as a form of propaganda, it can capture enormous publicity for a cause; as an extremely powerful blackmail weapon, terrorist operations can be used to obtain ransom payments, the release of jailed terrorists, and other concessions from the authorities. A less obvious tactical benefit of terrorism is that it can be a means of inspiring and mobilizing sympathizers and of encouraging emulation of terrorist acts.[10]

Although unimpressive in firepower, terrorism provides a low-cost, low-risk means of conducting armed conflict. However, current U.S. military doctrine does not stress an understanding of terrorism as a method of LIC. (Neither the term "terror" or "terrorism" is listed in the 1984 version of the <u>Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms</u>, Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 1.) Rather, it deals with terrorism in a conventional setting where the measurement of combat power is in terms of troops, aircraft and ships. The point being, U.S. military doctrine assumes comparable conduct by the enemy. Unfortunately, terrorists do not adhere to the traditional means of conventional warfare.

The tactics of terrorism fit well into the emerging geopolitical context confronting the United States in the remaining years of the 20th century. The need for raw

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materials, basing rights and international political
cooperation has made the United States dependent on others,
thus increasing its vulnerability. Even though the "old
truths" of the NATO Alliance are still valid - the Soviet
Union is a threat; a collective response to that threat is
needed; and nuclear forces remain the ultimate pillar of the
NATO deterrent - NATO is eroding politically and militarily
with dissension in the Alliance over a number of issues, not
the least of which is consensus on what constitutes an
adequate military deterrence of the perceived Soviet threat.[11]

Whether employed by subnational groups or by nation
states, terrorism has become a strategic tactic. Terrorists
have introduced a new breed of violence in terms of
victimization, threat and U.S. response. In the future, they
are likely to take greater operational risks, thus challenging
all segments of the U.S. society. Accordingly, U.S. political
and military leadership must strengthen their awareness of the
growing dangers of terrorism and must begin to jointly develop
strategies and capabilities to deal with this menace.

Although there are no simplistic solutions to the battle
against terrorism, the U.S. military must continue to prepare
to cope with this form of warfare This preparation will
compete with other Service priorities and programs for
scarce resource allocation[12] and will require appropriate
strategy, doctrine, equipment and training to deal with the
gross manifestations of terrorism. As a form of LIC,
terrorism requires serious consideration by the military

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planner regarding the proper role of the U.S. armed forces in responding to terrorist warfare. Currently, DoD is equipped to handle only a narrow band of terrorist situations.

Following a formal declaration of war, terrorist operations will assume minimal significance in the overall battle plan. The U.S. military's problems[13] in dealing with terrorism arise during peacetime or during the gray period between pre-crisis and crisis when demoralizing and destabilizing acts of terror occur. The nature of terrorist warfare, as is the case in most forms of unconventional warfare, is frustrating to those with an American cultural background.[14] In the past, wars that the United States fought had been undertaken for territorial or political goals which were inseparable from disruption of the opponent's internal power structure and which were waged according to Clausewitzian theory as refined into U.S. military doctrine.

In coping with terrorist warfare, a major lesson from the Vietnam conflict[15] that will undoubtedly remain uppermost in the minds of U.S. policymakers for years to come is that the American public is unwilling, over a prolonged period of time, to sacrifice the blood of its men and women in pursuit of goals that are unclear or which lack widely-accepted consensus. In order to make the supreme sacrifice of life for foreign policy goals, Americans require from their national leaders a detailed understanding of the threat, the articulation of well-defined objectives and how such objectives will be executed.

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The military approach to countering terrorism effectively involves the waging of two kinds of war: (1) a political and psychological war to secure the popular consent and support that must be the basis of any effective modern democratic government, and (2) an offensive military war to destroy, disrupt, contain and reduce terrorist organizations. For U.S. policymakers to be able to purse such an approach entails major problems.[16] However, based on the concerns being expressed by high-ranking U.S. officials, the patterns of international terrorist incidents (Figure 3) and recent events, antiterrorist operations will assume a more integral role in U.S. national security planning, policies and programs. However, if terrorism is to be treated as a form of warfare, there is a critical distinction that must be made regarding antiterrorist and counterterrorist operations. Antiterrorist operations denote an offensive strategy employing a range of options to prevent the occurrence of terrorist acts. Conversely, counterterrorist operations are retaliatory measures, primarily involving the use of force after the fact and, thus, are more accurately termed a reactive strategy. Though the current U.S. program is described as antiterrorist, in reality it is counterterrorist and makes no allowance for decisive preventive offensive action. (Although National Security Decision Directive 138 provides the framework for offensive action against terrorist groups and Secretary Shultz has pushed for U.S. military retaliation, indications are that such action has been deemed impractical.)[17]

FIGURE 3 - International Terrorist Incidents Against U.S.
Citizens and Property, 1973-83, by Type of Event

	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	Total
TOTAL	224	187	162	217	183	371	236(188)	272(178)	257(163)	401(211)	205	2,715(945)
Kidnaping	22	14	23	9	6	8	8(8)	9(10)	9(9)	7(8)	10	125(45)
Barricade-hostage	3	2	1	2	2	0	6(6)	6(7)	1(1)	3(3)	8	34(25)
Bombing	106	130	94	112	125	158	115(92)	95(76)	93(72)	168(109)	96	1,292(445)
Armed attack	8	6	7	8	5	12	7(36)	11(33)	6(29)	3(18)	24	97(140)
Hijacking	0	1	2	5	4	2	12(6)	20(4)	18(10)	10(1)	1	75(22)
Assassination[a]	4	2	8	14	6	7	9	14	15	8		87
Sniping	0	3	1	6	8	7	20	9	9	7		70
Threat, hoax	75	19	18	53	23	159	47	74	82	177		727
Other	6	10	8	8	4	18	12(9)	34(25)	24(17)	18(13)	30	172(94)
Arson							(31)	(23)	(25)	(59)	36	36(174)

[a] Includes attempts.

Source: Patterns of International Terrorism: 1982, DOS, Sep 83, p. 2.

NOTE: Figures reflected in parentheses, and 1983 data are extracted from U.S. Department of State, Patterns of
Global Terrorism: 1983, September 1984, p. 7. These statistics reflect new coding criteria that became
effective 1 January 1983. Ibid., p. 2.

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SUMMARY

Given the totality of missions presently assigned to the
U.S. Armed Services -- to maintain the capability to deter
strategic nuclear war, to engage in conventional conflict with
the Soviet Union and to react to a multitude of low-intensity
conflict, ranging from antiterrorist operations to fighting
more conventional wars -- the U.S. military planner is
presented with challenges more diverse in scope than those of
the early post-Vietnam years. Until recently, U.S. military
forces have been designed and structured primarily to engage
in mid- to high-intensity conflicts which pose the greatest
danger to U.S. national interests. With the complexity and
diversity of the threat to which these forces now must be
capable of responding, U.S. military forces require greater
balance and flexibility and must be easily tailored to meet
specific needs, since multiple types of conflict can and may
occur at any level of intensity. Antiterrorist operations, in
all probability, will assume an increasing role in U.S.
military strategy

Modern conflict, real or potential, is a serious and
complex business. Thus, one might ask: Is the U.S. national
security community truly attuned to the changing spectrum of
warfare that it is likely to experience during the remainder
of the 20th century, or does the traditional preoccupation
with conventional warfare (World War II fought with advanced
weapon systems) still prevail? For many years, Europe has
been the central focus in U.S. foreign policy, and while a

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radical change in this orientation seems unlikely, a certain

deemphasis seems both inevitable and not entirely undesirable.

Armed conflict in Europe seems less likely than in almost any

other part of the world -- a situation that is not expected to

change in the near future. On the other hand, threats to U.S.

interests at the lower levels of conflict have assumed greater

importance. During the past two decades, with regard to both

internal wars and conflict between nations, tensions in the

Third World have been on the rise. From 1945-1977, there were

no fewer than 56 conflicts involving a significant part of at

least one state; in 1983, some 40 to 45 nations were at war in

one form or another.[18] In short, it is likely that the United

States will become increasingly preoccupied with LIC and,

specifically, terrorist warfare. By necessity, the United

States will be forced to direct some of its attention away

from Europe.

The performance of the U.S.military since the end of

World War II has led some to question the Services' overall

readiness and their ability to defeat an enemy in the event of

war. Critics of the U.S. military have claimed that the

Pentagon cannot devise successful military policies -- Korea,

Vietnam, the aborted Iranian hostage rescue mission, and the

Beirut tragedy are cited as examples of U.S. postwar military

malaise. Even the recent Grenada operation has received its

share of criticism.[19]

Antiterrorist missions are only one of many missions that

U.S. forces must be prepared to accomplish within the LIC

environment. However, they appear to be the most prevalent
form of warfare that the United States will confront over the
next decade. In attempting to cope with such violence,
military planning may lack the detailed intelligence normally
associated with military operations, but certainly the urgency
of the mission will require the availability of well-trained
military units which are prepared for rapid deployment and
capable of carrying out tactics that emphasize surgical
precision. The maintenance of such operational readiness will
require appropriate resource allocation from all Services,
strong leadership, joint exercises, and the best equipment
available. Furthermore, the implementation of antiterrorist
missions will pose a severe test to joint command, control and
communication functions.

CONCLUSION

There can be little question that terrorism presents many
extraordinary challenges for the United States and that the
military, as the ultimate enforcer of U.S. interests, will
play an increasing larger role in combatting this phenomenon.
At this stage, there are more questions than answers as to how
best to combat terrorism. Unfortunately, terrorism is a
phenomenon for which there is neither a consensus nor a common
language. It flourishes in various forms in different
countries and at different times as a result of a combination
of factors. What terrorists will do next; when, where and how

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they will strike is an uncertainty. But reality is that there will be new victims and new attacks.

In sum, difficult and demanding decisions lie ahead in the war against terrorism. They will have to be made without vacillating or apology, because war is death and destruction -- characteristics which the American public has come to associate with contemporary terrorism. Terrorist warfare may well prove to be bloody and costly. Certainly, there will be no easy victories. As the United States has learned through bitter first-hand experience, war is a serious business.[20] Successful pursuit of it requires definite and well-articulated objectives, strong political commitment and national resolve, the courage of conviction in making difficult decisions, imagination, detailed planning, timely and effective implementation of a well-thought-out strategy and military men and women prepared to make the supreme sacrifice, their lives.

ENDNOTES

1.   Excerpts from a prepared text titled "Terrorism and the
     Modern World" presented by Mr. Shultz at the Park Avenue
     synagogue in Manhattan. The New York Times, October 26,
     1984, p. A12.

2.   Brian Jenkins, "International Terrorism: A Balance
     Sheet," Survival, July-August 1975, p. 160.

3.   Report of the DoD Commission on Beirut International
     Terrorist Act, October 23, 1983, U.S. Government Printing
     Office, Washington, D.C., December 20, 1983, p. 128
     (Xerox copy).

4.   Field Manual 100-5, Operations, 1982. Department of the
     Army, p. B-1.

5.   Low-intensity conflict is defined as the range of
     activities and operations on the lower end of the
     conflict spectrum involving the use of U.S. combat forces
     to establish, regain, or maintain control of specific
     land areas threatened by guerrilla warfare, revolution,
     subversion, or other tactics aimed at internal seizure of
     power. Other terms such as limited, small or minor wars,
     low-level violence, limited contingencies are often used
     synonymously with low-intensity conflict. This
     operational definition is adapted from FM 100-20,
     Low-Intensity Conflict, Headquarters, Department of the
     Army, January 1980, p. 14. Also, see Joint Chiefs Staff
     Publication 1, Department of Defense Dictionary of
     Military and Associated Terms, 1 April 1984, p. 211, for
     a definition of limited war.

6.   I have borrowed this term from Benjamin S. Lambeth,
     "Uncertainties for the Soviet War Planner," International
     Security, Winter 1982/83, p. 143. He writes: "Although
     the Soviets are masters of opportunism, they have avoided
     indiscriminate muscle-flexing. Instead, their tendency
     has been to talk tough as a matter of practice, yet to
     reserve actual intervention for cases where they have
     supreme interests at stake, a high probability of U.S.
     no-involvement, and a comfortable prospect of success
     with moderate investment of military capital." Ibid.
     See, also, Malcolm Mackintosh, "Perspectives of the World
     Scene 1983: A Soviet Assessment," especially p. 44 in
     Rusi and Brassey's Defence Yearbook 1984. Edited by the
     Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies,
     London. Washington, D.C.: Brassey's Defence Publishers,
     1984.

7.   The incremental and complementary models of potential
     conflict are discussed in detail in Lt. General Fred K.

Mahaffey, "Structuring Force to Need,: Army, 1984-85
Green Book, October 1984, pp. 205-206.

8. This term is a modified version of comments expressed by
    General William R. Richardson, Commanding General, USA
    Training and doctrine Command, "TRADOC: Army's Source of
    Well-Trained Soldiers," Army, 1983-84 Green Book October
    1983, p. 51.

9. An excellent discussion of the distinction between
    terrorism and other forms of warfare, part of which I
    have reflected here, is Neil C. Livingston's, "Fighting
    Terrorism and Dirty Little Wars," especially p. 7, in Air
    University Review, March-April 1984.

10. For a more detailed treatment on the "tactical uses" of
    terrorism, see Paul Wilkinson, "Terrorism - Global
    Links," especially pp. 217-219, in Rusi and Brassey's
    Defence Yearbook 1984, op.cit.

11. The obligations of alliance members entail more than
    burden-sharing. They also entail risk-sharing, inside
    and outside Europe. Though the "old truths" are valid,
    it's time members of NATO recognize that they must
    accommodate themselves to a changing strategic
    environment encompassing "new realities" and threats
    within the Third World. This particular theme is
    well-treated in Alan Ned Sabrosky, "NATO: Old Truths, New
    Realities," The Retired Officer, December 1984, pp.
    19-21.

    Three potential NATO crises are" (1) the possibility that
    Senator Nunn might revive his bill calling for the return
    home of up to 90,000 U.S. troops if the Europeans do not
    boost their defense spending (this proposal was narrowly
    defeated in June 1984 by a vote of 55-41); (2) concern on
    exploiting new technology to strike Soviet follow-on
    forces; and (3) the ever-present issue of whether to
    devote manpower and equipment to NATO's flanks in Norway
    and the Mediterranean or to concentrate forces in Central
    Europe. With regard to (2), NATO Secretary General Lord
    Carrington has warned about the risks of succumbing to
    the "dazzle" and "sex appeal" of new technology while
    neglecting more basic needs in western defense. In a
    major address on military strategy before a November 1984
    meeting of NATO legislators, Carrington stressed that the
    allies must fortify conventional defenses if they are
    sincere about reducing their reliance on nuclear weapons
    to thwart a Soviet attack. However, European allies
    contend their economies are still recovering from
    recession and cannot afford to pay the 3 percent annual
    increase in defense spending that NATO countries are
    pledged to carry out. On the Nunn proposal, see The
    Washington Post, June 21, 1984, p. A1. As to

Carrington's comments, see The Washington Post, November 15, 1984, p. A30.

12.   For a discussion of questions regarding the Reagan administration's priorities in military spending since 1981 and the U.S. armed forces' readiness to go to war, see "Military Priorities Hit by Critics of Readiness," The Washington Post, July 30, 1984, p. Al, and "U.S. Gambles on Peacetime Military," The Washington Post, August 19, 1984, p. Al. Appearing before a special Congressisonal panel to track improvements in U.S. special operations forces (SOF),Noel C. Koch, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs, DoD, noted that funding for special operations is once again on the rise, reversing the stagnation that set in after Vietnam. Mr. Koch cautioned that the pace of change is "agonizingly slow" and warned that SOF strategy being developed by the top military commanders is "still largely directed to actions in a conventional environment. Armed Forces Journal International, October 1984, pp. 15 and 18.

13.   For a succinct discussion of the military problems and challenges posed by the threat of terrorism as a form of low-intensity conflict, see Robert H. Kupperman, et al., "Terrorism: The Challenge to the Military in the 1990s," pp. 220-203, in Strategic Requirements for the Army to the Year 2000. Edited by Kupperman and William J. Taylor, Jr., Lexington books. Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company, 1984.

14.   Two excellent sources dealing with this point are Sam C. Sarkesian's America's Forgotten Wars, Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1984, and Donald Vought, "American Culture and American Arms" The Case of Vietnam," pp. 158-190, in Richard A. Hunt and Richard H. Shultz, Jr., Lessons From an Unconventional War, Elsford, New York: Pergamon Press, 1982.

15.   One of the more current critiques of America's military strengths and successes, as well as its weaknesses and failures, in Vietnam is General Bruce Palmer, Jr.'s The 25-Year War: America's Military Role in Vietnam. Lexington, Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 1984. General Palmer contends that America's most serious error was committing its armed forces to a war in which neither political nor military goals were ever fully articulated by U.S. civilian leaders. Lacking clear objectives, the U.S. armed forces failed to develop an appropriate strategy, thus relinquishing the offensive to Hanoi.

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16. The controversy sparked by Secretary Shultz's October 26, 1984 speech highlights this point very vividly. See endnote 1.

17. In a major shift to counter terrorism, President Reagan signed on April 3, 1984, NSDD 138, which endorsed the principle of preemptive strikes in addition to reprisal raids against terrorists abroad. This new get-tough policy, described as an "active defense against terrorist," represents, according to Noel C. Koch, the senior official in charge of Pentagon policy on terrorism, "A quantum leap in countering terrorism from the reactive mode to recognition that proactive steps are needed." Because of the lack of public source material regarding NSDD 138, it is difficult to discuss specific aspects of this new policy authoritatively. However, it has been reported that under NSDD 138 guidelines, preemptive action is to be based upon: (a) a specific planned event, and (b) only after complete information about a terrorist plan has been gathered. The Washington Post, April 16, 1984, p. A19; The Washington Times, April 16, 1984, p. 1. U.S. retaliation against terrorists has been described as impractical, inasmuch as such strikes "would damage America's real interests." U.S. News and World Report, November 26, 1984, p. 23. The latter source reported that not only did the White House drop the idea of U.S. military retaliation, but "gently chided Shultz for getting carried away in bringing it up." At the time this article was written, the Defense and State Departments had refused to comment on a story appearing in the November 27, 1984 issue of The Washington Post, p. A1 that the United States had undertaken detailed preparations to launch an antiterrorist retaliatory bombing strike in Lebanon before Thanksgiving from the aircraft carrier USS Eisenhower. Also, Secretary of Defense Weinberger's November 28, 1984 speech, "The Uses of Military Power" (see endnote 20), regarding the employment of military force contrasts sharply with Mr. Shultz's position on retaliating against terrorists.

18. John E. Endicott and Roy W. Stafford, Jr., editors, American Defense Policy, Fourth Edition (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977), p. 154; Brigadier General Joseph C. Lutz, Commanding General, U.S. Army, 1st Special Operations Command, "Special Forces: To Help Others Help Themselves," Army, October 1983; 1983-1984 Green book, p. 248.

19. See, for example, Arthur T. Hadley, "Inside America's Broke War Machine," The New Republic, May 7, 1984; Jeffrey Record, "It's Full of Bureaucrats Instead of Warriors," The Washington Post, January 29, 1984; Report on Grenada to Congressional Military Reform Caucus by Bill Lind on April 5, 1984, reprinted in press release of

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Representative Jim Courter (R-NJ). While claiming that most things went pretty well when U.s. forces invaded Grenada, senior military officers acknowledged that problem areas did exist, e.g., the lack of "decent" maps and trouble with communication between Army and Marine forces on different parts of the island. According to Congressman Courter, a member of the House Armed Services Committee, "The mission was accomplished but it was a good deal less than the totally successful operation they claimed. It took some luck, an overwhelming force ratio, and we lost more equipment than we should have." The Washington Post, January 26, 1984, p. A21. For a detailed assessment of the Grenada operation, see James Berry Motley, "Grenada: Low-Intensity Conflict and the Use of U.S. Military Power," World Affairs, Winter 1983-84, pp. 221-238.

20. In a November 28, 1984 speech entitled "The Uses of Military Power," Secretary of Defense Weinberger outlined a set of six tests, drawing on the lessons of Korea and Vietnam, that he said the United States would apply when deciding whether to send military forces into combat abroad. They are: (1) Deem the act "vital to our national interests"; (2) Commit forces only as a "last resort"; (3) Be prepared to fight "wholeheartedly with the clear intention of winning"; (4) Have "clearly defined political and military objectives" and the means to achieve them; (5) Have "reasonable assurance" of support by Congress and the public; and (6) Be ready to continually reassess and "adjust if necessary" the need to continue a military operation. The New York Times, November 29, 1984, pp. Al and A4.

AIRPOWER, SUPERPOWER, AND LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

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BIOGRAPHY

Major Gregory B. Colvin is assigned to the Special Operations Division of Headquarters United States Air Force Directorate of Operations. He is the primary action officer for the MC-130E and the new MC-130H programs. After OTS, flight and survival schools, he was assigned as a Combat Talon pilot to all three of the MC-130 units, the 1st, 7th, and 8th SOS where he was chief instructor pilot for the Combat Talon Formal School in 1978-79. He was assigned to the West German _Luftwaffe_ as an exchange pilot and holds German senior pilot wings and parachute wings. Afterwards he moved to Headquarters United States Air Force Manpower and Personnel Center where he was chief of special operations assignments before he moved to Washington D.C. Major Colvin holds a bachelor's degree in experimental psychology from Franklin and Marshall College, Lancaster, PA. and a bachelor's plus from Troy State University in international relations. He attended Squadron Officer's School and completed ACSC by correspondence. As hobbies he enjoys running, skiing, hiking, reading, writing, music, and theater.

AIRPOWER, SUPERPOWER AND LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

INTRODUCTION

Recent media reporting on Special Operations Forces (SOF) focused attention on Low Intensity Conflict (LIC), but it did little to clarify the definition, roles, or limits of such a conflict other than to identify them as "dirty, little wars".[3,6,7,8] This attention has begun to raise consciousness about the problem, but it has not analyzed many of the basic power struggle issues involved. One could argue that political and military leaders in the United States have never truly understood the implications of superpower, a phenomenon that has been with us for only forty years. At the same time military, political, and other leaders have not demonstrated a clear understanding of low intensity conflict, force structures to deal with it, or socio-politico-economic and military concepts of operations to prosecute it or to react to it. For that reason it is all the more important that people in power understand the implications of superpower relative to LIC and the ideological struggles in the hardball game of world politics. It is equally important for the United States Air Force to understand the role of airpower in LIC and how it fits into the superpower puzzle. US comprehension of LIC phenomenon will become more important in the superpower world, not less, regardless of how we define the term. For the purpose of clarity, this paper uses operational definitions of superpower, low intensity conflict, and airpower.

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Operational Definitions:

Superpower is confined to two nations, the USA and the USSR. (The People's Republic of China could become a superpower by the end of this century if it takes the lead in the Third World and if its economic and military power continue to grow at current rates, which may increase with the inclusion of Hong Kong capitalist expertise in 1997). The Manhattan Project ushered atomic power into human history and with it came the research and development, logistics, strategy, and tactics to employ it on a global scale. After years of climbing up the ladder of power, the US and USSR reached a nuclear level that could destroy not only each other's assault forces and the means of economic production, but the entire society and possibly Earth itself. This is superpower. Low-intensity conflict will be explored in depth, but for the introduction here is a simple operational definition: conflict including terrorism and counterterrorism, involving either unconventional or limited conventional assets in pursuit of specific political, and military objectives. This definition is intentionally general, and it does not restrict superpowers from playing roles with their own forces. It assumes a direct connection between forces in the social, political, economic, and military spheres. It supports Clausewitz's idea that military might is an extension of political power.[11] Airpower is what professional military education says it is: exploiting air/space to take advantage of electro-optico-mechanical media for military purposes.

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Recent History:

Many believe that low intensity clashes are a trend of the present that mark the wave of the future. LIC is definitely a factor in today's balance of power equation, because it is the form of military clash most likely to occur.[2,6,29] The superpowers now coexist in a nuclear balance of terror which has balanced power for forty years. Rather than engage one another directly in pursuit of competing politico-economic goals, each side looks after its vital and ideological interests by supporting, overtly or covertly, LIC in the Third World. While the USSR openly supports wars of national liberation, the US never established a clear position to confront LIC. The USSR exploits this lack of US doctrine and strategy.[2,33]

When political strategies fail and economic or social tactics are insufficient, direct military action often results as it did in Afghanistan, Grenada, Angola, Viet Nam, and the Falklands. The level and nature of overt and covert aid reflects the relative level of importance to the superpower involved. Airpower is a barometer of concern because it indicates higher levels of importance shown by greater commitment and risk of high-value military assets. Recently, airpower was the principal issue in Central America when the USSR continued its Nicaraguan support with Mi24 Hind helicopter gunships and attempted to further improve Nicaragua's airpower with the supposed delivery of MIG 21 Fishbed supersonic fighters. On election day the US observed closely as the ship carrying MIG size crates docked in Corinto

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harbcr. If the Soviets were testing the response of the re-
elected US President, they received a quick, clear answer to
their continued probing in the Western hemisphere.[24] Just as
John Kennedy had invoked the Monroe Doctrine and sent Soviet
missiles home twenty-two years earlier, President Reagan left no
doubt in the minds of the Soviets or his own Department of Defense
about power in the Western hemisphere.

*30.
DELETED BY SECURITY AND POLICY REVIEW.

The Big Four Spheres:

    Israel is not a superpower, but it is a well-developed power.
The point is that there are levels of power just as there are
levels of conflict; both are relative phenomena. Israel battles
the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) on the battlefield as
warriors and in the cities as terrorists. Anyone can set off a
bomb in a bus, but only superpowers can methodically bomb every
bus off the face of the earth. At the same time, only developed

powers are sophisticated enough to exploit airpower, because it
requires an established economic base and socio-political order
to sustain high technology and specialization. Israel is a small
country with much education and great power. To a small country
like Nicaragua or El Salvador, maintaining night vision infrared
devices or computers is not possible without extraordinary sup-
port. Airpower demands a broad educational base. Attempts to
develop a technological base in a small society can have immedi-
ate, significant, social, economic, and political impacts. Such
an attempt by a subnational group like the PLO or by a supra-
national group like the Shi'ite Moslems requires intense, desper-
ate motivation that can quickly become uncontrolled and have
ramifications to whatever socio-politico-economic base fostered
it.[8,19]

In any conflict military power can never ultimately substi-
tute for social, economic, and political stability, the best
measures of a civilized society. In Grenada, airpower delivered
a strike force to rescue Americans from a potential hostage drama.
History will judge Grenada, for example, not on the short-term
military victory there, but on the success of the social, politi-
cal, and economic order created there. Power applied as a solu-
tion to failures in other spheres is the basis of conflict in the
real world and in the context of this paper. This limitation
applies to airpower as to all other types of power.

As stated earlier, this paper links all power including air-
power, to social, political, and economic events at every level

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of conflict.

AIRPOWER

Global Reach:

For purposes of clarity this paper used operational de-
finitions of airpower, superpower, and low-intensity conflict.
These are linked through elements of power to wider social,
political, and economic events at every level of conflict. One
could argue that airpower and low-intensity conflicts are incom-
patible because airpower implies a level of sophistication beyond
the boundary of low-intensity. While such may have been the case
50 years ago when France first used airpower in the colonializa-
tion of Africa or when the US used airplanes to chase Poncho
Villa across the plains of Mexico, the proliferation of airplanes
around the world makes some sort of airpower omnipresent in every
LIC today.[17,36] Superpower mobilization of aircraft, people,
logistics, planning and operational staffs can be brought to-
gether to employ airpower anywhere in the world within 24 hours
(Mayaguez, Korean Tree, Afghanistan). In fact, superpower
military involvement in the 1980s always employs airpower
in some fashion.

Classical Airpower:

Although airpower needs to be tailored to accomplish specific
military objectives within LIC, the usual divisions of airpower
apply: Air superiority, close air support, interdiction, and
airlift. Before discussing airpower in LICs, I will review
briefly the definitions of airpower's four categories. Air

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superiority is that condition where air force may be employed

with impunity in a defined mission airspace because threats either

do not exist or have been neutralized, physically or electroni-

cally. Close Air Support (CAS) naturally means direct fire, bomb,

or psychological support to friendly ground forces engaging an

enemy. Interdiction is the third element of airpower and normally

applies to the disruption or destruction of troop movements and

supply shipments from rear to forward battle areas. In the case

of LICs interdiction with normal fighters may not be politically

feasible or militarily possible depending on targets, lack of

them, or ambiguous target environments (cities). The last of the

four major airpower roles, airlift, has a special role in LIC.

The conventional airlift role is divided into strategic and

tactical airlift. The strategic role involves long-haul inter-

continental missions while the tactical mission applies to intra-

theater and forward edge of battle area support. Air Force SOF

(AFSOF) can be either, depending on the scenario.

Air Force Special Operations Forces (AFSOF):

The US normally employs its superpower conventionally, al-

though AFSOF may be able to perform all airpower roles. At the

low-intensity level airlift plays an accented role because of its

high value carrying out AFSOF missions which include infiltration,

resupply, and exfiltration of special teams with force multiplier

roles. The MC-130 Combat Talon and HH-53 Pave Low helicopters

are uniquely suited to this role with terrain-following/avoidance

radars, forward looking infrared equipment, electronic

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countermeasures, and precise navigation. The precise firepower of the AC-130 gunship puts AFSOF in the CAS and interdiction business, too.

AFSOF include a variety of missions, but they are unique because they can employ power overtly or covertly. It is in the low visibility mode, black or clandestine, that AFSOF missions risk public support and lose liberal Congressional support.[16,28] Clandestine operations can cross moral borders quickly in peacetime, and they are easy targets for disinformation and misunderstanding. It is precisely this aspect of LIC that has kept it out of the public consciousness and out of strategic and tactical doctrine, a position a superpower cannot afford.

There are other areas where AFSOF are unique. The AC-130 Gunship performs superbly in CAS, interdiction, and airbase or rear area point defense. Grenada was a perfect example of how effective it can be. There was absolute air superiority in Grenada after the Gunship silenced the anti-aircraft batteries that gave such trouble to the MC-130s, C-130s, and helicopters in the initial attempts to deliver troops. It was no surprise that the Army wanted almost exclusive gunship coverage after that because of its pinpoint accuracy and awesome firepower coupled to its long loiter time. After the first morning of outstanding successes, the AC-130 provided nearly continuous CAS for the rest of the operation. Helicopters provided ship to shore airlift, and C-130s, C-141s, and C-5s provided airlift between Grenada, other islands, and the USA.

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Grenada:

Grenada was one example of how SOF airpower can be applied. It was interesting because it exemplified the ambiguities between LIC and other levels. It employed a very limited number of US troops. It was low intensity, not a major war. As a result of the media restrictions, it received a great deal of controversial attention, but it would have received attention anyway, because it directly involved a superpower. Grenada was also different in another way: it had overwhelming public support, which was proven by the negative public reaction to media criticism that occurred after the fact. The conflict was short lived, did not involve many casualties, and rescued Americans, a clear, uncontroversial objective. It did not involve the long scrutiny of Viet Nam or tax our socio-economic base. It emphasized the strong role of the US executive branch and its responsibility to manage foreign policy in accordance with vital national interests. In this case, military power rescued Americans and denied a strategically located Caribbean Island to Soviet and Cuban forces active in Central America and Africa. It provided an example of a higher level of LIC because it involved direct US military action but maintained other characteristics of low intensity. Grenada's future economic and socio-political health will depend further on the type of aid and support the US provides, but the US met its short-term military objectives to rescue US students from a hostage situation and to remove Cuban-Soviet arms.[6,31]

Grenada also directed attention to the considerable levels

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of airpower that can be involved in LIC. The US employed fighter-bombers, AFSOF and airlift. There was no doubt in the minds of Cuban or Soviet leaders that the US had committed a major power play. The level of airpower guaranteed it, and Cuba made no attempt to counter US air superiority in spite of the ridiculous order from Castro to the well-armed construction workers to fight to the last man. The implication was that Grenada was vital to Cuba's national interests, but Castro never planned to commit more ground or air forces in protest.

Central America:

With Grenada as a backdrop, the USSR's Eastern Bloc countries along with Cuba followed an obvious Moscow lead to keep up pressure in other Third World locations, especially Central America. The Central American situation is a complicated one because Nicaragua ostensibly receives aid from Hungary, Bulgaria, and East Germany while training comes from Cuba, not the USSR.[23] The entire area is an ideal setting for LIC, and the USSR is prepared to exploit the national liberation ideology. When the Sandinistas overthrew Somoza, the US took a hands off position saying it was an internal affair and that we would deal with whatever government evolved. The USSR, on the other hand, lost no time returning Soviet-taught Sandinista party members from training sites in Cuba and other places. Soon, many of the parties that had allied themselves with the Sandinistas broke away because of official government policies, including sharp state censorship of media, forced conscription, a strictly regulated but out-of-control

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economy, and abuse of power by the new elite. The new government

lost much of its legitimacy. The groups now known as Contras in

the US began to seek a counter revolution, not to return Somoza,

but to have politically free elections to shape their national

destiny in accordance with their own wishes, not those of the

USSR or the US.[16,22]

The US official explanation of our support to the Contras is

one of freedom,   but superpower interests go

beyond political freedom in Nicaragua. Nicaragua followed the

Soviet model trying but failing to control a drifting economy.

The usual Soviet economic model to pursue industrialization via

militarization is failing. By convincing the people that a US

attack of some sort was imminent, the Nicaraguan government

sacrificed part of the 1984 coffee crop by inducing hysteria.

The government risked its last cash crop for ideology and probably

motivated coffee farmers to join the Contras.[30] The Argentinian

government employed such tactics during the Falklands War to

rally its people behind illogical government positions. It also

failed. The Soviets and their proxy force, the Cubans, convinced

the Sandinistas to follow the so-called communist model for

ideological reasons without offering any real help to the crippled

economy.[31,33]

The Soviet model indicates that revolution is ripe in all

Central American countries, because the imperialist economic and

military might of the US exploited and threatened them. In an

attempt to help out their frustrated and desperate brothers in

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adjacent countries, the Nicaraguans have now taken on the proxy role of Soviet arms distributor for the area. In some ways, Nicaragua may be compared to the store front for Soviet wares, while Grenada was supposed to play the part of warehouse. Arms, terrorists, and guerrillas trained by Cubans in Nicaragua are crossing Nicaraguan borders into El Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica, and other countries.[35] This is disturbing to the US, because it upsets socio-politico-economic events in Central America.

The US has vital interests in the Western hemisphere because of Caribbean Basin sea lines of communication, resources, and political conditions. The Monroe Doctrine/Rio Treaty grew more important over time as a keystone of US foreign policy. President Kennedy cited it as one of the arguments for quarantining Cuba in 1962 when the Soviets were testing our resolve just as they are now. The arrival of the Bulgarian freighter Bakuriani, the first freighter directly from a Soviet port, with alleged MIG crates on board happened with perfect theater timing on the night of the US Presidential election. The President made it very clear that Soviet words about improved relations meant nothing unless backed by deeds. No MIGs arrived.

Although there are no MIGs in Nicaragua, the presence of Mi24 Hind helicopter gunships is no less alarming. The US fails to see the extraordinary combat capability these aircraft possess.[24] I personally think they are more accurate, versatile, and combat capable than MIGs because they can be used for airlift,

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interdiction, close air support, and are capable of air-to-air missile firing. The Soviet AFSOF rely heavily on vertical lift aircraft which they employ in all airpower LIC roles. The fact that such aircraft are entering Nicaragua shows increased emphasis by the USSR to export revolution. The US kept up with the Soviet power by insuring that the El Salvador Air Force received A-37 fighter-bombers, C-47s, and UH-1 helicopters, but they are less capable than the Mi24.

The superpower chess game continues at the military level, but coherent civic action programs, economic development plans, and general upgrading of life style and conditions still need to occur. The human condition is as much neglected by US doctrine and strategy as AFSOF in LIC. We must increase both. Let us continue with a deeper look at aspects of LIC.

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

A Prussian View:

Since World War II, there have been about 2000 international/ subnational conflicts. Since Cuba declared itself communist, 17 countries changed governments as a result of low intensity conflict. At the end of 1984 there were 21 active insurgencies occurring.[4]

Since the US withdrawal from Southeast Asia, low intensity military events have accelerted in many areas. Local and international terrorism, Third World struggles for power, subnational violence, and Soviet support for wars of liberation brought LIC to the forefront of political and military attention.

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After the US, British, French, and Portuguese withdrawals from the Middle East, Africa, and Viet Nam, the US was reluctant to engage in LIC during the 1970s. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, lost no time pushing LIC in Angola, Peru, Ethiopia, Chad, Kampuchea, Nicaragua, and Afghanistan. Many of these struggles revealed another new trend, the use of proxy forces from sovereign satellite states like Cuba, Libya, Yemen, and North Korea.

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Goals of superpowers and others in LIC conform to Clausewitz's notion that military might is an extension of political power and to Machiavellian concepts of connectivity between ideological factors and traditional social, economic, political, and military goals.[12]

This Machiavellian interpretation of history connects all events in the social, economic, and military spheres to political goals. There is an important parallel between the Marxist economic interpretation of history and the Machiavellian-Clausewitz political one: events in one sphere directly affect those in another. Where Marx emphasized economic factors, Machiavelli emphasized socio-political ones while Clausewitz said military power was primary.[12,17] Extending the analogy into the military sphere, low intensity conflict may be compared to warfare on a larger scale. LIC is never nuclear, can be conventional at limited levels, and almost always involves guerrilla

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warfare. LIC seems closely tied to social and political con-
sequences of economic realities in the Third World. That means
that superpower attention to any single area, like economics,
will affect events in socio-politico-military areas, whether we
like it or not.

A Theory of Relativity:

This paper's Airpower section made a case for relative
levels of LIC. LIC is a nebulous adjective describing part of
the spectrum of modern warfare. When warfare is compared on a
continuum of violence ranging from fist fights to nuclear wars,
one can see an obvious low and high end among the various
categories of intensity. Low intensity conflict falls short of
regular or nuclear forces fighting in support of socio-politico-
economic goals in the vital interests of nation-states. Just how
short of such a conflict LIC falls is subject to further debate
which may be affected by time. In other words, a theory of
military relativity applies to LIC because low intensity is
relative to potential capability as well as to the continuum of
violence. This idea must be considered in the context of the
definition of LIC adopted by this same CADRE forum last year:

> "Non-nuclear situations ranging from terrorism, crises,
> and small wars to revolutions and counterrevolutions
> that require tailored limited responses short of national
> mobilization and often in conjunction with host regimes
> and third countries. These reponses are likely to be
> military or paramilitary for short situations, but of
> mixed political-economic-military-and other character
> for revolutionary and protracted conflicts."[9]

This definition describes the old Machiavellian principle of
connectivity between social, political, economic, and military

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subsets of power.

Col Harry G. Summers, USA, wrote a paper that took exception to the CADRE definition saying that it was too broad and did not consider our peacetime support of allies. He refined the LIC definition:[34]

> "Non-nuclear situations ranging from terrorism, crises, revolutions, and counter-revolutions that require tailored mixed political-economic-military- and other character limited responses in support of host regimes and third countries not involving the commitment of US combat forces to direct hostilities."

According to this, Grenada and Beirut did not qualify as a low intensity conflict. I disagree.

LIC: Legacy of Despair:

Both definitions include terrorism. In the past 15 years religious fundamentalism has begun to increase the role of social factors in LIC.[29,32] Along with it came a righteous mandate to employ fear as a strategy and terrorism as a tactic. Simultaneously, came the increased use of proxy forces by superpowers pursuing support among Third World nations and subnational groups. It is only since the Munich Massacre in 1972 that the concept of international terrorism became part of the modern vocabulary.[5,20] It is only within the last two years since the Beirut bombings that the notion of state-sponsored terrorism became a household word. Both occurred because smaller states, even fanatical subnational and religious groups, wished to challenge established powers and superpower where there was no successful military way to challenge superpower in protest.[19] This point speaks to relativity in applications of violence.

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The US did not retaliate against terrorist bombings in Beirut because there was no clear target to strike without substantial, unacceptable damage to innocent people, not a consideration to terrorists and sponsor states involved. Does this make terrorism low intensity for superpower and high intensity for the Armenians, the PLO, Black September, Shi'ite Muslims or Libya? The USSR has few terrorist incidents because the state holds total power.[32] The US, on the other hand, is well known for its restraint. When sufficiently provoked to respond, the US is likely to employ conventional forces, because it has no unconventional strategy. Conflict in the 1980s is more complicated because the US has no coherent LIC strategy. When John Kennedy began the special forces program in 1960, the Jungle Jims were bilingual examples of military power used to improve the human condition. They had a medical and cultural mission along with military goals. Terrorists have no such thoughts. The US is increasingly involved as a target of terrorism while the USSR and its proxies have become perpetrators of terrorism and LIC.

State-Sponsored War:

State-sponsored and religious terrorism have become an undeniable part of LIC. In this decade power applied by individuals in the form of terrorism rose to new heights that mark unprecedented levels of murder against innocent by-standers as well as government officials. The impacts of religious fanaticism are only beginning to be understood.[29] In a RAND study on terrorism published in 1980 there was little attention

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given to the concept of mass social casualties because there had not been many. The term state-sponsored terrorism was not to be found. Hijackings, hostages, barricade confrontations, and assassinations nearly completed the repertoire of terrorist tactics in the 1970s. International terrorism only came into vogue after the 1972 Olympic Village kidnapping and massacre carried out by a subnational group inside the borders of a third country.[20,32]

Another RAND study by Brian Jenkins following The Long Commission's Report on the Beirut Bombing finally identified the state-sponsored terrorism which had become obvious and ominous. This RAND paper brought out many of the problems defining idea of low intensity conflict and strategies to deal with it, but it showed clearly that state-sponsored terrorism firmly entered the realm of LIC and that the rate of change was accelerating. From Jenkins' The Lessons of Beirut:[19]

> "The attack on the Marine Headquarters in Beirut con-
> forms to several trends in international terrorism:
> The volume of terrorist activity has increased in the
> last 15 years, terrorism has grown bloodier, there
> is increasing use of terrorism by governments. We may
> be on the threshold of an era in which limited conven-
> tional war, classic guerrilla warfare, and international
> terrorism will co-exist, with both governments and sub-
> national entities employing them individually, inter-
> changeably, sequentially, or simultaneously. As a re-
> sult, the United States will be compelled to maintain
> capabilities for defending against and, with the excep-
> tion of terrorism, waging all three modes of conflict....
> "If more governments opt to use terrorism and the
> international community fails to impose effective sanc-
> tions, military force may become the only means of
> combatting terrorism. The kinds of military operations
> in which U.S. armed forces may become involved include
> preemptive, search and rescue, and retaliatory or
> punitive operations."

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Of particular interest to the US is the need to wage both
conventional and classical guerrilla warfare in LIC as well
as to defend against international, subnational, and state-
sponsored terrorism. It is in this role of defense against
terrorism that many conventional notions of conflict disappear.
The US may not have the luxury of choice about whom, what,
where, and when to fight. The most serious issue is how to
fight.[7,27] Which actions in the social, political, economic,
or military arena produce the best results? What is the proper
superpower response to LIC: pre-emptive strikes, retaliatory
strikes, full-scale military operations? Mr. Jenkins ultimate
conclusion to the specific arena of terrorism was that
military forces may not be, but should be, adequately prepared
to deal with terrorism. I could not agree more. Unfortunate-
ly, neither regular nor special operations forces today are ade-
quately prepared to deal with LIC because US political doctrine is
only beginning to recognize the issue. Until the Reagan
administration decided to confront the growing problem head
on, there was no clear leadership defining which direction
the Departments of Defense and State should go to combat LIC.
A firm and stable policy by the US will help others to decide
policies and reactions. Commensurate spending on SOF needs
to occur to put our money where our mouth is.

It is terrorism along with unstable political situations
in the Third World that emphasize the level of the problem in the
1980's. Normally, when applying military force there are con-

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siderable ramifications involving the internationally accepted

norms of proportionality, collateral damage, reciprority,

appropriate response.[5,19,20] Superpowers must not ignore this.

SUPERPOWER

World Paranoia:

With reciprocity in mind, it is worth a few moments to go

back to the basic issues involved when employing military force.

When a superpower commits its forces, the questions of appro-

priateness race around the world because today the final escala-

tions of superpower can in fact endanger the world. This idea

of superpower did not exist before the atomic bomb, but now the

whole world watches, transfixed, when the US or the USSR commits

its military forces anywhere, anytime. The world watches even

closer when air forces go into action, because of the inherent

flexibility, devastation, and quick reactions that can rapidly

escalate to high levels including atomic power. While airpower

brought us combat at the speed of sound, atomic power brought us

combat at the speed of light. Superpower weapons can accelerate

LIC to such a pace; so can terrorists who steal superpower weapons.

Mental Block:

The United States was involved in Korea, Viet Nam, the

Dominican Republic, and Lebanon. These may have exceeded LIC

boundaries, but they all showed one trend, an unwillingness to

build, to maintain, to employ unconventional warfare forces. The

US regularly ignored SOF, even when LIC situations called for them

and when adversaries used SOF extensively. Take a look at the

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history of our DOD budget process. While our special operations forces were involved in each conflict, and are the most likely to be involved in future conflicts forecast to be of LICs (hence the conference), we spend less than 1/10 of one percent of our DOD budget on SOF, the specialists in LIC.[4,27] Perhaps as Professor Michael Howard suggested, the US cannot scale down its thinking to the level of low intensity.[18] For that reason, he said, the US was not, nor was it likely to become, effective against terrorists. This is not very optimistic since LICs are expected to increase because of terrorism, state-sponsored and otherwise. How we define LIC may shape how we respond to it, because definition helps to identify the threat.

Organize:

How we respond is a result of many factors, but one of the most significant ones is how we plan and organize to wield super-power. Grenada was a bad example of LIC from the planners' perspective, because it involved a real world crisis on an extremely compressed time scale, something else that is a likely trend of the future. Professor Howard's criticism that the US cannot think small enough to counter LIC and terrorist events may apply. The Philadelphia Inquirer claimed that Grenada was planned and initiated by "conventional staff officers, who have little understanding of SOF tactics or capabilities, who did the planning for Grenada in less the 72 hours".[37] When a joint or service staff does not employ its own SOF specialists in planning, it is not surprising that SOF capabilities are not fully or properly

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exploited. If that is a typical example, SOF may not be properly employed in the next LIC either, because in the real world of terrorism and exploitation Grenada may be closer to the norm than the exception. As a SOF Air Staff officer I can tell true stories about visits to more than one office where no one knew what SOF meant, much less its uniquely tailored capabilities. If we do not learn to properly employ our existing staffs, we will not often succeed employing airpower or superpower at any level of conflict.

Need Tactics:

Considering the range of force options the President has available ranging from nuclear and conventional to unconventional, it is curious that unconventional warfare should receive so much attention in the press.[13,27] Most people prefer to ignore the very real aspects of LIC, because killing people on a small scale, especially on an individual basis, becomes morally murky as one moves into the ranges of covert, clandestine or black operations. LIC battlefields can be urban environments or jungles. Targets can be whole groups or individuals

. Yet while Congress and the courts debate morality, the military is expected to respond.[14] In order to respond, it is important that the forces be tailored to deal with the threat, to resolve the conflict in a manner favorable to US interests. One of those interests is popular support for the government. Since the American people regard conventional tactics as accept-able, but UW or LIC tactics as suspicious, the politico-military

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planners in the National Security Council and Pentagon often use conventional assets to respond to LIC situations, even terrorism. This, conversely, de-emphasizes our primary LIC force, the un-conventional SOF.[1,7,14]

Need Strategy:

One of the methods of measuring intensity of conflict is simply to count the dollars. What is the cost? It is in this effort that I propose airpower as a meaningful criteria for de-fining levels of intensity. It is in this arena that one can see clearly that airpower, like dollars, is a relative measure within and between state's capabilities. The relative effort for the North Vietnamese or North Koreans was much higher, in spite of Soviet support, than the effort required by the US to mount airpower campaigns in those theaters, half a world away. In any theater, the application of airpower requires a broad level of economic sophistication to build, to train, to employ aircraft, or missiles. In any role airpower assets are expensive. Of all DOD expenses 1/10 of 1 percent does not seem much for the trained LIC elements, SOF.

While AFSOF airpower is often the first in and the last out both in peacetime and in war, the same is not true for fighters, bombers, and missiles. SOF aircraft can be employed secretly or with a very low operational signature. If MC-130 Combat Talons or HH-53 Pave Lows launch, it is possible that no one knows what is going on outside of an intimate circle in the executive branch The US Constitution organized us that way.

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Employment of conventional airpower leads to instant recognition
that a major power play is occurring.[36] It is a statement of
foreign policy as US reaction to Nicaragua's alleged MIG delivery
showed.[30]

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Normally, fighters, bombers, and missiles are not the proper
superpower tool in LIC. Yet ABC News reports that we have plans
to hit terrorists with F-14's in the Middle East.[1] There may be
times and places to use conventional airpower along with AFSOF in
LIC. Consequently, our tactics, strategy, and doctrine need to
be developed to show clearly where and when such is the case.
Nevertheless, it is prudent to have well equipped AFSOF, because
Soviet probes in the Western Hemisphere will continue to test US
resolve on the Monroe Doctrine. We need to be able to respond at
low levels as well at high levels of conflict.

Need Doctrine:

The country generally backed President Kennedy in his bold
handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis as he balanced the terror
and asserted US power backing the Monroe Doctrine. The same
popular support failed Lyndon Johnson six years later in a con-
flict outside of the Western Hemisphere. When the press joined
much of the rest of the country condemning the Viet Nam conflict
a war as that was undeclared, uncontrolled, expensive, and
immoral, it set a mood of unpopularity for LIC. Viet Nam led to
our present era and dilemma about LIC because the US employed SOF
extensively there, with bad press along with 500,000 regular

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troops over a protracted period.

It is ironic that Kennedy's Jungle Jim LIC commandos in Central America enjoyed great success by playing a very active role in civic actions without engaging much in combat.[35] They simultaneously employed civic action with military know-how and language skills to diffuse LIC, in contrast to Cuba which uses its advisors to fuel LICs.[33] Kennedy's Commandos were withdrawn to participate in the bigger war in Viet Nam where SOF fought guerrillas on their own terms. One man's freedom fighter is another man's terrorist, but to Americans, who felt unattached to events in Southeast Asia, our own counterguerilla forces seemed immoral. Fighting LIC at its own level lost popular US support, and shortly thereafter a political backlash occurred. We must be more sophisticated and recognize implications of our military power in social, economy, and political life wherever we engage in LIC and apply tactics accordingly. Both military and political leaders must understand LIC and superpower.

SUMMARY

As a superpower the US has a special responsibility to citizens of the world that it will not overreact. At the same time, it has responsibility to its own citizens to protect them and their interests. Such protection includes the ability to respond to terrorists and LICs. Without clear leadership, purposeful doctrine, and established strategies and tactics, the US will flounder in its ability to deal with a future that is likely to be filled with LICs. Terrorism will continue to be a particular

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challenge that could become a stumbling block for our free society. To prevent that from happening, we must train, equip, and organize both our regular and Special Operations Forces to deal with all power levels of conflict. This is especially true because trends in the 1980s indicate that low intensity levels of conflict will become the norm in the future.

Superpower airpower will often be the force employed in LIC because it is quickly mobilized and launched. The US has a responsibility to pay more attention to its Special Operations Forces because they are well suited to engage LIC enemies, whether they be terrorists or guerrillas. AFSOF includes all elements of airpower and must be further developed and tailored to LIC. If we do not prepare Air Force SOF to deal with this threat, we will badly miss the mark and lose the trust of our lesser developed allies who need our support. Most importantly, the US needs to perceive the LIC threat in the proper perspective of the superpower balance of power. Our ultimate responsibility is to balance that power in an attempt to make the world a safer, and hopefully, better place to live.

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SORTING OUT THE SEMANTICS

OF

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

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SORTING OUT THE SEMANTICS OF
LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

The problem. The many confusing and often overlapping terms
relating to Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) have led to frequent
misuse and misinterpretation of concepts and terminology in this
field. To make matters worse, recent writers on the subject have
added to the confusion by introducing terms of their own
invention, perhaps hoping to avoid the ambiguity of the older,
more familiar terms. The resulting lack of standardization of
terms in this re-emerging school of military thought has
complicated the task of developing clear doctrinal and training
documents.

The problem of uncertain word usage in LIC literature arises
from four sources. Lack of corporate continuity is the first of
these. The "on again...off again" characteristic of national
high level interest in third world insurgencies has segmented the
chain of special operations (SO) expertise and caused repeated
iterations of related semantics.

A second source of ambiguity stems from the reluctance of the
national hierarchy; e.g. state department, defense department,
politicians; to use terms that have been "contaminated" by
association with a politically unpleasant event or an unwanted
connotation. For example, the popular use of the term
"counterinsurgency" has given way to "internal defense", "foreign
internal defense", and now "collective security". This frequent

1·0   2·8   2·5

3·15   2·2

3·5

1·1   4·0   2·0

4·5

1·8

1·25   1·4   1·6

NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS
MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART

"changing of the linen" only clutters the LIC vocabulary with many meaningless and repetitive terms.

The third source of confusion in LIC terminology is inherent in its joint nature. That is, special operations are conducted by all military services, and each tends to attach its own parochial bias to the term. Frequently each service has a favorite word or acronym for the same idea, resulting in a lack of common terms among the services. This problem is being approached by the development of joint doctrine and manuals such as JCS Pub I and JCS Pub 20, but is far from a solution because the process of terminology arbitration itself is often another source of ambiguity.

The fourth source of ambiguity in LIC terminology is rooted in its inherent "secret" nature. Cover words or terms are frequently assigned to classified verbage in order to disassociate the secret aspect of the mission from terms that could be used openly. For instance, the adjective "special" is frequently used to provide an innocuous connotation to a force or mission which is classified. Although frequently necessary, this process of "sanitizing" the language only adds to the ambiguity problem.

In sum, the semantic problems plaguing LIC literature have largely been created by the bureaucratic processes of the system using the terms, and only a return to the semantic roots of LIC will yield meaningful terms. This paper researches and reports on the environment of low intensity conflict, revolutionary

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warfare, and the nature of special operations. The task of deriving terms from these sources is the first, and probably the easiest step toward a complete solution. The second and third steps involve the joint acceptance and eventually the publication of the terms. And, unfortunately, diligent adherence to these terms by each service may not come easy. But nevertheless, to complete a task one must begin. An understanding of LIC terms begins with a study of the origins of special operations.

The Origins of Special Operations (SO). Although various related subconcepts of SO, such as unconventional warfare, date back to biblical times, the seeds of the contemporary application of SO were sewn during this century. The teachings of Mao, Castro, Guevara, Giap, Marighella, and other modern revolutionaries have changed the political face of the earth since Lenin and a few hundred followers sparked the Bolshevik revolution in 1917. These teachings gained practical application after World War II, especially in national liberation movements around the world.[1] The advent of nuclear weapons and the adversary relationship between the U.S. and the Soviet Union have given form and meaning to the strategy of revolutionary war inspired and fostered by the overall communist movement.

In implementing this strategy, the Marxist-Leninist concept of class wars provided the ideological justification, and the Soviet and Chinese experience in revolutionary war provided doctrinal backdrop and "moral" support to the insurgent groups

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operating in regions of internal conflict.[2] The challenge to the

West was graphically posed to President Kennedy in 1961. When

Khrushchev announced the Soviet's support for "wars of national

liberation" wherever it was needed, Kennedy responded by tasking

the Defense Department to develop the doctrine and capability to

meet the threat.[3] As a result, the military service school

archives contain many now-forgotten scholarly analyses of the

proper U.S. role in revolutionary warfare. These roots of

SO doctrine relate directly to the term "low intensity conflict"

which is derived from the popular spectrum of conflict model.

Low Intensity Conflict. The spectrum of conflict which poses as

a model for military strategists (and thesis writers) for

speculation on future wars is shown in figure 1.

FIGURE 1

SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT

INCREASING INTENSITY		
LOW	MEDIUM	HIGH
(REVOLUTIONARY)	(CONVENTIONAL)	(NUCLEAR)

The absolute spectrum of conflict for our world ranges from low

to high as shown. The parenthetical labels under the spectrum;

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e.g. revolutionary, conventional, and nuclear; generally relate that specific type of conflict to it's intensity range.

Although it is true that a revolutionary war may be relatively high intensity to the nation involved it is nonetheless "low" in absolute terms. The validity of this model depends on its relativity to this absolute scale. On the other hand, it is important to remember that a low intensity conflict to a superpower may be a high intensity conflict to a lesser developed country. The significance of this statement lies in the fact that how a conflict is perceived by the participants determines the degree of dedication and sacrifice they exhibit, often a deciding factor in revolutionary warfare.[4]

The term "low intensity conflict" is derived from this model. Other terminology, such as "low-level conflict", "low order conflict", "small war", "brush fire war", etc., has recently been used in LIC literature to describe this fundamental area of conflict. But because of its graphic representation in this well-known model, "low intensity conflict" is the most appropriate and logical term to describe the region of conflict applicable to revolutionary warfare.

Special Warfare. One could conclude from the foregoing discussion that special operations occur only at the low end of the spectrum. On the contrary, SO forces frequently have been tasked to complement regular forces in conventional operations as well. During World War II, for example, the OSS[5] conducted

operations in all major theaters providing important contributions to the overall allied effort by conducting "behind the lines" operations for which conventional forces were ill-prepared.[6] Even today, SO forces are expected to be involved in medium and high-intensity conflicts.

In short, SO forces are tasked to conduct wartime operations using their special skills and equipment. As such, this concept of special operations during wartime would more appropriately be called "special warfare". Although this term may be new to many, special warfare was originally used to encompass the same general concepts that special operations does now. Special warfare was changed to SO when it became apparent that the related activities were as necessary during "peacetime" as during declared war. And although "special warfare" has declined in general use it has been retained by the Navy to mean those special clandestine activities performed by the Navy SEALs and other Naval Specwar forces in support of fleet operations during wartime. For this reason, "special warfare" is a logical choice for the term to describe the subset of special operations that are conducted during wartime. The lack of a designated term for this region of SO combat has created confusion by giving two distinct meanings to the term "unconventional warfare (UW)".

Over the last 50 years, UW has described almost everything that didn't fit the conventional concept of land-mass warfare. One definition of UW includes nuclear and biological warfare. But generally UW has been most closely associated with guerrilla

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warfare and psychological warfare. During WWII, for instance, US

support of partisan warfare behind enemy lines was termed UW.

Today UW is generally understood to mean commando-type operations

and guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines. In fact it is

frequently misused interchangeably with the term "special

operations". UW is even confused by some with the concept of

counterinsurgency. This confusion can be cleared up by making a

semantical analysis of revolutionary warfare which encompasses

these concepts.

Revolutionary Warfare. The terminology associated with

revolutionary warfare is a mixed bag of terms and counter-terms.

For instance, guerrilla, counter-guerrilla; insurgency,

counter-insurgency; and revolution, counter-revolution. Other

terms include: irregular warfare, unconventional warfare,

insurrection, resistance movement, destabilization operations,

internal defense, foreign internal defense, collective security,

and others.[7] A clear way to sort out these terms is by lining

them up on the appropriate side of the revolution (see figure 2).

Like a coin, every revolution has two sides: the insurgency side

and the incumbency side. The principals of the respective sides

are the insurgent, who seeks to gain power, and the incumbent,

who seeks to retain the power or government of the country in

question.[8] Figure 2 shows the arrangement of revolutionary terms

on their appropriate side.

FIGURE 2

THE TWO SIDES OF REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE TERMINOLOGY

INSURGENCY	INCUMBENCY

Related Terms:
  Unconventional Warfare
  guerrilla warfare
  resistance movement
  destabilization
  insurrection
	Related Terms:
	  Counterinsurgency
	  internal defense
	  foreign internal defense
	  collective security
	  civic action
	  nation building
	  counter-guerrilla operations

Participants:
  insurgents
  freedom fighters
  guerrillas
  partisans
  rebels
	Participants:
	  incumbents (government in power)
	  counter-guerrilla forces
	  allied COIN forces
	  loyalists

After a successful communist revolution, any insurgency is termed as:
 	
  counter-revolution
	and the communist government is called the:
	
	  revolutionary government

FIGURE 2

Although insurgency and counter-insurgency are opposing

concepts, revolutionary and counter-revolutionary are not, at

least from the Marxist point of view. Using Marxist terminology,

the counter-revolution can only occur after the original

incumbent has capitulated and a socialist (communist) government,

called the revolutionary government, has taken over.[9] Any

insurgency attempt or other real or perceived threat against the

revolutionary government is termed a counter-revolution. This

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obvious play on words is meant to semantically discredit any
revolution or movement other than the socialist one, and it
emphasizes the importance the Marxists place on propaganda.
Every thought and word must support the perception that the
communist movement is inevitable and good, and that any force in
Opposition is reactionary and ultimately doomed.

Good examples of counter-revolutions are those occurring in
Angola and Nicaragua. In these two cases, the war of national
liberation has succeeded, a Marxist government has been installed
in power, and insurgent "counter-revolutionary" forces (former
incumbent forces) are now engaged in guerrilla warfare against
the "revolutionary" government. Using this backdrop of
revolutionary warfare, the distinction between LIC terms can be
derived by studying the nature of SO.

The Nature of Special Operations. SO forces can operate on
either side of the revolutionary coin. Although directed in the
early 60s to engage primarily in counterinsurgency activities,
these forces are also capable of supporting the insurgent or
"resistance movement" by conducting unconventional warfare.[10]
A common misconception about UW is that it is conducted on both
sides of the revolution, but this is simply not so. The same
units and tactics may be used in conducting guerrilla warfare as
are used in conducting counter-guerrilla operations but only the
former case is unconventional warfare. The distinction to

remember is this; when the SO forces are supporting or engaged in operations favorable to the insurgents against the incumbents, they are conducting UW. When these forces are supporting or engaged in operations in favor of the incumbents against the insurgents, they are conducting counterinsurgency, also known as foreign internal defense (FID)[11].

"Foreign internal defense" has been replaced in JCS Pub 20 by "collective security", presumably because of the negative connotation of the word "foreign" and associated US failures of the underlying concept in the recent past. The term "foreign internal defense" came from adding "foreign" to "internal defense" which means "...the measures taken by a government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency."[12] FID then came to mean assistance by an outside government (the U.S. in this case) to help the incumbent conduct "internal defense". Since written documents on the subject of LIC are not changed as easily as State department and Pentagon "buzzwords", the reader of recent LIC manuscripts will have to consciously replace FID with "collective security" and remember it refers to "counterinsurgency" and other measures taken by the incumbent government and its allies, often including the U.S., to free itself from insurgency. A return to the familiar and descriptive term "counterinsurgency" eliminates this ambiguity.

The next two facets of SO are not necessarily involved with revolutionary warfare. These subsets of SO are direct action mission (DAM) and counterterrorism (CT).

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Direct Action Missions (DAM). This term has been around the SO lexicon since the early 70's when the Army coined DAM as a part of UW so it would be an official mission of the special forces.

In the context of UW, DAM were those commando-style sorties behind the lines that were conducted solely by US SO forces. This differed from guerrilla raids which were conducted primarily by the indigenous irregular forces. Recently, in an attempt to paint UW as primarily indigenous, which it should be, albeit with some outside help, the term DAM was removed from the definition of UW and made a subset of SO.[13] As it turned out this was a good move as it helped put UW back in the hands of the guerrillas where it belongs. At the same time it gave the SO community a term for that unilaterally conducted "commando raid" or "rescue" that was not associated with a war or revolution. The failed Iran rescue mission and the successful "Entebbe Raid" are examples of this concept. Although DAMs have been called "special operations" for many years by many people, in reality, DAMs are only a small subset of the overall "umbrella" concept of special operations. The relationship of SO to its subsets is illustrated by figure 3.

FIGURE 3

SPECIAL OPERATIONS UMBRELLA

1. Special warfare involves activities conducted behind the lines during wartime

2. Unconventional warfare involves assisting guerrilla forces engaged in a revolutionary war.

3. Counterinsurgency involves assisting government forces in a revolutionary war.

4. Direct action missions involve unilateral action by U.S. special operations forces in a hostile environment.

5. Counterterrorism involves continuous activities dedicated to pre-empting or terminating a terrorist act.

6. Psychological operations are activities which enhance the success of the other SO subconcepts by contributing to political objectives and exploiting cultural susceptibilities.

FIGURE 3

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Counterterrorism. One aspect of LIC to come to the forefront nationally as well as internationally is terrorism. Although not a new concept, the contemporary application of terrorism as a strategic option has created a whole new study of the idea. More specifically for the U.S., the problem has become how to counter or limit its effects. As with their "wars of national liberation", the communist world, through terrorism, is able to exert international political pressure without directly confronting western military power. However, as the problem continues to press US foreign policy makers, the subject is becoming better understood as the need to neutralize this threat has been elevated to a high national priority.

In the midst of much disagreement among those who are involved in this subject, one fact is generally given. Terrorism is nearly always conducted at the low intensity end of the spectrum. Because of this link to LIC and because of the inherent capability of the SO forces to operate in this environment, the concept of counterterrorism (CT) belongs as a subset of special operations.

One could argue that CT is really just another form of direct action mission and should be included under that concept. However this argument ignores the fact that CT involves much more than the "raid" or "rescue" that sometimes culminates a CT operation. The entire process is a continuous one, involving intelligence gathering, force planning, interagency coordination and unique logistics requirements. This ongoing characteristic

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separates CT as a concept distinct from the "one-shot" direct action mission. And in reality, the high priority assigned the CT mission would alone provide sufficient rationale to assign it separate status from the other SO subconcepts.

Psychological Operations (PSYOP). The final subject relating to the SO umbrella is PSYOP. Note it is depicted in figure 3 as the supports to the umbrella. PSYOP is not a mission parallel to the other five SO activities, although military managers of PSYOP assets continually try to manage it as such. PSYOP is a tool or weapon which can be employed (and is usually imperative) to insure the success of all types of special operations. Figuratively speaking, the umbrella would collapse without supporting PSYOP. For instance, since the objective of both sides of revolutionary warfare is the support of the population, the war cannot be won without effective PSYOP[14], intentional or not. One great advantage of guerrilla warfare is that the insurgent, though inferior militarily, can win by waging a powerful PSYOP campaign against the government in power.

To be used effectively, PSYOP must be centrally directed. Overall strategic objectives must be clearly articulated so that all operations, not just special operations, can be planned and conducted in order to support these objectives. As such, PSYOP is equally important to conventional operations. Too frequently, however, military objectives are given precedence over PSYOP objectives, even when they conflict. This is usually counter productive to the overall effort -- especially in revolutionary

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warfare where the objectives are more political than military. So as important as PSYOP is in all military activities, it is paramount in special operations. But PSYOP must be considered as a means by which to achieve the overall objective of the operation rather than a mission in itself. It is for this reason that PSYOP is depicted in Figure 3 as the supports of the umbrella not one of the various facets of SO. PSYOP contributes to the success or impact of all the other five missions but should not be considered a mission itself.

The SO umbrella which has been derived from the foregoing study of revolutionary warfare and the nature of special operations is similar to the "official" definition of SO. But there are differences which should be rationalized. The official list of special operations as listed in JCS Pub 20 Vol I states that

"Special Operations may include unconventional warfare, counterterrorist operations, collective security (foreign internal defense (FID)), psychological operations, direct action mission and intelligence (strategic and tactical) reporting."[15]

This list differs in that the definition presented by this article included the term "special warfare", changed "collective security" to "counterinsurgency", omitted "intelligence reporting", and identified PSYOP as a necessary, supporting ingredient of all aspects of SO.

The inclusion of "special warfare" in the SO terminology file was necessary to describe a realm of SO activities which occurs

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behind the lines in support of conventional operations during wartime. This move will help distinguish this facet of special operations from unconventional warfare which is the support of guerrilla operations in a revolutionary warfare scenario.

The decision to use "counterinsurgency" to describe the SO activities which involve assisting the side of a government fighting an insurgency, is based on semantic necessity. "Counterinsurgency" is a self-descriptive, meaningful term with common usage. "Collective security" has a vague association with it's intended meaning and a strong association with NATO and other "collective security" arrangements. This term is clearly unacceptable. "Foreign internal defense" is better, but not much. There is simply no need to invent bureaucratic "buzzwords" such as these when a perfectly good word is in common usage.

The recent inclusion of "intelligence reporting" in the SO arena is an example of "resmithing" the lexicon to justify force structure. This was done in 1983 to give the special operations forces a vital role in a NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation.[16] While the argument for enhancing the U.S. strategic position is sound, it is no case to incorporate intelligence reporting as a major subset of special operations. Intelligence reporting by SO forces is more appropriately identified as a designated mission of special warfare.

The final deviation of our SO model from the official list is that PSYOP has been assigned the important role of supporting the other aspects of SO. This overriding importance of PSYOP should

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be likewise projected to conventional military operations of all
services. In an environment which offers the spector of nuclear
holocaust, the psychological weapon is one which offers political
gains without nuclear risk. For this reason, US planners and
operators must utilize this weapon to the fullest. This can only
be done by superimposing the concept over all activities as
opposed to relegating it to a subset of SO.

Summary. The acceptance and use of these concepts and
definitions of special operations will do much to clear up the
misunderstanding and misuse of LIC terminology. If parochial
interests and bureaucratic inertia can be breached, eventual
joint acceptance will provide substantial impetus to the logical
development of SO doctrine. But acceptance of meaningful terms
and the formulation of clear doctrine is needed to provide order
and direction to special operations. Then, perhaps will SO be
recognized and accepted as a logical foreign policy option to be
considered in the complex strategy to check Soviet Marxist
expansion in the free world.

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APPENDIX I

Glossary

The following LIC terms and definitions have been derived from
JCS Pub 1, as well as SO, LIC, and revolutionary warfare
literature. They represent the author's recommendations to the
special operations community and Joint Military Terminology Group
for consideration in revising the official list of military
terminology in JCS Pub 1 and other joint and service manuals.
The list is limited to the key terms necessary to formulate the
basis for clear SO doctrine.

Anti-terrorism - Those activities conducted by an individual or
agency to prevent, reduce the probability of, or reduce the
effect of a terrorist act. Such measures may include
construction of barricades, varied travel routes and schedules,
special security procedures, and other actions which reduce the
vulnerability of persons or physical assets to acts of terrorism.

Counterinsurgency (COIN) - The aggregate measures taken by a
nation and the U.S. to free and protect that nation's society
from the effects of insurgency.

Counterterrorism (CT) - Those activities conducted by an
individual or agency to pre-empt or terminate a terrorist act.
CT is generally offensive in nature as compared to anti-terrorism
which is generally defensive.

Direct action mission (DAM) - A specified military or
paramilitary operation involving a commando style raid into a
hostile or denied area. DAMs are usually conducted covertly or
clandestinely by SO forces in order to rescue, strike,
reconnoiter, or destroy a target behind enemy lines.

Guerrilla raid - A paramilitary operation in unconventional
warfare involving a commando style raid usually conducted
clandestinely into a hostile or denied area by irregular,
predominately indigenous forces.

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<u>Guerrilla warfare</u> - Military and paramilitary operations conducted in hostile territory by irregular, predominately indigenous forces, usually in support of a resistance movement.

<u>Insurgency</u> - A form of revolutionary warfare involving a resistance movement by a disaffected portion of the population against the incumbent government. An insurgency usually consists of a methodically conducted, protracted struggle which seeks the support of the population and eventual overthrow of the incumbent government. The conflict usually involves insurgent initiated guerrilla warfare which may be supported by an external power.

<u>Low intensity conflict (LIC)</u> - On an absolute scale of all conflict, LIC is the order of non-nuclear conflict between people or nations involving limited destruction which falls short of that imposed by large scale conventional forces and weapons.

<u>Psychological operations (PSYOP)</u> - Political/military activities planned and conducted to influence the attitudes and behavior of a specific population.

<u>Revolutionary warfare</u> - Internal conflict involving at least one rebel faction which uses violence in order to overthrow the incumbent government. Though intra-national in character, revolutionary warfare frequently spreads to neighboring territory and attracts interest and support from other governments.

<u>Special operations (SO)</u> - A concept of military and political actions involving the use of specially trained, equipped, and organized forces in pursuit of national objectives worldwide in war or peacetime. Special operations forces may support conventional military operations across the spectrum of conflict but are specially designed for employment at the lower end of the conflict spectrum, assisting another nation or people defend against the imposing effects of an unpopular force or tyranny. Special Operations specifically include special warfare, unconventional warfare (UW), counterinsurgency (COIN), direct action missions (DAM), and counterterrorism (CT). In addition, psychological operations (PSYOP) are an essential element of all special operations.

<u>Unconventional warfare (UW)</u> - The support of paramilitary operations conducted by predominately indigenous guerrilla forces in support of a resistance movement by the people of that nation.

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Appendix II

ENDNOTES

1. William J. Pomeroy, ed., <u>Guerrilla Warfare and Marxism</u> (New York: International Publishers, 1968) pp. 9-49.

2. Ibid.

3. John F. Kennedy, <u>Public Papers of the President, John F. Kennedy</u>, 1961 (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1962), p. 236.

4. Sam C. Sarkesian, and William L Scully, eds., <u>U.S. Policy and Low Intensity Conflict</u> (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1981), p.6.

5. The WWII SO forces were organized under the Office for Strategic Studies (OSS), the forerunner of the CIA.

6. Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., <u>U.S. Army Special Warfare, Its Origins</u> (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1982), p. 23.

7. David Galula, <u>Counter-insurgency, Theory and Practice</u> (New York: Praeger, 1964), p. xiv.

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9. Sleeper, Raymond S., <u>A lexicon of Marxist-Leninist Semantics</u>, (Alexandria, VA: Western Goals Press, 1983), p71.

10. Paddock, op. cit, p. 23.

11. Field Manual (FM) 31-20, <u>Special Forces Operations</u> (Wash D.C.: Dept of the Army, Sep. 1977), p. 4.

12. FM 100-20, <u>Low Intensity Conflict</u>, (Wash D.C.: Dept of the Army, Jan. 1981), p. 274.

13. Minutes of Joint Military Terminology Group (JMTG) Meeting, Xerox, 15 September 1983.

14. Kelly George A., "Revolutionary Warfare and Psychological Action," <u>Modern Guerrilla Warfare</u>, (New York: Glenco Press, 1962), p429.

15. JCS Pub 20, Vol 1 (Wash D.C., 1983 Draft) p. 2-1.

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LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT: NON-COMBAT SOLUTIONS

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The United States is currently involved in a very significant, yet difficult, conflict in Central America. We are waging a war against Marxist-Leninist influence in the region. Influence which will undoubtedly assist Soviet goals in this hemisphere. The United States Government, through all possible avenues, must win this war, for obvious reasons.

The purpose of this paper is to describe what the United States Air Force is currently doing in the region, and make suggestions and recommendations on how we might improve our efforts. Our primary sources of information are personal experiences in dealing with the problem of combatting Marxist-Leninist penetration in the region.

Addressing this issue is of grave importance not just because of the critical situation we face in Nicaragua and El Salvador, but because most experts appear to agree that low-intensity conflict is the most likely form of warfare that we will fight in the future.[1]   The reason for this is simple. Through our conventional and nuclear military might we have successfully deterred conflict at the mid-to-high level portion of the conflict spectrum. However, low-intensity conflict is virtually impossible to deter owing to its very nature of low risk and low cost. Thus, we must do everything we can to learn to fight in the low end of the conflict spectrum.

This paper, however, will not deal with battlefield tactics or maneuvers, but will narrow its scope to an examination and evaluation of US assistance to foreign governments for internal defense. This application of Security Assistance is precisely what we are doing in El Salvador, and to lesser extents in most Latin American countries. This application is consistent with the Nixon Doctrine, reaffirmed by President Reagan, which generally states that the United States will provide its allies with equipment and training for internal defense, but will not provide US soldiers. If we, a major international power, are able to provide

proper and sufficient security assistance that enables recipient governments to maintain their own internal defense, we will, in fact, have precluded the necessity for US troops to become directly involved in any Third World conflict. Thus, in this paper we are primarily concerned with non-combat solutions, to the problem of Marxist-Leninist penetration in Latin America.

CURRENT EFFORTS

Before we discuss our security assistance efforts in Latin America, it is important to place our resources in perspective with the rest of the world. Latin America receives approximately 3% of total world-wide US security assistance.[2] This modest amount is significant by its small size in light of the fact that we are currently being directly challenged, by sworn enemies, in a region within our own hemisphere. Thus, we believe we have inherited more than 3% of the problem.

Our gravest immediate threat is in El Salvador. We are embroiled in an effort to maintain the integrity of the newly elected government in that country, a government that is being challenged by Marxist-Leninist insurgents. In order to meet this challenge, we are providing the government of El Salvador with equipment and training in order for that country to combat leftist guerrillas within their own borders.

In FY85 alone, the US Air Force will provide the equivalent of $1.5 million in military training for approximately 210 Salvadoran students. Most of the students will receive training at the Inter-American Air Forces Academy (IAAFA) at Albrook AFS, Panama. About 20 students will receive their training in the United States under special flying training scenarios. Most of the training conducted at IAAFA is technical in nature, such as aircraft mechanic and technical instructor courses. In the United States, Salvadorans will receive pilot training as well as professional military training. In terms of equipment, the US Air Force has a current case value in Foreign Military Sales (FMS) terms of approxi-

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mately $23 million for El Salvador. A major problem currently in progress is the modification of C-47s into air fire support platforms.

Honduras is another important ally primarily owing to its strategic location, adjacent to Nicaragua and El Salvador. In FY85, Honduras will receive over $1 million of International Military Education and Training (IMET) funds, representing training for approximately 450 Hondurans. Again, most of the trainees will receive their training at IAAFA in technical courses not taught in Honduran military schools. A major FMS program in Honduras was recently highlighted in national news articles - the delivery of 4 A-37s in September, 1984, under the PEACE RANAS II program. We currently have various FMS cases with Honduras with an approximate value of $20 million, a healthy percentage of that country's entire military budget.[3]

Our security assistance, of course, is not limited to these two countries. On the contrary, we provide security assistance to nearly every country in Latin America, the most significant case being the sale of F-16s to Venezuela.

Another threat which strikes directly at the heart of our nation's health and well-being is that of drug trafficking. The importance of the Latin American region with regard to the threat posed by the drug trade is highlighted by the fact that "in 1982, Colombia was the source of approximately 75% of the cocaine seized in the United States, for which the origin could be identified."[4] Additionally, Bolivia and Peru are the largest producers of coca, the base ingredient in cocaine production.[5] International drug trafficking is not just a domestic threat to the United States; it is a vital ingredient of the low-intensity conflict threat as well. It has been verified, especially by drug raids in Colombia, that subversive groups are deeply involved in the drug trade. This is logical since such groups require large sums of money to purchase weapons and run their organizations,

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and the selling of drugs is a relatively low risk method of acquiring such large amounts of money. Recent US efforts have been designed to trace and prove the link between arms suppliers and drug traffickers. However, even though we are taking steps to combat this problem on a national as well as an international level, US laws limit in many ways US military involvement in directly confronting and combatting the drug trade. Thus, all we can do is "provide training, technical equipment and intelligence."[6]

This, in no way, is an all-inclusive narrative of our efforts in Latin America. Our purpose here is to provide the reader with a general idea of _what_ and _how much_ we are doing in the region. Our major purpose at this point is to show the weaknesses in our efforts and recommend specific, workable solutions to a growing threat to our national security.

EVALUATION

Have we been doing the right things in Latin America? Let us evaluate our more recent efforts in the region before directly providing recommendations. Obviously, providing training and equipment, as we have been doing, is a necessary prerequisite for our allies to combat subversion, terrorism, and assassination. But, are we providing the appropriate kind and the correct amount of security assistance modules?

If we are primarily concerned with the low-intensity threat in the region, then there are areas where we are falling far short of providing the kind of assistance that we are capable of supplying to our friends in the hemisphere. As an example, most countries in the region have small unimproved airstrips in remote locations. However, the smallest cargo aircraft that the US Air Force has available to sell to US allies is the standard version C-130, and a C-130 can land only in a handfull of carefully selected airfields throughout the Central American region.[7] Another example, Latin American countries also require cheap,

easy to maintain military equipment, such as radios, navigation equipment and technical test equipment. Too often, our equipment is far too expensive or sophisticated for these countries to purchase, let alone maintain for 10-20 years.[8]

The most poignant criticism of our efforts in Latin America, however, deals with the lack of recognition of the human element of the low-intensity threat. Low-intensity conflict can be viewed as having two elements - military, and non-military (or human). It is given that subversive groups employ military force to frustrate, and ultimately to defeat, the regime in power. Historically, military might has always been an integral part of any revolution. Concurrently, however, subversions have always relied on non-military strategies to succeed. It is this non-military aspect that we wish to address, since it appears that the US government is failing to place sufficient emphasis on this singularly important element of low-intensity warfare.

When we speak of the human or non-military element we are referring to the battle for the "hearts and minds" of the people. This is a critical element needed to gain the support of the indigenous population, since no armed uprising can succeed without logistics links and intelligence networks. Any concerted effort to defeat insurgents must address this form of conflict or the sovereign state is doomed to failure.

There are two aspects of the non-military element of low-intensity conflict that have been needlessly relegated to the "back burners" in our efforts within the Latin American region. First is civic action, a term closely connected to national development and governmental involvement. Second is psychological operations within specific insurgency areas.

In retrospect, during the 1960s when guerrilla movements reached an epidemic level in Latin America, US officials placed great emphasis on civic action programs both in Latin American countries and in training programs designed for US personnel enroute to overseas assignments. This emphasis was intended to convince

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the Latin American militaries that defeating the guerrillas would be impossible unless the military elicited the cooperation of the people and both groups rejected the guerrillas and their beliefs. Of course, in order for such a favorable outcome to materialize the military had to have been viewed in a favorable light by its own people. US officials publically argued that the only way this could happen would be for the military to become totally involved in responsible people-oriented programs. In short, the military had to conduct successful civic action programs throughout threatened areas of its country. This concept, when carefully planned and extended, closely relates to the idea that national development greatly reduces insurgency in a given region - in this case Latin America. National development is currently a tenet of our foreign policy scheme in this region. We are pleased that foreign policy-makers have recognized that the underlying causes of subversion in the Central American region are due more to socio-economic problems than other problems. Alleviating those socio-economic problems, it is believed, will greatly reduce future opportunities for subversion. Bottom line: If the socio-economic conditions in a particular country improve, then insurgent groups will find it extremely difficult to win the hearts and minds of the people. Civic action programs, designed to support national development, aid in the improvement of the people's living conditions, making them more supportive and loyal to their government.

The US Air Force recently conducted training during which humanitarian assistance was provided that illustrates the benefits of such worthwhile programs. Detachment 1, 2nd Air Division, Military Airlift Command, Panama, conducted special operations high altitude training in Costa Rica and incidental humanitarian assistance was provided. "Detachment 1 transported approximately 3,000 lbs of food to a village for more than 200 people that had been cut off by floods for weeks -- and was in danger of starving".[9]   In addition, through this helicopter airlift, doctors, dentists and Red Cross personnel were made available to tend to the needs of Indians in remote sites.[10] In praising the program, Maj Glenn Ferguson, Com-

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mander of Det 1, 2AD, wrote: "Ambassador Windsor later stated that we were able to accomplish in 2 short weeks what the rest of the various [US] embassy programs took years to do in so far as public relations are concerned".[11] Unfortunately, sometimes it is difficult or impossible for the US Air Force to become directly involved in civic action activities due to legal considerations; i.e., the Air Force in many circumstances, is prohibited from applying fiscal resources to civic action programs.[12]

As additional testimony, several countries in Latin America are making strong efforts in the area of civic action/national development; they have been sold on the utility of these programs. For example, the Brazilian navy recently completed a new hospital ship to provide regular health care for the people of the Amazon. More significantly, according to the Defense Attache Office in Guatemala, that country is also adamant that the best way to win the people away from the guerrillas is through civic action, and the application of a great deal of resources to this effort. Guatemala has instituted a project of "model villages" that has considerably enhanced the military's image. It has been observed that the villagers in these projects are much less likely to support guerrillas, since they have become attached to their villages and realize that supporting guerrilla movements could jeopardize their new-found gains.[13]

At this juncture one might well ask, should the US Air Force be involved in civic action and national development? Is that not the responsibility of other government agencies? There are several reasons why the military and the Air Force should be involved in such foreign policy initiatives. Speaking of the accomplishments of civic actions, Col Kenneth Alnwick has pointed out: "[civic action] teams often played a major role in a nation's internal development because only the military possessed the organization, manpower, technical skills, and resources needed to accomplish various development projects."[14] Additionally, in December 1984, a combined civic action program was conducted in Panama. The US Military

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Group, US Embassy, Panama, has stated that, because of the difficult terrain surrounding the targeted town, Llano Nopo, the mission can "only be correctly supported by air."[15] We believe the US Air Force can do a great deal for the national development of countries in Latin America. For example, the Center for Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown University is attempting to initiate a project to study the role of air transportation in national development. Their assumption is that aviation is a critical element of development in Latin America, owing to the difficult geography and the lack of road and railroad systems.[16] Most importantly, however, is that the Department of Defense is responsible for US national security. If civic action/national development programs enhance our security by limiting the effectiveness of Marxist-Leninist influence, then we must become involved in promoting such programs. The answer is obvious – we are needed, and we can become involved.

Let us now turn to psychological operations (PSYOPS), another important initiative that is currently receiving little attention by US forces in Latin America.[17] PSYOPS, as in the case of civic action and national development, involves the human element of low-intensity conflict. US Army Field Manual 33-1 describes the purpose of PSYOPS as follows: "The purpose of all psychological operations is to create in foreign groups the emotions, attitudes, or behavior to support the achievement of [US] national objectives."[18] Creating the proper emotions, attitudes, and behavior is precisely what must be accomplished in order to curb the tide of Marxist-Leninist influence in the region. Regardless of the importance of conducting PSYOPS, we believe the US military is not sufficiently emphasizing this element of low-intensity conflict. Of the three services, the US Army gives the greatest emphasis to PYSOPS, yet even its efforts in PSYOPS are very limited.[19] Many Army leaders have recognized the need to re-emphasize PSYOPS in Army doctrine, as well as in new force structures.[20] In addition, Col K. Alnwick has concluded that the "US Air Force no longer possesses a strong institutional counterinsurgency

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or psychological warfare capability."[21] The basic problem as Gen Paul Gorman, Commander in Chief, USSOUTHCOM, has pointed out, is that civic action and PSYOPS units are vitually absent from active forces.[22]

Of grave importance is that Marxist-Leninist employ extensive propaganda to gain support throughout the world. Our lack of PSYOPS allows them to increase their influence and appeal in Latin America. This situation is aggravated by the startling fact that approximately 50% of the total population in Cental America is under 14 years of age. If Marxist-Leninist propaganda continues unchecked and unchallenged in this region, that enormous portion of the population (those under 14) could well grow to maturity as anti-US adults. Perhaps an example will drive home the point. In northern Costa Rica the only radio broadcasts that the inhabitants receive originate from Nicaragua and Cuba, hardly bastions for freedom and democracy. This situation has existed for many years. Fortunately, just within the past few months, the US and Costa Rican Governments have agreed to establish a Voice of America station to provide an alternative viewpoint to those served by a duly-elected democratic government.[25]

PSYOPS, civic action and national development are initatives that address the human or non-military element of low-intensity conflict. We personally believe that efforts in these areas should stress two primary goals:

1. Develop programs which clearly neutralize the appeal of guerrilla type movements/activities.

2. Develop programs which clearly create a positive US image to the countries and peoples in the Latin American region.

The second goal is imperative, since, regardless of the success of non-military initiatives, there is always the possiblity that other outside pressures on a political system might be too great to bear and revolution could still occur. In other words, socio-economic prosperity does not ensure political stability. On the contrary, some analysts posit that prosperity leads to politcial instability.

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It is the authors' belief that prosperity and stability go hand-in-hand. Neverthe-less, if the US is involved in civic action, national development and PSYOPS pro-grams, then the chances will be greater that the opposition forces and the people themselves will be less anti-US, and less susceptible to anti-US propaganda.

Finally, some observers profess the theory that those who stress the socio-economic problems in the region are ignoring the military threat; and, certainly, some do. Conversely, those who stress the military target forget that Communism primarily draws it support, not from _guns_, but from _hearts_. Communism is an ide-ology fighting for men's minds. Without the mind the gun becomes useless. The current socio-economic conditions in Central America greatly aid the Communists in their quest for minds. Addressing this issue of inequitable socio-economic conditions is as important to our national security as any form of direct military action. We in the armed forces are responsible for safeguarding our national security; we must aggressively confront this emerging form of warfare - low-inten-sity conflict.

SUGGESTIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS

We must now ask, what can we do to improve our efforts in Latin America? First, and foremost, we must devote _more_ resources and attention to this volatile region. More relevant security assistance is required, both in equipment and training. We are giving too little attention to our southern neighbors, a region that can easily become our greatest national security threat.

Specifically, we propose immediate adoption of the following recommendations by the US Air Force:

1. Develop military equipment that is more appropriate for countries in Latin America, so as to address the military element of low-intensity conflict on its own turf, on our own terms, in our own time. Example: Develop aircraft that are light, easy to operate and maintain, and inexpensive; and ensure immediate avail-ability for security assistance .

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2. Dedicate more Air Force resources to civic action/national development and PSYOPS programs and initiatives so as to address the human element of low-intensity conflict. Ensure that adequate funds and personnel, as well as organizations, to adequately combat this element of low-intensity are funded and supported. Expansion of efforts in this very important area is mandatory. Supply aerial platforms and communications equipment for various types of PSYOPS missions with Air Force assets, including an expansion of an AF role in development of a national air transport system, country-by-country.

3. Develop expanded initiatives to combat international drug trafficking. Investigate and pursue initiatives to change provisions of US law to ensure that the military can become involved in fighting the international drug trade, especially since "the military is not funded in its budget to perform this function because the Congress and the executive branch (including DOD and the services) have not yet recognized international anti-narcotic operations as a military mission."[26] Thus, the first step we must take is to emphasize the threat posed to our national security by the international drug trade. We should also continue working and cooperating with other governments to attempt to alleviate this pernicious problem as much as possible.

In conclusion, even though we are currently increasing our security assistance to Latin America to defeat and deter Marxist-Leninist influence and aggression there is much more that we can do, as demonstrated by the above recommendations. Primarily, we must keep in mind what Major General Donald Morelli, US Army, deceased, an expert on low-intensity conflict, stated very eloquently:

> Low-intensity conflict defies purely military solutions. It requires
> a cross-discipline approach which recognizes the interplay of social,
> economic, political and military factors.[27]

We have a clear choice; we can either learn this lesson in the corridors of the Pentagon or learn it in the jungles of Central America.

NOTES

1. General Paul F. Gorman, US Army, "Low Intensity Conflict: Not Fulda, Not Kola", Unpublished Paper, US Southern Command, 7 June 1984, p. 10.

2. Ibid, p. 12.

3. Information on FMS and IMET was acquired from various Talking Papers and Background Papers filed at USAFSO/LAI, Howard AFB, Panama.

4. "Cocaine Review - 1982", The Quarterly: DEA Quarterly Intelligence Trends, Winter-Spring, 1983, p. 38.

5. Ibid

6. Lt Col R. A. Novack, USAF, "How May US Military Forces Participate With Host Country Law Enforcement Teams in Anti-Narcotic Operations in Foreign Countries?", Unpublished Fact Sheet, United States Southern Command, (date unknown), p. 2.

7. Gorman, p. 13 and Major Humberto Otero, US Southern Command, Special Assistant for Program Analysis and Evaluation, Personal Interview, 8 November 1984, Panama.

8. Otero Interview.

9. Major Glenn L. Ferguson, USAF, "After Action Report, Special Operations High Altitude Training/Civic Action, Costa Rica", unpublished Trip Report, US Air Force Southern Air Division, Howard AFB, Panama, 21 November 1984, p. 2.

10. Ibid

11. Ibid

12. Otero Interview.

13. This information was acquired through several US Defense Attache Office, Guatemala, reports that have been destroyed.

14. Colonel Kenneth J. Alnwick, "Perspectives on Air Power at the Low End of the Conflict Spectrum", Air University Review, March-April, 1984, p. 26.

15. Letter to General Paul F. Gorman, US Army, Commander, US Southern Command, Panama, from the US Military Group, US Embassy Panama, 30 July 1984.

16. "Caribbean Basin Development Through Air Transportation: Prospects Through the End of the Century:, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, Draft Document, 13 August 1984, p. 15.

17. Major Skip Anders, US Army, US Southern Command, Special Operations Division, Personal Interview, 13 November 1984, Panama.

18. Army Field Manual 33-1, Psychological Operations, (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, p. 2-4.

19. Anders Interview

20. Ibid

21. Alnwick, p. 28.

22. Gorman, p. 13.

23. Anders Interview.

24. Novack, p. 2.

25. Major General Donald R. Morelli, US Army, Retired, and Major (P) Michael M. Ferguson, US Army, "Low Intensity Conflict: An Operational Perspective", <u>Military Review</u>, November 1984, p. 4.

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An Analysis of Early Warning Indicators

Relative to United States Involvement

In Third World Conflict

Lt Col Lee Dixon, USAF
Leslie Lewis, PHD

During war a nation concentrates on execution of that war. But
when the war is over efforts shift toward planning for future
conflicts. Such actions usually include efforts at postulating
the future environment in which conflicts could occur. Analysis
of several long range studies developed over the past decade
consistently postulate the future environment in which this
nation will find itself as one providing numerous circumstances
for the U.S. to be involved in low intensity conflict.[1] Some of
the characteristics which could impact the vital interests of the
U.S. and contribute to this turbulent environment are portrayed
at Figure #1. These characteristics suggest that U.S. involvement
will probably not have the clear focus of resolve as past major
conflicts and may be fought on a battlefield even less defined
than the conflicts of Korea or South East Asia. Brian Michael
Jenkins, in a Rand publication entitled, "New Modes of Conflict,"
suggests:

> "The conflict in Lebanon is likely to be representative
> of armed conflict worldwide in the last quarter of the
> twentieth century; a mixture of conventional warfare,
> classic guerrilla warfare, and terrorist campaigns, openly
> fought or secretly waged, often without regard to national
> frontiers, by armies as well as irregular forces.[2]

The heightened involvement of the media and legislative
branch of government in national security and foreign policy
matters probably will not subside. Many would point to the
war in SEA as the turning point where populace awareness became
more focused on the process of establishing policy rather
than on the policy itself.[3] Colonel William Taylor alludes to
to this when he suggests the relationship between national security

FIGURE # 1

VISION OF THE FUTURE ENVIRONMENT

POLITICAL
- DIFFUSION OF POWER
- POLITICAL INSTABILITY

ECONOMIC
- REDUCED U.S. ECONOMIC DOMINANCE
- INTERDEPENDENT WORLD ECONOMY

SOCIOLOGICAL
- SOARING POPULATION IN LDC's
- DECLINE IN MILITARY AGE COHORTS

TECHNOLOGY
- RAPID ADVANCES
- ERODED U.S. SUPREMACY
- IMPROVED WEAPONRY/LETHALITY

MILITARY
- EXPANDED SOVIET POWER PROJECTION
- INCREASED TERRORISM . . . LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT
- MODERN WEAPONS (INCL NBC) PROLIFERATION

SOURCE: DAMO/ZXG

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and foreign policy has converged as shown in Figure #2. He believes that during the past three decades the tangential area of the spheres have substantially merged. Such events as the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks(SALT) and Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions(MBFR) move the two policies closer together, but the suddenness of the 1973 oil embargo underscored the interdependent nature national interests and all but fused the spheres.[4] Because we can expect that the use of military force, whether in a combative or non-combative role, will be extensively questioned and debated the decisionmaker's challenge is how to best instill a sense of national resolve to take those steps necessary where vital interests are threatened. If decisionmakers can predict crisis far enough in advance they may be able to undertake measures more commensurate with national beliefs and accomplish them in a more deliberate and non-reactionary manner. We attempted to determine if early warning indicators could be used to assist in that effort and, if so, with what amount of reliability. This paper looks at U.S. involvement in Third World conflict or crisis and the use of early warning indicators as a means to effectively predict where it might occur.

FIGURE # 2

NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY

SOURCE: WILLIAM J. TAYLOR, JR.
THE FUTURE OF CONFLICT

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II - U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN THIRD WORLD CONFLICT

Frank Klingberg believes that there is a cyclic nature to U.S. foreign policy that has approximately 16-year periods. He suggests that U.S. values move through periods that are introverted and extroverted phases. Following these phases he has the U.S. moving out of the introverted toward extroverted phase during the remainder of the 80s.[5] Others believe the interdependent nature of world affairs and the competition for dwindling resources forces the nation to maintain its global focus. Regardless of the reason, when U.S. interests are threatened we can expect the potential for involvement of military forces to be high. Much of that involvement is expected to occur in the lower end of the spectrum of conflict and hence is currently receiving a substantial amount of discussion. Mr Noel Koch, during congressional testimony recently stated:

> "We have a number of self-described defense thinkers, intellectuals and academics, who have seized on low-intensity conflict as the latest vehicle to the closest podium, symposiuum or talk show, not to mention any number of lucrative consulting contracts. As a remunerative fad, low-intensity conflict is surpassed only by the subject of terrorism, which itself has produced more experts in a shorter period of time than any issue since the energy crisis.[6]

What appears to be lost is that to effectively respond as a nation to the threat requires a degree of popular and political consensus not necessarily required when U.S. interests are threatened in a more direct manner. Consensus that is only forthcoming through education and discussion in forums such as this Air Power Symposium.

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"Mr Koch goes on to state, "what we do not have and will not have without profound changes is a clear understanding of what we mean by low-intensity conflict."[7]   Supporting Mr. Koch's observation of the need for resolving the issue of semantics is a noted pattern in many of the papers discussing low intensity conflict. They begin with an attempt at resolving the issue of semantics, followed by a graphic portrayal of their interpretation of the spectrum of conflict. A workshop sponsored by Air University's Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education (CADRE) on 22-23 Mar 84 attempted to rectify the issue of semantics and provided this definition:

> Non-nuclear situations ranging from terrorism, crises, and small wars to revolutions and counterrevolutions that require tailored limited responses short of national mobilization and often in conjunction with host regimes and third countries. These responses are likely to be military or paramilitary for short situations, but of mixed political-economic-military-and other character for revolutionary and protracted conflicts.[8]

Colonel Harry Summers suggests even this definition lacks a major distinction between war and peace and thus opens the door for a perception among the American people that military support during "peacetime" for allies is the first step toward direct commitment of combat forces.[9] To overcome this perception, the primary focus must involve those actions necessary for a threatened nation to protect itself. Theodore Shackley, drawing heavily on his experiences in SEA with the CIA discusses these actions by outlining the military oriented countermeasures a government should undertake in each of the four phases of an insurgency.[10] These actions are presented at Table #1.

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TABLE # 1

ACTIONS FOR COUNTER INSURGENCY

CADRE PHASE (#1)

- Determine the Recruiters

- Penetrate the Organizers

- Learn how they are recruiting and selection process

- Determine how to disrupt by due process of law

- Don't hide it

- Establish/Maintain an effective security agency

- Enact anti-terrorist laws

- Develop elite anti-guerrilla units within military or police force

INCIPIENT PHASE (#2)

- Identify the cadres as they reenter country

- Locate urban and rural safe houses that support operations

- Identify and disrupt external support lines

- Gain intimate knowledge of terrain best suited for guerrilla bases

- Establish informant networks in guerrilla's operational areas

- Organize effective civic action programs to encourage or reward loyalty

- Initiate anti-guerrilla operations with elite units as soon as intelligence reveals presence of bands

OPERATIONAL PHASE (#3)

- Accurately determine guerrilla's strength, disposition and intentions

- Intensify intelligence operations against support system

- Expand psyops to keep progovernment resistance alive in guerrilla-controlled areas

- Develop a credible amnesty program

- Expand civic action adjacent to guerrilla dominated areas

- Expand anti-guerrilla operations

- Establish tamper-proof population control mechanism

- Organize local self-defense forces

- Coordinate conventional military forces with elite anti-guerrilla units

- Establish interrogation capability to exploit prisoners

- Keep enemy off balance

COVERT PHASE (#4)

- Determine degree of U.S. Commitment

- Establish force levels for the Government's conventional forces requiring U.S. equipage

- Provide sufficient airlift capability for mobility

- Furnish instructors to expand specialized training programs

- Selectively employ "volunteers" as combat troops or advisors

- Appropriately expand operational phase programs proven successful

SOURCE: THE THIRD OPTION,
Theodore Shackley

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An expanded discussion of these actions is presented in his
book, The Third Option. Note that not until the later stages
is an attempt made to determine the degree of U.S. commitment.[11]
While this is consistent with the public concern for having
early U.S. involvement it permits the insurgents to develop the
infrastructure support for both political and military action to
become a formidable threat to the established government. This
is especially true in a remote or rural based society where
because of government inattention or incompetence the insurgents
and government usually start on an equal footing in an attempt to
win public allegiance.

Does earlier U.S. involvement, with either military or
paramilitary forces lead to an escalated level of conflict?
Bertil Duner, of the University of Uppsala, has studied external
military intervention in conflict for several years and categorizes
the instruments and levels of involvement as depicted at Table
#2.[12] Not only has he found few common features in the cases of
multiple involvment, but also that little evidence exists to
support a hypothesis of involvement occurring by different instru-
ments in succession (escalation). Duner's study addressed the
actors present in the involvement. Remarkably, the preponderance
of Less Developed Countries (LDCs) in relation to industrialized
countries was striking. This was especially true at higher
levels of intervention.[13] Still to be answered is the degree of
surrogate or proxy relationships present.

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TABLE #2

INSTRUMENTS AND LEVELS OF INVOLVEMENT

I. DIRECT COMBAT INVOLVEMENT

A. Invasion (regular)

B. Specialist functions

II. INDIRECT COMBAT INVOLVEMENT

C. Invasion (irregular)

D. Shelling

III. DIRECT PARA-COMBAT INVOLVEMENT

E. Advisory functions

F. Arms supply

IV. INDIRECT PARA-COMBAT INVOLVEMENT

G. Military training

H. Armed blockade

I. Financial support

V. DIRECT SUPPORTING ACTIVITIES

J. Military warning

K. Transport

L. Base functions

SOURCE: Bertil Duner
"The Many-Pronged Spear:
External Military Intervention
in Civil Wars in the 1970s"
Journal of Peace Research
Vol 20, NO 1, 1983

One of the critical aspects of U.S. involvement in these
conflicts is the perceived degree of U.S.S.R. participation.
Eliot A. Cohen notes that U.S. policy since World War II has
focused on a path of containment and conservation. He states,
"two principles have characterized American foreign policy since
World War II: containment and conservation." He went on to say
that, "as in the late 1940's, American foreign policy today aims
to limit the spread of Soviet influence which is now reflected in
the global conflict between the superpowers."[14] The second
principle is "the conservation of the world order as it stood at
the end of 1940's...includ(ing) an open world economy, agreed-
upon and virtually unchangeable borders, and the support of
moderate (i.e., non-revolutionary) regimes, which can have repub-
lican, monarchial, or limited autocratic forms of government."[15]
This propensity to view regional pertubations along East-West
conflict lines also contributes to the insurgents being able to
establish themselves as an effective force before countermeasures
can be formulated and implemented. Stephen Hosmer approached the
question of US involvement from one of constraints. He suggests:

> U.S. strategies in past Third World conflicts and crisis
> have evolved largely from cumulative constraints. That is,
> various U.S. administrations have tended to base strategies
> more on what they believed that the U.S. should not or dare
> not do than on what the battlefield situation of a particular
> conflict or crisis might optimally require. One finds a
> striking continuity in the fundamental motivations that have
> induced American decisionmakers, whatever their political
> affiliation, to constrain U.S. combat operations and other
> military responses in the Third World. [16]

Hosner goes on to point out that, "Paradoxically, U.S. concerns

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about igniting a third world war have both stimulated US intervention in the Third World conflicts and constrained the military strategies pursued in those interventions. Citing the memoirs of both Presidents Truman and Johnson he points out their concern that if the U.S. did not maintain a commitment to resist Soviet expansionism that it would open the path to expanding global conflict.[17]

The contrast between the perceptions of superpowers and the Third World toward security was reviewed recently by Mohammed Ayoob, Associate Professor of Political Science at the National University of Singapore. He believes that the major states, whether capitalist or socialist, have as their central concern the security of the international system.[18] That, as interdependence has become the dominant strand in strategic thinking, it has increasingly obliterated the distinction between state centric and system centric approaches to international security. On the other hand within the Third World, the predominant sense of insecurity emanates to a substantial extent from within their boundaries rather than from outside.[19] He points out that:

> This does not mean that external threats are totally absent, for they are not. But the 'mix' of internal and external sources of threat to these state structures, and particularly to their regimes, is quite often heavily weighted in favour of internal sources. Moreover, external threats quite often augment the problems of insecurity that exist within state boundaries and, in many cases, would be quite ineffective if internal threats and domestic fissures did not exist within Third World societies.[20]

In an effort to depict the differing perceptions of security and conflict between players we developed the graphic at Figure #3. It is where the vectors of each of the players intersect

FIGURE # 3

MULTIDIMENSIONAL ASPECTS OF CONFLICT

INDIGENOUS CONCERNS/PERCEPTIONS

WEAK INFRASTRUCTURES
THIRD WORLD DEBT
OVERPOPULATION
PERCEIVED U.S. DOMINATION
URBANIZATION

POWER PROJECTION
TRADE
SUPPORT TO 3RD
WORLD REVOLUTIONS
CHALLENGE U.S.
HEGEMONY

SOVIET
GOALS

U.S. INTERESTS/
PERCEPTIONS

TRADE
SEA LANES
SPHERE OF
INFLUENCE
GEOGRAPHICAL
PROXIMITY

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
that one can expect the opportunity for crisis or conflict to occur. As either U.S. or Soviet involvement increases indigenous perceptions are one of concern that the low-level involvement of a super power or its surrogate will result in a strategic war of survival for the indigenous government.

So far, the central overall balance of military, economic and political factors remains in an area of relative equilibrium. While the Soviets have made substantial improvements in their military capability, western economic growth has maintained its disproportionate lead. It is in this environment that the U.S. seeks to maintain and consolidate the US economic and military position internationally while preserving US political and economic strength at home. However one must ask whether this situation will last forever? Will unseen technological factors destabilize the balance? Will a superpower miscalculation of involvement in the Third World lead to a low intensity conflict that does expand to regional or global conflict? While empirical answers to these questions are lacking, decisionmakers can benefit from efforts to identify potential crisis regions and then develop proper political and military actions to defuse or at least limit the impact on U.S. interest in those strategically important countries. In particuliar are current crisis prediction mode's useful in predicting mid- to long-term contingencies(5-20 years away)?

Accurate predictors of future crises in regions strategically vital to the United States could enable decisionmakers to initiate necessary actions early to hedge against their impact. Early-warning indicators and crisis models can predict, with some accuracy, a crisis anywhere from two months to three years away (the highest success rate is with crises two to six months away). If decisionmakers are to be provided choices of military involvement short of direct action it is important to identify those potential crises for the mid- to long-term contingencies (five to twenty years in advance). For instance, few analysts argue that the Philippines is a potential crisis region. If current political and social unrest continues, U.S. interests in the region will be jeopardized. Certainly, long-term preventive actions could have been taken in the Philippines to quell growing anti-Marcos sentiments if the crisis had been predicted ten or even five years ago.

Preliminary research reveals that there is a plethora of data on early-warning indicators and potential crisis models. In particular, a large amount of data is available on crisis analysis. Analytic methods by which the Department of Defense (DoD), the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) attempt to forecast future crises and identify the causes of unrest and conflict was reviewed and assessed. These agencies do most of the potential crisis analysis for the U.S. Government. In addition, there are a number of firms, many of which are DoD and CIA subcontractors, and academic institutions that also do this work.[21]

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Models vary greatly in their scope and method of analysis.
Some models attempt to explain war, others conflict (religious
conflicts, territorial disputes, political wars). Most of the
work is geographical in orientation, concentrating on regions
such as Latin America, Africa, and Southeast Asia. Three
methodological approaches predominate: case-by-case historical
analyses, early-warning indicators, and quantitative and qualitative
models such as factor analysis, expert-generated data and
multivariant regression analysis. Frequently crisis analysis and
warning indicators use combinations of all of these methods.

Analysis of early warning indicators incorporates quantitative
and qualitative measures with demographic, economic, and military
phenomena. Examples include: growth in Real Gross National
Product (RGNP), literacy rates, and arms transfers from the U.S.
and U.S.S.R. We deliberately avoided evaluation of social and
political indicators. Measurement of such phenomena in the Third
World is infrequent or tenuous, frequently both.[22]

Indicators were examined for the crisis and non-crisis
countries, searching for general patterns and distinctions between
two groups. Representative questions are: do rising debt
obligations and declining personal wealth indicate an increased
potential for crisis, or are such conditions common in all poor
nations? In the years preceding crisis, are armed forces larger
or growing faster in nations experiencing crisis than in those
avoiding it?

For each crisis nation, a non-crisis nation was selected
from the same geographical region (Saudi Arabia/Lebanon, Angola/

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Kenya, El Salvador/Costa Rica, Argentina/Mexico). This selection scheme attempts to ensure a moderate amount of similarity between crisis and non-crisis groups as a whole, although individual nations are diverse. Furthermore, since the objective of this analysis was to review the efficiency of traditional early war inj indicators in predicting crises, nations were chosen on the basis of data and availability as well. Many Third World countries are without statistics for several of the indicators reviewed.[23] For the eight nations evaluated, however, only Lebanon and Angola are incomplete for more than one indicator.

While most phenomena examined is quantitative, the analysis is strictly qualitative. Thus, criticism of this study based on statistical methodology, such as sample size or randomness of choice, is not applicable. We believe that quantitative models of crisis for Third World nations are of limited predictive accuracy and subject to substantial drawbacks. Our rationale is that if there are consistent mid- to long-term crisis indicators, they should be observable in the analysis. An example might be: countries undergoing crises experience severe balance-of-payment deficits coupled with stagnating manufacturing output in the five to fifteen years prior to conflict. Nations avoiding crisis over the same time spans are marked by growing GNP's and increasing equality in their distributions. It is our belief that such generalizations are the strongest assertions to be gleaned from frequently inaccurate and distorted data from Third World countres. These generalizations, if they can be made, however, provide decisionmakers with insight into the conflict process.

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Indicator analysis and crisis models are evaluated for their mid- to long-term utility only. The mid- to long-term crisis analysis attempts to highlight future crises rather than short-term contingencies. Predictions from crisis analysis of when and where future crises will occur must also be consistent, reliable and highly accurate if decisionmakers are to use such the results in policy formulation. Predictions correct only half the time, or with high false alarm rates (predicting a crisis for a non-crisis nation) offer no more certainty than human judgment. Perhaps the most significant requirement is that potential crisis analysis serve as a valuable tool for gaining insight into the origins and causes of crisis; identification of crucial players in the conflict process and social-econo-political phenomena likely to incite a crisis will help to better address and hopefully alleviate future crises.

Early warning indicator analysis is hampered by a lack of definition of what consititues a crisis. The definition of crisis depends on the agency or business doing the data assessment as well as the individual analyst's social, economic and cultural perspective. A current government document on low-intensity warfare does not give a definition of crisis, though it gives detailed descriptions of how to respond to the various indicators of crisis.[24] Warren R. Phillips and Richard V. Rimkunas studied the methods used by DoD, Department of State and the CIA for identifying crises. Though all these organizations do early-warning-indicator analysis, there are variations in their definitions of what is

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a crisis and the methodologies used to indicate a crisis. The

military, the authors conclude, is the clearest on what constitutes

a crisis, but is overly sensitive to small-scale isolated insurgencies

and frequently ignores broader strategic issues such as territorial

integrity and overall Third World peace. The military defines

crisis as an imminent threat to American military activity which

"can be countered by immediate limited U.S. actions."[25] The

State Department defines a crisis as any threat to U.S. commitment

or precedence which compels unilateral and multilateral diplomatic

initiatives. Importantly, within the State Department there is

little agreement on what is a crisis. Nonetheless, the State

Department has a proclivity to proclaim many more crises than the

military or the CIA. This is attributable to their broad definition

of crises and the variety of options available to them to respond

to the crisis.[26] The CIA has the narrowest definition of crisis,

declaring a crisis only in those situations that threaten the collapse

of governments friendly to the U.S. or that could result in a

confrontation between the Soviet Union and the U.S. The CIA

emphasizes that immediate preventive action is necesary to preserve

the status quo in threatened countries. Phillips and Rimkunas

argue that the CIA's emphasis on "immediate preventive" actions

has contributed to some failed operations because of the short

response time.[27]

Though the three organizations have differing views of what

constitutes a crisis, they often use the same indicators for

identifying a potential crisis. Crisis-analysis documents stress

demographic trends, urbanization, and goods consumption/capita

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projections for Low Development Countries (LDC's). But the
studies reach differing conclusions on the causes of crises and
where they will occur. The Army study on Latin America gives
signficant weight to trends in urbanization and demography. It
examines these trends among several Latin American nations. The
CIA work concentrates on the emergence of political factions in
Central and South American Nations. It also examines a variety
of economic indicators. The weighing factors determined by the
indicator models used, the organization's purpose, the analyst's
background and training [28], and the type of intelligence and
statistical data provided determined the conclusions reached in
each study.[29] The data, in turn, is influenced by the organization's
world view and the methods used to analyze it.[30]

The community's view of what distinguishes a crisis from a
conflict also is blurred. Many analysts use the terms crisis and
conflict interchangeably. Some argue that because there are
different types of conflicts there is no single definition.
If conflict is defined as the actual exchange of firepower then
confronters move between crisis and conflict. Conflict can also
be viewed as a subset of crisis.

The absence of single definitions for crisis and conflict
handicaps crisis analysis. The hurdle to developing crisis
models and indicators is deciding what constitutes a crisis, and
whether the definitions can be applied across all spectrums.
There have been the Cuban missile crisis, Iranian Hostage Crisis,
Suez Canal Crisis, and the Taiwan Crisis to list a few. These
incidents, trends and events compose a broad range of international

actions, some resulting in war, others resolved through peaceful channels.

Analysis may be qualitative, quantitative, or a mix of both. Despite the plethora of diffrences among techniques and scope in crisis analysis, all models have a common purpose. First, using analytic techniques to outperform human judgment in forecasting the circumstances of future crises, and second, providing insight into crisis origins and instigators.

In this report, standard types of early warning indicators of crisis were evaluated. Demographic trends, economic indicators, and military indicators were all examined. These indicators were assessed to determine if a reliable set of crisis indicators for mid- to long-term contingencies can be established. Based on our research of existing indicators and their evaluation against crisis and non-crisis nations, no such set exists. Table #3 provides a summary of the results for all but one indicator.[31] The table highlights diversity among, rather than across, countries avoiding and experiencing conflict. Among the eighteen demographic, economic and military indicators, there is notable lack of consistency. Food consumption increased in El Salvador and Lebanon prior to their respective wars, declined in Argentina, and fluctuated in Angola. The trends for income inequality, agricultural income relative to other sectors, balance of trade, export concentration and debt diverge as well. For other indicators, such as age structure, military expenditures, and armed forces, the only observable pattern is a fluctuation between rises and declines or the absence of trends. The few indicators for which

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TABLE #3

SUMMARY TABLE OF INDICATOR ANALYSIS

DEMOGRAPHIC[1]
- TOTAL POPULATION
- URBAN POPULATION
- AGE STRUCTURE[5]
- POPULATION DENSITY
- INFANT MORTALITY

ECONOMIC[2]
- PER-CAPITA GNP
- INCOME INEQUALITY[6]
- FOOD CONSUMPTION
- TOTAL CONSUMPTION
- AGRICULTURAL INCOME
- AG. IN. RELATIVE TO OTHER SECTORS
- BALANCE OF TRADE[10]
- EXPORT REVENUE
- EXPORT CONCENTRATION IN COMMODITIES
- INTERNATIONAL DEBT

MILITARY[3,4]
- UNEMPLOYMENT
- MILITARY EXPENDITURES
- ARMED FORCES

I CRISIS:
- ANGOLA
- ARGENTINA
- EL SALVADOR
- LEBANON

II NON-CRISIS:
- COSTA RICA
- KENYA
- MEXICO
- SAUDI ARABIA

KEY:
- ↑ INCREASING TREND
- ↓ DECREASING TREND
- ↕ MIXED TREND
- ● NO TREND
- ∅ DATA NOT AVAILABLE
- ▲ HIGHLY UNEQUAL DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME
- ■ MODERATE OR LITTLE INEQUALITY IN DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME

the four crisis or four non-crisis nations are consistent, such as GNP and population growth, agree across peaceful and war-torn states as well as among their crisis/non-crisis categories. Such indicators signal Third World status, rather than susceptibility to radical change.

No attempt has been made to review each potential crisis indicator; those listed in Table #3 cover the major types of indices: demographic, economic and military. Why, though, is it not possible to deny the validity of all early warning indicators which could be used? Based on this study the unambiguous lack of clear, consistent trends in crisis/non-crisis states across every indicator evaluated casts considerable doubt on their ability to signal crises in several nations for the mid- to long-term. If there were indications of impending conflict, one would have expected observable trends across some of the categories examined.

The origins of war are diverse and multifaceted. Lebanon's Civil War is the product of polarized religious factions and mosaic society.[32] Longstanding territorial disputes between Britain and Argentina erupted into the Falklands War. A coup in Portugal forced the Portuguese to surrender its last remaining colony, Angola, where the inability of a transitional government laden with extreme factions to achieve consensus led to civil war. Historical conflict between a Salvadoran government controlled by the military and certain elements of the middle classes led to the conflict now occurring in the region.

Pronounced regional distinctions reduce the ability of the potential indicators to consistently augur crisis in the mid- to

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long-term. The use of conventional conflict indicators such as
rising unemployment and burgeoning population ignores more signi-
ficant characteristics of Third World countries such as religious
factionalism and colonial experience. Stated simply, the military
has too often viewed the conflict process from the First World,
American cultural perspective. Conventional wisdom has sought to
explain war as a product of forces that might cause crisis in our
own country or in the developed world: rapid population growth,
severe economic downturns and military buildups. Our penchant
for material well-being and fear of superpower conflict, however,
is often not shared by the Third World. LDC's know little but
dire poverty and growing populations; prosperity and abundance of
farming lands is the exception rather than the rule. Furthermore,
a large and increasing military presence is a force for muting
dissent among the underpriviledged and preserving existing power
structures rather than deterring international war. Unique
regional characteristics such as religious diversity and resentment
of colonial exploitation are more likely to bring about crisis
than an increase in already paralyzing poverty and unemployment.

The review of crisis models is primarily negative, focusing
on the significant drawbacks. This is not to assert that conflict
models are useless. Rather, there is a tendency among analysts
to search for simple answers to complex situations and to place
more confidence in analytic models, and particularly numbers,
than is appropriate. The analysis of conflict in the Third World
for the mid- to long-term does not produce "crystal ball" predic-
ctions and figures magically enabling policymakers to forecast

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future wars. The origins and interrelationships involved in the war process are too numerous and complex to model given the current state of technology. Decionmakers will simply not be able to accurately predict future conflicts or highlight early warning indicators with a substantial degree of accuracy.

SECTION IV CONCLUSIONS

The conclusions reached in this paper have broad implications
for decisionmakers attempting to foresee U.S. involvement in Third
World conflicts. They must realize that because of the dearth of
reliable tools with which to predict conflict they must be prepared
to take those military and non-military actions necessary to
defuse crises in their earliest stages. With respect to U.S. military
actions the proper organization, training and equipage must occur
to insure that this nation is prepared to assist Third World nations
in securing themselves.

With respect to crisis analysis one must understand that actions
must produce "value added" information through the combination of
human expertise, theories of conflict, empirical data, and where
used, mathematical analysis. The accuracy of crisis forecasts
summing these components must be greater than each individually if
it is to be useful in policy making situations. Predictions of
when and where future crises will erupt must be more consistent
and reliable with techniques such as factor analysis, multivariant
regression, and indicator analysis than with human judgment
alone. A crisis forecast generated by a model must be superior
to a single analyst's estimate if crisis prediction is to be a
viable tool. Such a conclusion follows similar patterns in
intelligence analysis using manual versus automated tools and
bringing highly subjective data into a sphere where objective
decisions must be made. It is precisely because of the subjective

nature of mid- to long-range crisis prediction that few if any models are available or even usable. This problem stems not from the inferiority of present crisis models, although many techniques are of questionable validity, but rather because identification of crises, an extremely complex, multifaceted phenomena, is not subject to strict laws of nature. It is difficult to predict situations two to three years in advance in socially, politically, and economically volatile regions of the world let alone five to twenty years ahead of time.

Thus, present mid- to long-term crisis models are inapplicable for the decisionmaker interested in clear-cut predictions of war and identification of early warning indicators. Nevertheless, analytic models of war are valuable. While their predictive accuracy is poor, the analytic thought process involving models orients decisionmakers to a greater understanding of the causes and factors involved in war. Questions that need to be asked include, what are the trends in this region? Who are the important social and political groups? What types of behavior do they exhibit? Are there assumptions about political beliefs or ration- ality inherent in the analysis? Examining social, political and economic trends, inventing and testing conflict theories, and logically, systematically developing implications model assumptions provide insight into the conflict process.

FOOTNOTES

1. See New Horizons II, Vol II, Alternative Strategies
   (HQ USAF, 1975); Air Force 2000 - Air Power Entering the
   21st Century (HQ USAF, 1982); AirLand Battle 2000 (HQ
   TRADOC, 1982); Strategic Requirements for the Year 2000
   (Washington, D.C., Center for Strategic and International
   Studies, 1982)

2. Brian Michael Jenkins, New Modes of Conflict (Santa Monica,
   Rand Corp., 1983) as reported in Harpers (May 1984), p. 23.

3. Harry G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy: The Vietnam War in
   Context (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S.
   Army War College, 1981)

4. William J. Taylor, Jr., The Future of Conflict - U.S.
   Interests (New York: Prager, 1983), p. xii.

5. Frank Klingberg, "Cyclical Trends in American Foreign Policy
   Moods and Their Policy Implications," in Challenges to
   America: US Foreign Policy in the 1980s, Sage International
   Yearbook of Foreign Policy Studies, Charles Kegley and
   Patrick J. McGowen eds., Vol. 4 (Beverly Hills and London:
   Sage, 1979), Also quoted in Taylor, The Future of Conflict,
   p. 35.

6. Statement by Noel C. Koch, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
   of Defense (International Security Affairs), Before the
   Special Operations Panel of the Subcommittee on Readiness,
   House Armed Services Committee, Second Session, 98th Congress
   6 Sep 84.

7. Ibid.

8. Workshop sponsored by Air University's Center of Aerospace
   Doctrine, Research and Education (CADRE) held on 22-23
   Mar 84 at Maxwell AFB, AL.

9. Harry G. Summers, Jr., "On Joint Doctrine For Low Intensity
   Conflict," paper submitted for inclusion in manuscript of
   Low Intensity Conflict and Modern Technology (Scheduled for
   publication by Air University in 1985)

10. Theodore Shackley, The Third Option, An American View of
    Counterinsurgency Operations, (New York: Reader's Digest
    Press, 1981), pp. 36-125.

11. Ibid., p. 118.

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12. Bertil Duner, "The Many-Pronged Spear: External Military Intervention in Civil Wars in the 1970s," Journal of Peace Research (Vol. 20, No. 1, 1983) p. 60.

13. Ibid., p. 70.

14. Eliot A. Cohen, "When Policy Outstrips Power," The Public Interest (Spring, 1984) pp.7-9., Also quoted by Summers, "On Joint Doctrine for Low Intensity Conflict,".

15. Ibid., p. 7-9.

16. Stephen T. Hosmer, Constraints on U.S. Military Strategies in Past Third World Conflicts (Santa Monica: Rand Corp., 1984), p. v.

17. Ibid., P. 4.

18 Mohammed Ayoob, "Security in the Third World: the worm about to turn?" International Affairs (Winter, 83/84), pp. 41-51.

19. Ibid., p. 43.

20. Ibid., p. 43.

21. The most widely recognized model for potential criis prediction is that at DATA Research, Inc. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita presents the theoretical aspects of the DRI model in his book The War Trap (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981).

22. Indications of social development, such as literacy rates, racial homgeneity, linguistic characteristics, doctors per 1000 people, and per capita energy consuptio have also been used as early sign of crisis. See: Richard E. Barringer, Patterns of Conflict, (Cambridge: MIT Press 1972). Collection of these phenomena is haphazard, and often subject to anglo perceptions of what "ought to be." Data collected is seldom done on a regular or comprehensive basis, and social development statistics prove to be no better signals of conflict than oother indicators. (For literacy rate statistics and other social development indices, see World Tables 1983-1984 (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1984) pp. 454-459. Data collection is seldom complete and the indicators precede coonflict as inconsistently as do demographic, economonic and military phenomena). Although the doctor-to-populus ratio is high in the U.S. and other developed nations, this does not imply that a low or declining ratio will indicate a heightened potential for conflict in the subject to Wild fluctuations in foreign aid. Similar arguments apply to literacy rates,

or in nations where such criteria have never existed. Political indicators are similarly difficult to quantify and validate, and are infrequently collected as well. For examples of political indicators see Richard Barringer, War: Patterns of Conflict (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1972). The tenuous nature of political indicators is discussed in Lewis Taylor and David A. Jodice, World Handbook of Political and Social indicators, 3rd Ed. Vol I. (New Haven: Yale Univveristy Press, 1983), pp. xix-xxii.

23. Many African and Middle Eastern countries lack indicators for a majority of demgraphic, economic and military phenomena.

24. See FM 100-20, "Low Intensity Warfare." In this document, definitions of crisis and conflict are not given. Rather, indicators for certain types of low intensisty conflict are discussed.

25. Warren R. Phillips and Richard V. Rimkunas, "A Cross-Agency Comparison of U.S. Crisis Perception," in To Augur Well: Early Warning Indicators in World Politics, eds. J. D. Singer and Michael Wallace, (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1979), pp. 238-241.

26. Howard H. Lenter, "The Concept of Crisis as Viewed by the United States Department of State," in International Crisis, ed. Charles F. Hermann (New York: The Free Press 1972) pp. 113-116. Both studies emphasize that the Department of State has multiple definitions of what constitues a crisis and very little agreement from department to department.

27. See Phillips and Rimkunas, "A Cross-Agency Comparison," in Singer and Wallace, pp. 238-241.

28. See Potential Crisis Indicators (U), CIA and Army Long Range Planning Estimate: Latin America/Caribbean Region (U), GRC Log, No. 158817. The CIA Potential Crisis Indicators work is published on a quarterly basis and assesses Third World Regions.

29. Army Long Range Planning: pp. 43-58

30. The infuence of the analyst and his cognitive process cannot be minimized in the assessment of intelligence data and crisis analysis. This has been a major problem in the intelligence field for a long time. Phillips and Rimkunas argue this in their article, "A Cross-Agency Caomparison," in Singer and Wallace, pp. 251-260. The Air Force has investigated this problem extensively and concluded that not only cultural background but service intelligence training also influences selection of data to be assessed, the way the data is assessed,

and how it is correlated with other data. See Leslie Lewis
at al., "Human Performance Deficiencies and Requirements in
C3I systems," (IR&D 80006201, December 1980).

31. East/ West Alliances as measured by arms transfers cannot be
summarized in trend form, due to the aggregate nature of the
data.

32. John Keegan, "Shedding Light on Lebanon," The Atlantic, No.
4 (April, 1984) p. 60.

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LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT;   NOT FULDA, NOT KOLA

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LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT:NOT FULDA,NOT KOLA

One should open this book with the understanding that the title is
less a question than a quest: once more an old warrior who still believes
in rationalization, standardization, and interoperability has charged at
a windmill of national strategy. I too am an ancient knight of the
Pentagon (albeit less long of tooth than Blowtorch Bob), and like him I
remain a true believer in the proposition that the ultimate purpose for
all armed force is control of land and people. Moreover, I hold that the
cultural forms with which Komer and other American strategists are
burdened --our several navies, our disparate air forces, our many
armies-- are but means to that end. Like Admiral Harry Train, former
SACLANT, I believe that even a very good navy is unlikely to win a war,
but that an inferior navy can lose one. Like Komer, I deplore
propensities to march boldly into the 21st Century enlightened by
concepts attuned to the technology and politics of the 19th. And I concur
that if future defense budgets will be constrained --and you can bet they
will be, Sancho-- then unbalanced multiyear commitments to shipbuilding
will inevitably cut into the annually disposable monies needed to
underwrite the strategy the U.S. ought to pursue in a world of growing
interdependency.

I need not add my feeble lance to Ambassador Komer's. But I feel
obligated to express one dissent, and then to submit an ameliorating
corollary:

Continentalist Komer, in his eagerness to get off a salvo at the new
navalists, wrote:
> ..."loss" of Cuba, Angola, Ethiopia
> or Nicaragua cannot be said to have
> undermined our' strategic position,
> however much these losses may have
> inconvenienced us(!)This is not to suggest
> that the United States should ignore
> third-area conflict, only that our
> commitments should not be allowed to
> outrun our interests, as happened in
> Vietnam. Indeed the legacy of Vietnam
> has been to make it more difficult for
> the U.S.Congress and public to contemplate
> limited interventions than a major U.S.-
> Soviet conflict(!)...

The exclamation points are mine. Angola and Ethiopia I am prepared to

accept as inconsequential, but Cuba and Nicaragua are quite different matters, for what happens in the Caribbean Basin affects our national interests directly and significantly.

Allow me to cite five such interests:

1. Support for Democracy

The United States has an interest in preserving democracy among its immediate neighbors. It does make a difference whenever societies so close geographically, culturally, and ethnically to our own are forced to depart from the norms of participatory democracy, the rule of law, and respect for basic human rights to submit to authoritarian government. It is not easy for Americans to countenance the same relationship with such a government as we maintain with those who patently share with us our trust in popular sovereignty. And this is not a matter of preference alone. It is a reflection of our appreciation that, historically, it is difficult to cite much of permanent value that authoritarian governments have achieved in this hemisphere, and easy to trace economic and social tragedy to interventions in the political process by individuals or small groups whose claim to power rested on the possession of guns. Unfortunately, in the United States today many citizens do not understand that the struggle in Central America is fomented by those who believe in force rather than franchise, in bullets rather than ballots, who strive to impose by arms their will upon resisting peoples. In this sense the present strife resembles struggles of the past. But today to that problem of generations in Latin America there has been added the threat of Communist neocolonialism.

The U.S.S.R. pours $4 billion into Cuba each year, much of this to create a huge military establishment capable of furnishing forces for Soviet clients in Africa. Nicaragua over the past three years has received over $500 millions in economic aid, and more than $500 million worth of military equipment and military construction.

During those years, under constant Cuban tutelage, the Sandinista comandantes have:

   *Renewed traditional Nicaraguan claims to the
    territory of their neighbors.

   *Supported armed subversion against Honduras and
    El Salvador.

   *Imposed universal conscription, and raised
    armed forces of over 100,000, of which half
    are kept under arms.

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*Altered fundamentally the arms balance in the
 region with an armored brigade strike force
 of over 100 tanks, as many armored personnel
 carriers, 50 large artillery pieces, numerous
 multiple rocket launchers, anti-aircraft and
 anti-tank guns, and a profusion of motor
 transport.

*Trained pilots to fly high-performance
 fighters, and allowed Cubans and other
 foreigners to install radars
 and to build air bases in Nicaragua --one
 of which, Punta Huete, will soon be capable of
 supporting both jet fighters and the heaviest
 transports in the Bloc inventory.

The long-standing unanimous rejection by the American nations of
subservience to extra-hemispheric powers, which faltered with the
conversion of Cuba into a Soviet dependency, now threatens to dissolve
altogether. It is a tragedy of our times that many in North and South
America alike seem prepared to tolerate the consolidation of a
Marxist-Leninist garrison state in Nicaragua in the image of Cuba:
dominated by Cuban cadres, militarized to a crushing burden on the
people, and economically and politically puppeted by the Soviet bloc. It
is a tragedy of our times that the victory over the clumsy oppressions of
Somoza has been betrayed, without much understandng or protest in the
United States, into the hands of a small committee of venal men who have
ignored their pledge to restore democracy to their people, and have
instead mortgaged the future of their country to Russians, Bulgarians,
East Germans, Cubans and Libyans.

The lessons of modern history are clear: once a society is dominated
by a Marxist-Leninist party, democracy is dead. The new totalitarian
governments of the world have been no more successful than the older
Fascist states in meeting the aspirations of their people in either a
material or a moral sense. The present danger is greater than that posed
by Fascism. Alexander Solzhenitsyn said it well:

*Communism is something new, unprecedented in
    world history...
Communism is unregenerate...
It stops only when it encounters a wall, even
    if it is only a wall of resolve...
It will always present a danger to mankind...*

A Marxist-Leninist state is what it professes to be: authoritarian
and totalitarian. Society is closed; dissent is not tolerated; the state
is all encompassing. And Marxists ruthlessly maintain themselves in
power. In contrast, Latin military governments have been transitory
phenomena. Both are an affliction of the body politic, but while
recovery from the latter is possible, the former are invariably fatal. In
this hemisphere, Marxism-Leninism of the Castroist variety is distinctly

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militarist,and aggressively expansionist. My countrymen who abhor, as do
I, military intervention in domestic politics, should remember that the
Sandinista Army, the largest, most elaborately armored military force in
Central America, is under direct control of the political party which
exercises exclusive power over what may accurately be called a garrison
state. It is very much against the interests of the United States that
Nicaragua continue its course toward Cubanization, and very much against
the interests of its democratic neighbors as well.

2.Prosperity

It is also contrary to the interests of the United States that the
Caribbean region remains depressed and debt-ridden. It is the fourth
largest market for U.S. goods and services--coming after the European
Economic Community, Canada, and Japan--and when the Caribbean Basin is
impoverished, workers in the United States lose jobs. The United States
has just posted a record $25 billion trade deficit. Moreover, banks in
the United States hold debts of over $130 billion from the Caribbean
region. Prosperity for the region, then, is very much an interest of the
United States.

3.Regulating Migration

Political violence is, of course, inimical to prosperity. But
instability and poverty militate against the interests of the United
States in another way: they cause migrations. One out of every two new
Americans today is an immigrant, nine of ten coming from the Caribbean
region, most from Central America, and most illegally. The present
violence in Central America has prompted at least 1,000,000 people to
immigrate to the United States. Among the American Republics today, there
are only four nations with a greater Hispanic population than the United
States; by 1990 there will be only one. Many U.S. citizens are concerned
whether their community can continue to absorb immigrants at the rate
they have been coming from the south. But in other, less fortunate
countries, refugees place unprecedented demands on social services
already overtaxed by high birthrates: Costa Rica harbors Nicaraguan and
Salvadoran refugees; Honduras has Salvadorans, Guatemalans, and
Nicaraguans; a Panamanian leader has talked about a "population bomb" in
referring to Salvadoran migrants entering his country; Mexico, Guatemala,
Belize all have uprooted people in significant numbers. It is in the
interests of the United States that these displacements be regularized by
the restoration of peace and mutual respect among the nations of the
region.

4.Control of Narcotics

The latest generation of North and South Americans share a problem
different from any in the past: narcotics trafficking. Today consumers in
the United States spend between $50 and 80 billion each year on illegal
drugs, something like $350 per capita, approximating the total annual per
capita personal income for many nations of the region. U.S. importers of
illicit drugs pay out at least twice as much as all our coffee importers.

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Over two thirds of the cannabis (marijuana) consumed in the U.S. by 20,000,000 monthly users comes from Colombia, 90% of it by sea, moved to "motherships" off-shore from more than 100 sites along 400 miles of Colombian coast. Almost all of our cocaine, some 50-70 tons per year for 4,200,000 monthly U.S. users, comes from the Andes, 72% of it by air, using some 200 airstrips in Colombia alone. Although Colombia maintains its position as the hub of the narcotics trade, recent trends indicate that Peru and Bolivia are developing their own processing and distribution capabilities, and Ecuador, which hosted the recent regional anti-narcotics conference with Vice President Bush, is deeply concerned that the infection will spread to its people as well. It used to be commonplace to hear Andean Latins blame U.S. importers and consumers for this social plague, saying that they made it exclusively a U.S. problem. But we have all learned that large-scale narcotic rings perforce attack the moral fiber of a nation, that any nation which tolerates drug traffickers in its midst commits societal suicide, and invites the suborning of democratic political institutions, the corruption of public officials, and the devastation of education for the young. Moreover, the traffickers in drugs are conduits for subversion. All the Andean republics face a nexus of internal threats, *insurgentes* and *narcotraficantes*, frequently in league one with another, which outstrip their own resources. As for the U.S., the strategies we have relied upon in the past, our picket fences of law enforcement measures against illegal importation of narcotics, are demonstrably ineffective. It is very much in the interests of the United States to curb these vicious criminals, and to cooperate with Latin nations willing to attack narcotic distribution systems at their sources. We will have to be prepared to provide more help than we have to date--much more.

5. U.S. National Security

The Caribbean Basin engages serious, still-compelling military interests of the United States: The Panama Canal remains a strategic defile which our security--as well as our treaty obligations to Panama--dictate that we defend. The sea lines of communications through the region carry half the peacetime commerce of the United States. In the event of an attack on NATO, 50% or more of the planned reinforcements of men and materiel would transit the Caribbean; in a major war in the Far East, 40% would pass through the region. In this era of electronic warfare and cruise missiles, the security of the United States is substantially impaired by the Soviet air and naval facilities, listening posts, and potential jammers in Cuba, and would be further impaired were these positioned on the continental land mass.

Concerning the present violence in Central America, I agree with the report of the National Bipartisan Commission, which reached the conclusion that *"...even in terms of the direct national security interests of the United States, this country has large stakes...They include preventing:*

 A series of developments which might require
 us to devote large resources to defend the

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*southern approaches to the United States,
thus reducing our capacity to defend
our interests elsewhere.*

**A potentially serious threat to our shipping
lanes through the Caribbean.*

**A proliferation of Marxist-Leninist states
that would increase violence, dislocation, and
political repression in the region.*

**The erosion of our power to influence events
worldwide that would flow from the perception
that we were unable to influence vital events
close to home..."*

I am keenly aware of critics who perceive that U.S. policy and presence in the region overly emphasizes military undertakings. But like the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America. I see no way of separating political and economic from security measures on behalf of our interests.

But our interests are congruent with the interests of most, if not all, nations in the region: freedom, prosperity, stability, narcotics-suppression, security. Acting alone the United States can assure none of these. What we need today as never before is a regional coalition to protect those interests. At the very least, we must together build what Soishenitsyn called a "wall of resolve".

The United States can and should contribute not only resolve, but its political leadership, its wealth, and its military power. Democracy is ascendant in Latin America, patently preferred to Marxism by most Latins. It is now time for the United States to abandon its perennial cycle of insouciance and intervention, to become involved and remain influential. The National Bipartisan Commission has recommended some $8 billion in economic and security assistance over five years. I strongly support such a commitment, but I believe we will have to go further: we must restructure our armed forces to play their proper role in protecting such an investment. General Maxwell D. Taylor wrote in 1981 that U.S. forces "must be capable of unchallenged military superiority in the Western Hemisphere and its air-sea approaches..." U.S. military superiority in the Caribbean Basin is being directly challenged. Our friends, especially Honduras and Costa Rica, are threatened with military attack; communist-sponsored subversion is rife. Hence, I want to submit a corollary to Komer's theorem:

It will not be enough for the
National Command Authorities(NCA) to
decide --as Ambassador Komer

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> suggests--between a maritime
> strategy based on large capital
> ships, and a coalition strategy
> based on alliances with
> continental powers.
>
> The NCA will have to decide how to
> deal with threats to national
> interests less conventional
> than those which might be countered
> by bombing the Kola Peninsula
> or counterattacking in the Fulda
> Gap.

Low intensity conflict, the proper name for those threats to our interests, requires different kinds of policy instruments,and especially, different kinds of armed forces than those we have readied for contingencies like the Kola or Fulda.

The Ambassador, like the maritimists he deprecates, centers his attention on a main-force war between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. which does not involve the use of nuclear weapons. I regard such a war as improbable, not only because the forces we have structured and readied are likely to deter such an event, but because Soviet options for damaging our interests and advancing theirs without recourse to conventional confrontation are so ample that the risks and costs of the latter must seem to them comparatively unremunerative.

I trust Komer's book does not signal his alliance with the emerging "go for the jugular" school of strategy which claims to be the antithesis of that which we pursued in Korea and Southeast Asia. As a historian, and as an author-editor of the so-called Pentagon Papers, I have found this revisionism without much merit. But allow me to make the point that the 19th Century theorists so frequently quoted by that school (I hasten to report that the Ambassador is blameless in this respect) were themselves certain that nations should structure forces for lesser as well as major wars. Mahan was an enthusiast for what he termed "torpedo boats", capable of waging a guerrilla war at sea. Peter Paret said of Clausewitz that his theoretical acceptance of gradations of violence was his most impressive intellectual and psychological achievement. (Cf., Clausewitz and the State, p.380). To quote the general himself:

> *Generally speaking, a military*
> *objective that matches the political*
> *object in scale will, if the latter is*
> *reduced, be reduced in proportion;*
> *this will be all the more so as the*
> *political object increases in*
> *predominance. Thus it follows that*
> *without any inconsistency wars can*
> *have all degrees of importance and*
> *intensity, ranging from a war of*

> extermination down to a simple armed
> observation...Once this influence of the
> political objective on war is admitted,
> as it must be, there is no stopping it;
> consequently we must also be willing
> to wage such minimal wars, which
> consist in merely threatening the
> enemy, with negotiations held in
> reserve..(On War,Chap.1,Chap.8)

Hence, it is classical to suggest that strategists should consider the full spectrum of war, and the force structure germane to dealing with political violence of varied intensity, risks and costs. The issues raised by Ambassador Komer demand such consideration.

Reflect for a moment on how a Soviet strategist might evaluate the events in Lebanon in recent months. While the U.S. forces there were engaged in "simple armed observation", they none the less constituted a formidible conventional presence, and a maritime presence at that. They were ejected at the cost of the lives of two fanatics, each willing to drive an explosive-laden motor vehicle against a building occupied by Americans. Moreover, since no linkage has been established with the U.S.S.R., the incidents entailed low risk. It might be logical for such a strategist to array possible uses of political violence of varying intensity against associated risk or cost, as a kind of calculus of strategic opportunity for the Soviet Union. Were he to do so, his spectrum of war might look like this:

SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT

The message for our opposition is evident: if political objectives can be achieved by recourse to low intensity conflict, that is the preferred course of action.

An analogous diagram for an American strategist, who cannot contemplate aggression, should encompass the concept of probability or likelihood. I have suggested the following construct, in which Probability (P) is plotted on the ordinate, and Intensity (I) on the abscissa --N.B., the latter reflects risks and costs as well.

PROBABILITY vs INTENSITY

Let me hasten to say that this diagram is not intended to illustrate what Ambassador Komer labels *the likelihood fallacy*. I agree with him that the United States cannot afford to structure or posture primarily for the most likely contingencies at the expense of the most critical ones, which he avers, is what the maritime school would have us do. His argument should have been that even very flexible sea power --read carrier battle group or Marine division/wing-- is unlikely to meet our needs in many Third World situations where U.S. interests are challenged today. And the same could be said of an armored division or an F-15 wing. No, the problem is that all or most of our armed forces are poorly structured, unready for their most probable missions, and that this mal-structuring constitutes, in my view, a grave strategic vulnerability.

To illustrate this last point, I drew up a list of force functions in low intensity conflict, arranged roughly in the order these might be called into play as the intensity of conflict were raised. Plotted on the *Probability-Intensity* paradiom, these look like this:

FORCE FUNCTIONS

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

In most situations involving low intensity threats, the U.S. response will be Security Assistance. Note that this function continued after the withdrawal of USMC forces from Lebanon, and that it is our mainstay in El Salvador. But what a weak reed! Encrusted with bureaucracy, encumbered by law, handled by the services as a *ho-hum*, ad hoc function for which they make few if any provisions in program, it is scarcely a deft instrument of policy. Critics of military assistance have consistently made the point that the equipment developed and procured for U.S. forces is frequently ill-suited to Third World nations, yet after four decades of experience, we persist in foreclosing the use of Department of Defense research and development funds for projects intended for foreign use. Moreover, Congress insists that grant aid recipients buy American, from service stocks. Security Assistance is highly politicized, so that seeking aid for a country with a strong domestic constituency is intrinsically different from seeking help for a Third World little-known. Many Americans, given the furor in Congress over security assistance for El Salvador, are surprised to learn that over the last ten years, that country has been voted 1.2% the amount provided Israel. Our present difficulties over the Administration's self-imposed limit on the number of American trainers in El Salvador illustrate well the constraints on the Commander-in-Chief in using funds even if they be voted. But even more important from the strategic point of view, most Security Assistance is paid out to allies as rent for

American bases --e.g.,Portugal, Spain, the Philippines-- or as incentives to lay aside enmity for a neighbor --e.g., Israel and Egypt, Greece and Turkey. When these purposes are served, precious little is left, less than 20% for Fiscal Year 1985, to deal with other problems worldwide. Latin America as a whole, for example, is allocated about 3% of the total.

INTELLIGENCE

We must have accurate intelligence to persuade Congress to provide Security Assistance, or to support other U.S. actions in low intensity conflict. Intelligence is access and influence for U.S. Ambassadors and military officers. Knowledge is literally power. Intelligence can be used as a strategic or tactical support for an ally, and our superior collection means will often be the sole recourse of a foreign government seeking to acquire an advantage in sentience over an adversary, especially if the latter employs the clandestine methods taught by the Soviets or Cubans.

But the best U.S. intelligence units are manned and equipped to collect against Soviet targets, and are often inept --especially limited by linguists-- in dealing with cultural peculiarities of Third World targets. Too, units designed to operate as part of a larger force in mid-intensity conflict are often awkwardly robust and expensive to support, politically as well as logistically, in the austere theaters of low intensity wars. This is as much true of maritime forces as of others --the day of the rust-bucket intelligence ship is long gone, and any activity which is patently USMC, now an especially attractive terrorist target, requires extra vigilance. Moreover, Army and Air Force units with missions in the Third World are often issued older, less capable, more manpower-intensive equipment, which creates problems for host nations and U.S commanders who wish to minimize the visibility and maximize the security of intelligence collectors. Very little DoD R&D has been directed at this problem, with the result that military intelligence, which could be a decisive response to low intensity threats, remains only marginally useful.

COMMUNICATIONS

Communications are sine qua non for dealing with low intensity warfare. For foreign governments under attack, access to modern communications technology can be a force multiplier. For the United States, it is essential if the plethora of U.S. government agencies in the several regional Country Teams are to be advantaged by intelligence, and are to act separately in concert with Washington, or within a region, with each other. DoD satellite relays have enabled secure voice and facsimile transmissions using portable equipment anywhere in the world. But usually U.S. embassies do not possess such equipment, and some Ambassadors actively resist its installation. Too, our better military communications equipment is reserved for "major contingencies", and often readiness for these is cited in denying requests to support low intensity conflict.

CIVIC ACTION AND PSYOPS

Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations units have all but disappeared from the active forces. The Army, which possesses most of these, now has 98% of its Civil Affairs, and 61% of its Psyops personnel in the reserve components. Active or reserves, these are conceptualy and technologically obsolescent, bypassed by the age of television. Nonetheless, the skills called for in such units are useful in prosecuting low intensity warfare: civil-military relations, and ways and means of addressing and appealing to terrorists or insurgents. While it is true that any kind of unit can and should engage in civic action and psyops, the possibility of error is such that having trained Civil Affairs and Psyops personnel on hand would be a comfort to any commander. But men and women with these skills must be prepared to deal with specific cultures. There's another rub: few units are targeted on Third World nations. For example, despite growing manpower resources among Hispanic minorities, the services have only a handful of units with personnel capable of assisting in Latin America.

MOBILITY

It has become almost axiomatic that tactical mobility is a prerequisite for low intensity conflict. Whenever a foreign government faces a low intensity threat, one of the first items for which it is likely to ask is helicopters, and helicopters are one of the first things a U.S. Ambassador is likely to offer. But as Security Assistance, U.S. military helicopters are expensive to acquire and to own. U.S. military trucks are no bargain, either. In any event, fixed wing intra-theater airlift might provide an equally important boost to mobility, but here the Security Assistance options are even fewer and more expensive --the U.S. services have no contemporary transport smaller than the C-130 HERCULES, which is for many countries too big, too expensive, and too complicated to fly and maintain. For example, the U.S. abandoned the C-7 CARIBOU short-take-off-and-land transport in favor of the more "efficient" C-130, an aircraft limited by available runways in Central America to only 20 to 30 airfields, vice the 1000 or so available for C-7's. Similarly, we seem to have forgotten that in most Third World countries, population clusters on coasts and rivers, where a "brown water" capability built around small boats and landing craft would be useful.

As for capabilities of U.S. services, our "brown water" maritime units are at minimal strength, and their equipment is outdated. The U.S. MARKET TIME experience in Southeast Asia is all but dissipated. In the air, despite the range and navigational aids provided for modern helicopters, we have seldom seen fit to equip them with fuel reserves or airborne refueling capabilities so that they could self-deploy over strategic ranges. Our structuring for wars where ports are commodious, and airfields are big and plentiful has provided redoubtable capabilities to deliver cargoes to those foreign countries which have the seaports for RO-RO and container ships, and the long runways and parking aprons to

accommodate our C-5A and C-141 behemoths. But since most Third World
nations are strapped for such facilities, getting to one of the latter is
not easy, and moving onward is even more difficult. Building ports and
dirt strips for use by C-130s is an option, but that takes time, and is
usually beyond the engineering capability of the locals. Hence, engineers
might play a crucial role in mobility, especially for intra-theater
airlift.

CONSTRUCTION

There is suprising recognition in the Third World of the value of
military engineer units, with the equipment and discipline to undertake
construction tasks in remote areas where security may be questionable, or
in a natural disaster zone, where operations by commercial contractors is
unlikely. And in any less-developed country, military engineers can dig
wells, build water distribution and flood control systems, and construct
the roads and bridges essential to economic progress. There is a
concomitant demand for U.S. expertise in organizing and training such
units. Too, given the proliferation of Soviet armor all over the world.
U.S. military engineers are in demand for counter-mobility engineering.
As far as force structure is concerned, 68% of U.S. Army engineers are in
the reserve components --a fact which calls into question less their
readiness for low intensity conflict (many are highly skilled
construction tradesmen in civil life) than their availability.

MEDICINE

There is a comparable demand for U.S. military medics. Like our
military intelligence, communications, and engineering, our military
medicine is respected, even venerated, for its sophistication. Any Third
World country which has a bloody war thrust upon it is likely to find
that its medical establishment is unequal to the challenge of providing
stabilizing treatment to soldiers when they are wounded, and evacuating
them to hospitals fast enough to save lives. El Salvador is a good
example: the mortality rate in Salvadoran hospitals is commendable, but
one out of every three soldiers wounded dies before he reaches a
hospital; mortality overall more than three times what U.S. services
would consider tolerable. Most countries have never considered seriously
the concept of a medical service corps trained and equipped for the
field. Here U.S. ideas and techniques can exert powerful leverage on
manpower. But again, 55% of U.S. Army medics are in the reserves.

LOGISTIC SUPPORT

If Third World notions of military medicine are outdated, their
approaches to logistic support are ante-deluvian. Shortsightedness,
limited managerial skills, corruption, and simple lack of organizational
know-how often produces logistics which are more shambles than system,
and lead to such dysfunctional practices as troops foraging on the
peasantry, or commanding officers being paid cash based on unverified
muster rolls. Standard field rations, bandages, batteries, boots,
uniforms, load-bearing equipment and rain gear, which often could be
manufactured within a given country from indigenously produced materials,

usually do not exist, and there is therefore no alternative to buying expensive U.S. products, or continuing with traditional makeshift means. Here again, relatively simple production and quality-assurance technology, or such inexpensive upgrades as mini-computers for material or personnel management, usually await a U.S. assist.

FIRE SUPPORT and MANEUVER

Finally, in this construct we have come to a use for naval power. To be sure, Navy Department personnel and materiel could and probably would have figured in all the activities described above. Navy intelligence collectors, small boat squadrons, SEALs, CBs and medics are active today in Central America. But not until one is addressing a situation warranting the commitment of U.S. combat forces do the CVBGs and MAFs become relevant. I understand, of course, the importance of "presence" and "showing the flag," and appreciate that a deployment of naval force can provide powerful reassurance or deterrence. But there is little evidence that carriers off the coast have much deterred guerrillas anywhere. More importantly, were the United States so to structure its forces that carriers and MAFs were all we had to send, we would have opened a whole range of unchallengeable violence to our adversaries. Force structure aside, Congressional apprehensions over "another Vietnam" reflected in the War Powers Resolution and the latest changes to the Foreign Assistance Act and the Arms Export Control Act, as Ambassador Homer points out, constrain the President's freedom of action when it comes to providing fire support and maneuver. But as it is, he labors with limitations imposed not only by the Hill, but by DoD and the services, whose strategic and structural lacunae have severely limited his options at the lower end of the spectrum of war. We need more light land and air forces, more strategically mobile, and better fitted to support other nations in defending themselves.

As the recent Grenada expedition amply demonstrated, one of the very best fire support weapon systems in the armed services is the AC-130 SPECTRE gunship --tactically flexible, precisely discriminate, powerful, and strategically mobile. But we have only a handful of such left, there having been no development of the system after 1972, when the demand fell off in Southeast Asia. A project then underway to develop a "minigunship" for Third World allies was dropped. We need to do much better.

The strategy and force structure for which I argue would allow the United States, in concert with allies, to prepare the battlefields of low intensity conflict to help counter the full range of threats that adversaries pose to our national interests. For me, the need to prepare the theater of operations in advance was one of the strategic lessons I learned in Viet Nam. In the summer of 1971 I stood on a hill overlooking the Ashau Valley in northern I Corps with General Creighton Abrams. COMUSMACV had been prompted to visit me because of my insistence that the North Vietnamese were building a road through the jungle out of Laos pointed straight toward the city of Hue. The road was being advanced at

such a pace, and trellised, ditched, and crowned with such lavish
manpower as to establish it as a project of strategic significance. My
medium artillery had blasted away enough of the camouflage to expose a
segment of the road, which is what Gen. Abrams came to see. When he asked
me what it meant, I told him that it was designed to permit rapid forward
positioning of towed artillery, and the swift introduction of truck-borne
infantry and possibly tanks. He asked when I thought such an attack might
come. I replied that my estimate was Tet (lunar New Year) 1972. He
agreed, and remarked that American officers needed to understand that the
North Vietnamese ran their force projection sequence precisely the
inverse of ours: where we stormed in with bayonets and then brought up
our fire support, and finally our combat service support, they insinuated
their logistic system first, even preparing the battlefield to the extent
of engineering it, as we were witnessing. When the battlefield was fully
prepared, and only then, would they introduce fire support. Maneuver
forces would come last. Incidentally, we were proved wrong: the attack
came not at Tet, but on Easter,1972. We had the rest of it right.   PFG
June,1984

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SECURITY ASSISTANCE: PLANNING FOR LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

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SECURITY ASSISTANCE: PLANNING FOR LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

Challenge and Response

In an article before his abrupt removal as the Chief of Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, Marshal Ogarkov wrote of the possibility of converting a "counterattack" against an enemy's vulnerable salient into a series of counterattacks against many salients and thereby overwhelming and routing the enemy. Ogarkov was ostensibly writing about military lessons learned in World War II, but the words are said to have implications for present-day politics also. The U.S. and the West have a number of military-political-economic salients around the world. Should a large number of these or even a few key areas come under attack, the U.S. would be hard pressed to confront them simultaneously at a conventional level.

The threat of widespread Soviet troublemaking becomes even more problematic when one realizes that the Soviet Union does not need to commit its own forces to prosecute the small wars that have become the hallmark of the latter half of this century. In the Middle East, Russia profits in hard currency from the arms it supplies in opposition to U.S. interest; in Latin America the illicit drug trade could obviate the need for foreign financial assistance for various left-wing insurgent groups; in Africa and South East Asia surrogate or proxy forces replace or augment Soviet forces in pursuit of Moscow's foreign policy goals.

Few crises for U.S foreign or security policy have a clear Soviet origin. The USSR has not shown itself so adroit in dealing with the Third World. On the other hand, most crises are potentially exploitable and many may never have begun without a direct or indirect Soviet role. A 1982 study by the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War college documented that out of 65 examples of crisis in the Third World, the Soviet Union exploited instability and conflict in 47 that it did not cause.

How do we meet this challenge? In purely military terms the answer would vary. Each region has its requirements. The demands of terrain, political culture, and distance from the U.S., are all crucial to what strategy and tactics would best meet the threat. I would argue that the U.S. would be best served by a strategy that aims at the indirect approach, one that if successful would not require a commitment of U.S. combat forces.

The purpose of this paper is to describe a strategy for optimizing the use of security assistance in coping with low-intensity conflicts, specifically those involving insurgency in the Third World. It does not address the doctrine and tactics necessary to win such conflicts, whether U.S. troops or local forces alone are involved. The focus is on a prior problem: how to win support in the U.S. for security assistance to threatened nations considered important to the security of the U.S.

Security assistance ideally provides these friends and allies and means to deter or defeat threats to their own security without direct U.S. combat involvement. Often in low-intensity conflicts, the military content, at least initially, is low, while the political content is high. The military content is crucial, nevertheless. Critics of military assistance in an area such as Central America, often refer to the root cause of the insurgency, which is invariably economic and political. These critics, if they offer a solution, conclude that economic assistance would take care of the problem. The difficulty with this well-intentioned position is that the leadership of an insurgency movement develops a political agenda of its own. Usually, the economic infrastructure is a key target of the insurgents. Economic assistance alone without a military shield can not be delivered. Often the military shield itself needs aid to be effective.

Another standard criticism that finds its way to the heart of security assistance is the "military-as-the-real-culprit" approach. Again, this criticism is often well-intentioned and in an untidy world, the critics can usually point to real abuses in most Third World conflict situations. These critics usually have no empathy for an overtaxed and possibly desperate Third World military, ill-equipped and ill-trained for the challenge it faces and held accountable often for economic problems that its lowest ranks share fully with the insurgents and the people who may support them. In the confused reporting usually associated with crises provoked by insurgencies, the military is sometimes charged with the crimes committed by the insurgents themselves. The military is often heavy-handed with the local populace, in any case.

U.S. security assistance is broad enough to address these critics and the real problems that their criticism reflects. The Economic Support Fund (ESF), administered by the Agency for International Development (AID) under the direction of the Department of State, can address the key economic problems in the Third World countries in which the U.S. has important national security or political interests. Often ESF, in loan or grant form, complements development programs that may already be underway. Ideally in an insurgency or pre-insurgency situation, ESF or DA should be directed at the proximate causes of discontent among disaffected citizens. A key theme of this paper is the complementarity of economic and military assistance in an integrated approach to security assistance.

Security assistance can help meet the "military-as-the-real-culprit" charge by using the International Military Education and Training Program (IMET), as well as through training given under the Foreign Military Sales Program (FMS) and Military Assistance Program grants (MAP). Through IMET the Department of Defense provides training and training support to foreign military personnel as grant assistance. Training stressing sound civil-military relations and respect for human rights can help diminish abuses in the field. Unfortunately, this is a difficult problem to overcome

in some cultures and countries with a long history of civil violence and the cult of revenge. The U.S. can avoid becoming associated with crimes committed in such situations by avoiding becoming involved at all, but this is an unacceptable alternative in areas of important national interests. In general, U.S. security assistance can help dampen the worst excesses of an undisciplined Third World army by helping create a more professional military, less likely to resort to random violence opposed by the local political leadership.

Hostility to Security Assistance

For every small war in which the United States has a direct or indirect involvement, at least two parallel struggles exist: the regional war and the bureaucratic/political "war" in the U.S. itself. The bureaucratic war, in which no lives are lost although reputations are sometimes ruined, is arguably the crucial conflict. Except for a very few scenarios involving the sudden insertion of proxy or surrogate forces, low intensity conflicts, insurgency warfare, usually take years to develop. This is both fortunate and unfortunate for U.S. policy. It is fortunate, because the strategy that I propose also takes years to develop and unfortunate because public support for U.S. involvement in these small wars is highly perishable. The successful implementation of a security assistance program requires careful planning and constancy, qualities that are difficult to achieve and maintain in the face of fractious political support.

A key problem with implementing a security assistance strategy to cope with low intensity conflict (especially where we do not have the firm base of an existing program) is the unpopularity of foreign aid in general and of military aid in particular. What is true of military aid in peacetime is especially true when that aid is intended for one side in a "nasty little war." Some people believe military aid to be immoral, others think of it as a give-away program, while many believe it to be a futile waste. Congress reflects the public's view. Even the military, at least in the middle and lower ranks, often complains that security assistance is too often a direct drain on the armed forces because of the diversion of equipment in times of crisis from U.S. units to the armed forces of Third World countries. Recent studies indicate, however that higher levels of government leaders, both civilian and military, appreciate the role that security assistance plays as one of the few effective tools available for the implementation of foreign policy. Moreover, most diversions are paid back eventually.

Currently, there are three opposing views of security assistance and foreign policy in the U.S. The first view is represented by a group, which could be termed "Cold War nationalists." This group is characterized by strong opposition to Soviet expansionism in any form, viewing opposition to this

expansionism as the chief foreign policy goal of the U.S. Cold
War nationalists recommend the use of security assistance as well
as the other tools of foreign policy including direct, if limited,
military force to achieve this primary goal. The second attitude
is held by those who could be termed "post Cold War internationalists".
This group while expressing concern for Soviet expansionism believes
that U.S. interests are best served by using other foreign policy
tools not associated with the military to confront the problems
of the Third World. The last group, which could be termed "post
Cold War nationalists," are neo-isolationists concerned primarily
with domestic affairs and the economy. While this group is gen-
erally suspicious if not hostile to the Soviet Union and communism,
it advocates a strong domestic policy as the key to strength and
is unsympathetic to a foreign policy that it sees as leading to
foreign entanglement.

Although security assistance programs can maneuver through
the shoals of these attitudes from year to year without directly
confronting them, low-intensity conflict in the Third World has a
polarizing effect, which make such maneuvers doubtful. In fact,
any prolonged U.S. effort intensifies the need not only for bipar-
tisan support but the support of conservatives and liberals
regardless of party affiliation. Such support, after all, is
nothing short of the support of the American public, which has
proven to be a sine qua non of success in American involvement,
direct or indirect, in low intensity conflicts.

The difficulties facing policymakers attempting to cope with
small wars in Third World areas, such as Central America, are many
and great, but not overwhelming. Despite all the opposition, the
current Administration has received over 90% of its annual requests
to Congress for security assistance program funding. Even in the
highly contentious case of El Salvador, Congress has granted about
80% of the Administration's request for FY 1984, and nearly the
entire request for FY 1985.

Security Assistance Planning

Security assistance can be implemented in a hurry during a
crisis, but speeding up the normal process can impair the absorp-
tion of delivered equipment and make rational choices about system
buys more difficult. Economic assistance normally can not be
absorbed on a accelerated basis and accelerated military assistance
delivery does not address the economic and social roots of an
insurgency. In addition, such deliveries may involve diversion
from U.S. units. To do the job right takes extensive planning and
long, careful implementation.

The focal point for security assistance within DoD is the
Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA). DSAA takes policy
guidance on regional issues from ISA and ISP within Defense and

overall policy direction from the Department of State, which has
ultimate authority over all foreign aid programs. The Secretary
of Defense through DSAA advises on the availability of defense
goods and services. The Director of DSAA generally delegates case
management to the Services. Other important components of the
security assistance community in Washington are the Office of
Management of the Budget and to some extent the Treasury Depart-
ment. AID is involved in the budgeting of Economic Support Funds,
which is also considered part of security assistance. Finally,
Congress allocates the funds to execute programs requiring Foreign
Military Sales Credits (FMSCR) or military grant aid (MAP or IMET).
Two readily apparent phenomena result from this complex arrange-
ment. The first is that the process of planning, implementing and
managing U.S. security assistance is a bureaucratic black box to
many who do not understand it, let alone appreciate what it can
and has accomplished. The second result of this black box is that
the overall program is discussed and coordinated throughout the
Administration and in the end most interested parties to foreign
policy and national security have had some input.

Linear ideal planning for security assistance is probably
impossible in the real world. Rational models would have at least
the following stages:

1. Determination of national strategy.
2. Division of strategy into regional strategies.
3. Identification of countries critical to strategies.
4. Determination of country military and economic needs.
5. Computation of required levels of financial assistance.
6. Compilation of country plans into a budget.
7. Submission of budget to Congress with strategic justifi-
    cation.
8. Congressional allocation of funds based on successful
    strategic and fiscal argumentation.

To some extent these components do exist, but the adjustments
made for the fiscal and political realities, including dealing
with countries, may make the execution of some of these steps less
than ideal. Despite the problems invloved in every stage, let us
examine the above model as it could apply to planning for low
intensity conflict in the mythological Republic of Strategistan,
which is mixed in a low intensity conflict involving an ambiguous
insurgency campaign, i.e., one in which the affiliation of the
insurgents is unclear, while at least some of the imperfections
they claim to be opposing in the incumbent government are undeniable.

In our ideal model the process of aiding Strategistan is
fairly simple if somewhat lengthy. The model assumes that the
national strategy is fairly clear and universally supported within
the bureaucracy, assumes that we know exactly where Strategistan
ranks in national priorities and that this ranking is somehow
fixed; assumes that the threat has been identified and after

extensive consultations with the Strategistan a rational procurement plan is developed, financing arranged, and resources are identified, obtained, and delivered.

The real world is infinitely more complex. Strategy can never envisage all minor contingencies. Intelligence information can never be complete. The decisionmaking apparatus in Strategistan may be incapable of relating or relating well to the American decision and planning process. Equipment is expensive and complicated. Lead times for equipment may create an implementation and delivery process that would resemble a doctor telling a patient that he can not deliver the needed medicine until the patient will be cured or dead already. Strategistan's problem may not catch the public attention necessary to energize a security assistance program for it--it may be too small, too unimportant, its threat too remote. On the other hand, the U.S. and Strategistan together may proceed ideally through all the steps necessary to implementing a rational security assistance program, but falter in the Congressional presentation stage because of the ambiguities associated with the insurgency.

The determination of country needs is critical to proceeding beyond the strategy stage. This planning can not be done in Washington or in the headquarters of a Unified Command. Viable planning must include joint planning. Such planning must be detailed and patient. Progress at first will be slow with misunderstandings on both sides. On our side the misunderstandings will probably arise because we tend to expect others to react to our cultural signals, or worse expect others to know how to plan in our way. Others misunderstand us for the same reasons and occasionally because they have had experiences with other outside supporters, whose governmental procedures are different from ours.

Perhaps, the greatest reason for joint military planning is the need to make defense procurement decisions based both on funding limitations and on local conditions and local constraints, which may be misinterpreted or ignored in a plan developed solely in the U.S. We may want a country to change its strategy and tactics, but we will not succeed without beginning with a thorough exploration of the current strategy and thinking of that country. This can not be accomplished in a few meetings, but must be developed over years. The strategic dialogue must be pursued week by week at the country team level, although regular Joint Military Commission meetings (or their equivalent) have a galvanizing effect on planning and coordination on both sides.

Continuous bilateral strategic and defense procurement dialogue benefits both the U.S. and the foreign nation. The foreign nation enhances its ability to defend its territory, promote stability, and lobby for what it conceives to be sensible defense decisions. The U.S. may benefit by achieving greater influence

through a stronger, more personal relationship, possible access to facilities, promotion of force cooperation, and perhaps regional cooperation with U.S. objectives. Constant dialogue also helps both sides choose equipment suitable to needs within the financial realities of the individual case. Joint planning also helps with the problems of protracted lead times by anticipating needs and avoiding the need for diversions from U.S. forces.

In-country planning in most instances will be accomplished by the Security Assistance Office (SAO). The SAO, assisted by MTTs, TATs, and TAFTs, is best able to advise on the absorption of existing equipment and such areas as manpower, training, main-tenance and supply. The SAO also should work with the country to select new projects, which are consonant with the stage of overall modernization of the country's armed forces. New projects may be geared to simple replacement, expansion and achieving new capabi-lities, or helping a mature force improve its operations. In some cases, the SAO will make recommendations that influence the deve-lopment of force structure. The SAO's recommendations on these matters are captured in the Annual Integrated Assessment of Security Assistance (AIASA), which forms the basis of planning country programs and the security assistance budget. These interagency discussions ultimately result in a budget request and Congressional presentations in some form or other.

For many countries, planning with the U.S. means the develop-ment of a five-year plan. This plan may be the first such plan the country has produced. Great initial problems and a myriad of misunderstandings are inevitable. Typically, the initial input to a five-year plan consists of a massive wishlist. Many people are against the development of five-year plans because they may raise country expectations (despite all disclaimers U.S. officials make) that the U.S. will fund or finance the entire program. Critics claim that five-year plans cause more problems than they solve, creating disenchantment instead of mutual understanding.

A good case for long range planning can be made despite these problems. Five-year plans allow countries to develop an appre-ciation for lead times and the limits of financing. In short, they force a country to develop a planning apparatus to deal with the American system. There is a difference between countries that have dealt with the U.S. over a protracted period and those that have not. Planning in the U.S. system requires a degree of staffing sophistication and coordination among governmental ele-ments that is unusual in a Third World nation and difficult to achieve even in the U.S.

Countries with sophisticated planning have instruments for close coordination between the Ministries of Defense and Finance. They are able to distinguish between funding needed for support

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
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS
MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART

and sustainment of existing forces and the needs for modernization. Further, lead times are taken into account and the need for training and the rationalization of the logistics system is recognized. New procurements are made on the basis of strategic and tactical needs rather than parade-mentality prestige. Sophisticated planning is flexible, capable of prioritizing to allow for changes in available financing by substitution of sensible alternative procurement.

Some Third World count.ies have approached this high level of sophistication. Some are still at the primitive level where the wishlist mentality predominates. Most, of course, inhabit the middle ranges of sophistication.

One of the clear collateral advantages of sophisticated five-year plan, in addition to the obvious military advantage of rational modernization, is the clarity with which one can justify a nation's military requirements to Congress. In some cases a five-year plan may not be possible, especially early in the bilateral military relationship and where the U.S. cannot project budget requests for that country beyond the present year. But, even a short range plan that is carefully programmed can represent a rational "presentable" approach to the intractable problems often associated with low intensity conflicts.

Congressional Approval: El Salvador

Congressional suspicions and in some cases overt hostility to security assistance is such a daily fact of life that it often obscures the helpful role Congress plays in performing its duty. Few cases have generated so much initial opposition as security assistance to El Salvador, yet the Administration received almost 80% of the funding requested for FY84, although achieving this result required one continuing resolution, one supplemental request, and one emergency supplemental request. A more modest figure for FY 1985 was approved easily in the CR. No single factor determined the outcome, but a well-thought-out procurement plan which is not capriciously changed, constant brief-ings, and responses to serious Congressional concerns must be considered a necessary part of the successful campaign.

It is useful to review how the El Salvador case was presented to illustrate two key points: 1) Congress can and should be actively engaged; 2) the process can actually enhance the military effort. Congress serves for the American people, and any successful prosecution of a limited war in the American system, either through security assistance or with direct U.S. combat involvement requires Congressional support.

The issues and arguments concerning El Salvador are complex, but the history of vocal Congressional opposition is fairly clear. In the July-August period of 1984, additional funding for security

assistance for El Salvador was in serious doubt. Conventional
wisdom both inside and outside government advised that any attempt
to convince Congress to accede to the Administration's proposal
would be futile. The Administration developed a plan and a set of
arguments and proceeded with a series of formal and informal brief-
ings.

The problem of funding was addressed on a regional basis and
supplemental funding for FY 1984 and the annual request for FY 1985
were treated together. These requests were originally submitted
to Congress in February of 1984 on the basis of the Report of the
National Bipartisan Commission on Central America, better known as
the Kissinger commission. The Administration's emphasis in late
summer was on the FY 1984 supplemental request, because time was
running out on the fiscal year and the FY 1985 program, which was
based on an integrated procurement plan, depended on funding the
level requested for FY 1984.

The key themes of the Administration's argument responded to
much of the criticism directed at U.S. foreign and security policy
in Central America. Economic assistance is the largest component
of the U.S. regional assistance program. In FY 1984 the ratio of
requested economic to military assistance was 2/1, but for FY 1985
the ratio had increased to 4/1. A synergism exists between econo-
mic and military assistance. Naturally, El Salvador has the
greatest military requirements and accounted for about two-thirds
of the FY 1984 supplemental request for military assistance. Of
the $400M regional request for supplemental economic assistance for
FY 1984 about three-fourths was for ESF. Other economic and develop-
ment programs aimed at improving food supply, education, health,
social services and private agricultural needs. The ESF portion
addressed such basic economic needs as balance of payments,
infrastructure, stimulation of exports and export industries and
economic stabilization in general.

The military portion of security assistance for El Salvador
addressed the traditional concerns of an armed forces tasked with
a counterinsurgency mission: mobility, supplies, training,
infrastructure and fire support. The Administration's main argu-
ment was that the ESAF needed the capability to sweep areas for
guerrillas, protect crop planting and harvests and allow schools
to remain open while providing an atmosphere of security. All of
this is in support of democracy, a fact attested to by the free
elections that brought Duarte to power, a man Congess grew to
respect.

The effort was successful in Washington and in the field.
The situation is fragile in both places and the future is far from
assured, but optimism is at least possible. Elsewhere in Central
America success of U.S. security assistance may never be noticed.

No newspaper will trumpet a headline in 1990 declaring that stability and incipient prosperity have broken out in the region. But The Economist of 22 December 1984 did juxtapose the following two statements about El Salvador.

First in 1980:

"El Salvador was on the brink of an all-out war between extremes of right and left, which seemed likely to end in a guerrilla victory."

Then in the beginning of 1985:

"In El Salvador, under the threat of a withdrawal of American aid, the army held a not-too-messy election in 1982. The assembly thus elected drafted the constitution under which demonstrably-pretty-clean presidential and parliamentary elections were held last spring...The Salvadorean army, after a crash programme of American training, gradually became more efficient, keeping the guerrillas from striking into the big cities, although failing to chase them out of their mountain strongholds."

The Economist emphasized the fragility of the gains in El Salvador as well as the successes in other parts of Central America. The subtitle of the article that I have quoted tells the story however: "Sea-changes happen slowly; but compare the start of 1985 on that bloody isthmus with how things were in 1980."

The point here is not that one program has been a success. All of it could go sour tomorrow and there are other programs that are not going so well. Rather, the point is that Congress played a vital role in what happened in this program. Negotiating with a foreign country, even a weak one, is a terribly difficult endeavor. In this day and age threats and overt pressure do not often bear results. The robust independence of Congress, however, ensures that the negotiators have an objective standard to use in its discussions. Congress acts in advance as the conscience of the American people. Whether it is misinformed or biased is irrelevant. The people, by and large, will probably follow their representatives' lead.

Properly approached, the relationship between the Administration, Congress, and foreign governments is potentially a vitally healthy and dynamic one. Congress pronounces its views, which have the power of the pursestrings behind them. The Administration reflects these views to the foreign nation and urges its government to accommodate these views, and finally the Administration comes back to Congress to report on how its views have been addressed. The result of this synergism is that the course of policy tends to track with the public view. Even when Congress is implacably

opposed to an Administration's policy, the Administration can take its case to the people. If the people respond favorably, Congress will back off. If the people are not convinced by the arguments, a wise Administration has heard a verdict of sorts. It is important to emphasize that I am speaking about security assistance only. Operations, because of the need for secrecy, may demand a totally different approach. Security assistance can never remain a secret long enough to achieve final results.

By now the importance of getting to Congress early with our best arguments should be clear. Silence accompanied by leaks and the inevitable rumors breeds only suspicion. Early discussions with Congress may obviate the need for a defensive posture later. These discussions should be in closed hearings, formal or informal, but complete. Furthermore, any Administration must go into such discussions with the idea that it might be asked to change certain aspects of its plan.

A final aspect of this approach is the possibility of dealing with a drastic downturn in events. If we need to commit our own combat forces to an area under the conditions enunciated recently by Secretary Weinberger, it would be advantageous to be able to argue and to have Congress realize that every step short of that ultimate commitment had been taken.

Conclusion

The achievement of support for the security assistance program for El Salvador is a dramatic example of the well coordinated and persistent efforts of several major Departments of the Executive Branch. Mostly, the business of security assistance is accomplished on a more routine basis. In this case a major effort to achieve Congressional support was undertaken because of the concern that Congressional antipathy towards the Administration's Central American policies would result in the disastrous curtailment of security assistance to that region. Despite the unique character of this effort, however, several generally applicable lessons can be learned from it.

Although conventional wisdom proclaims that all decisions concerning foreign aid on the Hill are politically motivated, Congress will not knowingly work against U.S. interests. Surprisingly greater consensus exists about those interests than is often recognized. Many of the most serious disagreements in the U.S. system are actually about means and not ends. Hostility to security assistance can be overcome in most instances, but only when the case is made in a clear, complete, and forceful fashion. The great corrosive is suspicion and the one way to curtail suspicion is early and continuing engagement of key Congressmen, Senators, and staff.

Security and economic assistance are not dichotomous, especially in low intensity conflict situations. Careful planning is required to strike the proper balance between the two. This apportionment is something that we occasionally do well in high priority cases, but we probably need to enhance our efforts in more routine cases, if only to prevent them from becoming high priority.

Careful planning with the recipients of security assistance is essential, not only to the success of the program in the field, but even to the success of the effort to obtain funding for the program in the first place. Such planning is almost always most difficult where most needed. Countries fully capable of sophisticated planning can prevent low-intensity conflict from becoming a crisis without special attention from the U.S. Sophisticated planning considers not only military requirements, but also the availability of funding and/or financing. Because of the nature of our system, moreover, lead times and absorption rates for sophisticated equipment must be factored into any long range planning. Where possible five-year plans should be developed despite the difficulties involved.

Political realities in Washington must be considered as well the realities in the field. Congressional requirements and concerns, considered during planning, do not become overwhelming problems when the programs are presented to Congress.

After presenting an optimistic outline for achieving a viable security assistance program for a country faced with an active insurgency, I would caution that grave problems still confront security assistance programs in areas of Third World conflict. Taking an early reading of the feasibility of achieving a fully funded program, however, may help us decide which cases are truly vital to U.S. interests and which are merely desirable. In areas of vital interest we must be able to judge when security assistance is not enough and more direct involvement of U.S. forces is necessary. The proper use of security assistance should reduce the occasions of this more serious requirement.

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